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Competition and choice in health care are viewed as solutions to some of the most 
pressing issues in health care in United States.  In this set of thesis papers, we use several 
approaches to defining health insurance market structure to examine whether consumers 
in more competitive markets report having better experiences with their health plan than 
consumers in less competitive markets.   
The first paper describes methods for developing measures of competition in the 
hospital and health insurance industries, presenting an empirical analysis of several 
approaches.  The paper also describes trends in hospital and health insurance 
concentration and the relative concentration of insurance to hospital markets from 2003-
2009.  The paper concludes that both hospital and health insurance markets on average 
have remained highly concentrated from 2003-2009.  On average, there was no 
significant change in the average HHI though some markets experienced greater change.  
The paper also finds that in the average metropolitan statistical area (MSA), the health 
insurance market is more concentrated than the hospital market.   
The second paper examines the relationship between market competition and 
consumers’ experiences with their plans, access to care, and the percentage of spending 
for selected medical services paid out-of-pocket.  The paper explores this relationship in 
two different settings, private group insurance and Medicaid managed care.  This paper 
finds that in general, there is little to no significant association between the level of 
insurance concentration and consumers’ access to care or experience with their health 
plan.   
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The third paper builds upon the second paper by focusing on whether a consumer 
directly has a choice of health plans.  The paper concludes that individuals who have a 
choice in health plans at their current main job do report slightly better access to care on 
most measures and higher satisfaction and fewer administrative problems with their 
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Competition and choice in health care are often touted as solutions to some of the 
most pressing issues in health care in United States, including rising costs, inefficient 
delivery systems, and suboptimal quality.  While these policy solutions follow from 
conventional economic theory, there is little published research that examines whether 
consumers in more competitive markets actually report having better experiences with 
their health plan than consumers in less competitive markets.  In this set of thesis papers, 
we use several approaches to defining health insurance market structure including the 
level of health insurance competition, the relative balance of insurance concentration to 
hospital market concentration, and whether an individual consumer has a choice in health 
plans.  While macro-level considerations such as the impact of market structure on prices 
and volume of services are important, these papers focus on the consumer’s perspective.  
Findings from these papers are relevant for understanding dynamics of the current health 
insurance systems and will help policy makers anticipate some of the issues involved 
with the implementation of new health insurance marketplaces as part of the Affordable 
Care Act (ACA).  
According to economic theory, price competition in health care is desirable 
because it can lead to lower costs for consumers, creating broader access to services and 
products.  Non-price competition can lead to improved quality and enhanced innovation 
(U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission 2004).  As markets become 
more monopolistic, consumer welfare is compromised because the monopolist can charge 
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higher prices and reap more profit than under competitive market dynamics.  Health 
insurers are both sellers of insurance as well as purchasers of medical services from 
hospitals, doctors, and other health providers, and so concentrated insurance markets can 
raise both monopolistic and monopsonistic concerns.   
In recent years, the level of merger activity in the hospital sector has increased 
and the industry has grown more concentrated over time (Kirchoff 2013).  Concentration 
in hospital markets raises concerns about the impact on costs and quality (Vogt, Town 
and Williams 2006).  Hospital costs represent about a third of every private premium 
dollar, making the negotiation between insurers and hospitals an important determinant of 
the overall premium cost.   
There are several possible scenarios that could occur when assessing the balance 
of power between insurers and hospitals in this negotiation.  Premiums are expected to be 
lowest (and quality highest) in markets that are competitive in both the hospital and 
insurance industries, given similar population demographics and utilization patterns.  
Hospitals must deliver high quality at competitive prices in order to be included in 
networks, and insurers must pass these lower costs onto consumers in order to compete 
for market share.  At extreme levels of either hospital or insurer concentration, premiums 
are expected to rise (and quality decrease).  In a concentrated hospital market, hospitals 
can demand high reimbursement rates without fear of being excluded from a network, 
and insurers have greater leeway to demand high premiums from consumers without 
losing market share. However, greater concentration in the health insurance market could 
have the “monopoly busting” effect of eliciting lower prices or higher quality from 
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hospitals relative to markets with the same level of hospital concentration and lower 
insurance market concentration.  When both markets are concentrated (bilateral 
monopolies or oligopolies), evidence points to a reduction in hospital prices and 
increased access, though the bargaining game between insurers and hospitals makes the 
outcome less predictable (Bates and Santerre 2008, Moriya, Vogt and Gaynor 2010).   
Background 
This thesis examines the level of market structure in health care and its associated 
impacts from the consumer perspective, including both those with private insurance and 
those enrolled in Medicaid managed care.  In the background section of this introduction, 
we provide additional information about these two markets to support methodological 
approaches and interpretation of findings. 
Private Insurance Background 
The majority of Americans receive their health coverage from their employer. In 
2008, 63% of adults age 19-64 (117 million) and 59% of children (46 million) reported 
having employer sponsored coverage (Holahan and Cook 2009).  Most private firms 
(58%) offer only one plan option to employees, but this varies by firm size (Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality 2013) with larger firms offering more options.  In 2012, 
65% of private sector employees work in firms that offer two or more health plans, a 
percentage that has not changed statistically since 2008, but is significantly higher than 
the percentage (43.5%)  in 1996 (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 2013).  
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Some employees may not be offered coverage at these firms based on part-time status or 
other eligibility restrictions. 
On average, in 2009 employees paid 17% of the premium for single coverage and 
27% for family coverage (Kaiser Family Foundation/Health Research and Education 
Trust 2010).  Employers offer coverage to their employees through commercial insurance 
plans, employer’s self-insured plans, and combinations of the two (such as third-party 
administrators), and the insurance regulatory framework depends on the type of coverage 
offered.  For example, self-insured plans are largely exempt from state insurance 
mandates because of legislation (ERISA)  (U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade 
Commission 2004), and so there is some question as to  whether these plans should be 
considered in the same market as fully insured plans subject to state regulations.  
Research suggests that employers are responsive to quality information about health 
plans and select offerings that have high quality scores for their employees (Chernew, et 
al. 2004).  Another 5% or 14 million nonelderly people have individual coverage.  These 
individuals must pay the full insurance premium and can select from any non-group plan 
available in the local market. These often have significant restrictions. 
Beginning in October 2013, consumers will be able to enroll in health insurance 
plans offered through new health care marketplaces established as part of the Affordable 
Care Act (ACA).  The Congressional Budget Office estimates that about 7 million people 
will enroll in coverage through the marketplace in 2014, increasing to 24 million by 2023 
(Congressional Budget Office 2013).   Most individuals purchasing coverage through the 
marketplace will receive a financial subsidy, which are offered at a sliding scale from 
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100-400% of the federal poverty guidelines.  The regulation and structure of the 
marketplaces can be state-based, federally facilitated, or partnership models.  In the 
marketplace, consumers can choose among Qualified Health Plans (QHPs) at four levels 
that differ in terms of cost-sharing and premiums.  All plans will cover the Essential 
Health Benefits in that state, and some plans may cover additional benefits (see 
“Standards Related to Essential Health Benefits, Actuarial Value, and Accreditation Final Rule”, 
FR 78(34) 12834-72).  The marketplace will provide information on plan benefits, prices, 
quality, and other factors in standard plain language to facilitate consumers’ decision 
making process.  The health care marketplaces will bring new avenues for health 
insurance competition and choice in health plans to consumers in the individual and small 
group markets.  The findings from this research can inform policymakers regulating the 
marketplace, while it will also be important to assess the effect of competition and choice 
on consumers in this new setting. 
Background on Medicaid Managed Care 
The second paper in this thesis research includes an analysis of health insurance 
competition in Medicaid Managed Care.  Medicaid is a program that provides health 
insurance coverage to certain qualified low-income individuals including children, 
pregnant women, parents, adults with disabilities, and certain Medicare beneficiaries.  In 
2007, Medicaid covered 58 million people or about one in five in the total US population.   
Medicaid is administered by the states within broad federal guidelines, and the financing 
of the program is shared between states and the federal government.  In fiscal year 2008, 
Medicaid spending totaled $338 billion (State Health Facts 2010). 
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By June 2008, about 71% of Medicaid beneficiaries or 33.4 million individuals 
received some or all of their health care services through managed care plans.  In 2007-
08, there were major expansions of Medicaid managed care in several states (Kaiser 
Family Foundation 2010)  Managed care is the dominant delivery system for Medicaid 
beneficiaries in most states, with nearly all states (46) having more than half their 
Medicaid population enrolled in managed care.  Medicaid managed care plans primarily 
cover families and children; more costly Medicaid beneficiaries such as the aged and 
people with disabilities tend to remain in fee-for-service Medicaid.  Nearly all states 
operate their SCHIP program under a managed care arrangement. 
 The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA)  gave states the authority to mandate 
enrollment in managed care without a waiver; states have had the ability to allow 
beneficiaries to enroll on a voluntary basis for longer and could mandate enrollment 
through a federal 1915b or 1115 waiver prior to the BBA.   There are two primary forms 
of Medicaid managed care: risk-based, where an MCO is paid a monthly fee per enrollee 
for fixed set of services, and primary care case management (PCCM), wherein the 
beneficiary’s primary care provider is paid a small case management fee to help 
coordinate care.  A smaller share of Medicaid beneficiaries are in PCCM relative to risk-
based plans, though it is more common in rural areas.  In 2009, 36 states used HEDIS or 
similar measures and 34 states used CAHPS to monitor quality in MCOs, and 29 states 
reported they published data on plan performance to help Medicaid enrollees choose a 
health plan (Smith, et al. 2009).   A 2007 study of publicly reported performance on 8 
HEDIS measures suggests Medicaid managed care plan characteristics are associated 
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with improved quality; better performers were non-profit managed care plans,  provider-
owned, and larger plans relative to for profit plans, other Medicaid dominated plans, and 
smaller plans respectively.  No difference was found between commercial plans and 
Medicaid –dominated plans (Felt-Lisk, Barrett and Nyman 2007).  The evidence is mixed 
as to whether Medicaid beneficiaries actually use publicly reported CAHPS scores to 
choose health plans.  Farley and colleagues found no difference in plan choices among 
Medicaid beneficiaries who did and did not receive CAHPS information, whereas more 
recent research by Liu and others (2009) found a positive relationship between plan 
choice and CAHPS scores among Medicaid beneficiaries in New York State (Farley, et 
al. 1999, Liu, et al. 2009).    
 The state has an important role in establishing the market for MMC products by 
determining relevant geographic areas and covered populations in addition to granting 
contracts to plans.  Research suggests that states have been able to attract plans that are 
committed to serving the Medicaid population, though a few states have had difficulty 
finding an adequate number of plans to serve beneficiaries (Gold, et al. 2003, Holahan 
and Suzuki 2003, Howell, Palmer and Adams 2012).  The capitation rate is an important 
determinant of plan participation; about half of states use administrative pricing based on 
risk-adjusted FFS spending to set rates, and only 9 states in 2001 used competitive 
bidding (Holahan and Suzuki 2003).  A more recent review of Medicaid ad SCHIP 
programs in 20 states from 2001-2010 by Howell, Palmer, and Adams found greater use 
of competitive contracting in either their Medicaid or SCHIP programs among the states, 
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with 17 using competitive bidding in all or part of the state and 7 using an any-willing-
provider contracting methodology (Howell, Palmer and Adams 2012).   
Numerous studies have examined the impact of Medicaid managed care on access 
to care for beneficiaries relative to fee for service.  In general, the studies have found that 
managed care increases the likelihood of having a usual source of care (USC), reduces 
reliance on the ER, and reduces rates of referrals to specialists for adults  (Coughlin and 
Long 2000, Garrett, Davidoff and Yemane 2003, Garrett and Zuckerman 2005), although 
this relationship varies depending on the length of Medicaid enrollment (Lo Sasso and 
Freund 2000). The findings for physician visits, inpatient visits, access problems, and 
preventive care are less consistent in the literature (Garrett, Davidoff and Yemane 2003).  
Additionally, MMC enrollees report shorter travel times to the USC and shorter wait 
times once there to see their provider (Sisk 1998, Coughlin and Long 2000). Adults with 
disabilities enrolled in MMC reported higher rates of inpatient admissions for 
ambulatory-care sensitive conditions and higher ER visits (Lo Sasso and Freund 2000), 
while other research found that disabled beneficiaries living in counties with MMC 
reported improved access (Coughlin, Long and Graves 2009).   
Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework for this study is guided by the Andersen-Aday model for 
access to care (Aday and Andersen 1974, Andersen and Aday 1978, Andersen, 
McCutcheon, et al. 1983) and economic theory of competition (Appendix A).  The 
Andersen-Aday framework integrates important, broad factors that relate to the outcomes 
of interest-access and consumer satisfaction—while the economic theory guides study of 
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the key issue, namely how the market power of insurance companies’ and its balance 
with hospital market power may impact access and satisfaction. 
The access framework has several major components: health policy, delivery 
system and population characteristics, health care utilization, and consumer satisfaction.  
For the study of Medicaid managed care, the access and quality dimensions included 
follow from requirements for Medicaid MCOs set forth in the Balanced Budget Act of 
1997.  Through the CMS regulations released in accordance with this act, Medicaid 
MCOs are required to provide and ongoing source of care for enrollees, to consider the 
expected utilization of services, to provide timely access to services, and to consider the 
geographic location and accessibility of providers when developing networks (U.S. 
Government Accountability Office 2004).   
Health policy includes issues such as financing and regulations and is the most 
distal factor, influencing delivery system characteristics and population characteristics.  
In the case of health insurance competition, antitrust regulatory policy, insurance 
regulatory policy, and state Medicaid policy are relevant distal policy factors.  States 
determine Medicaid managed care offerings on a county level, deciding which population 
groups (children, people with disabilities, etc.) are to be included, whether enrollment is 
voluntary or mandatory, the delivery mechanism (fully capitated managed care versus 
PCCM), and the specific health plans that will be available to beneficiaries.   
Delivery system characteristics can also influence access to care because these 
factors represent the availability of care in an area, or potential access in Andersen’s 
10 
 
framework.  The number of doctors, specialists, health clinics, and hospital beds per 
capita are linked to utilization and access.  
Characteristics of the population also influence access to care and consumer 
satisfaction with health care.  For example, the need for health services—often described 
by measures of health status—is clearly related to the amount of healthcare a consumer 
uses.   Other individual-level factors predispose individuals to have greater need for 
health care or access challenges: age, sex, race/ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and 
residence.   
Recent research using the Andersen-Aday framework to examine access for adults 
with disabilities in MMC controlled for the following individual-level factors available in 
MEPS: age, sex, race/ethnicity, highest degree earned, residence in a metropolitan 
statistical area, annual income, marital status, family size, employment in the past 12 
months, and self-reported physical and mental health and activity limitations (Burns 
2009). This research also took into account local-level factors known to influence access 
to care: poverty rate, average per capita income, median household income, population 
density, HMO penetration rate, physicians per 10,000 residents, and the percent of 
households with an SSI beneficiary.  In her analysis, Burns included an indicator for the 
presence of  Medicaid prepaid health plan in the county, which can provide “carved out” 
services, and dummy variables to account for residual state-level factors that might 
influence MCO enrollment or health care access such as Medicaid program 
characteristics or socioeconomic status. 
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In the Andersen-Aday framework, one important enabling factor that affects 
access to care is health insurance coverage.  Building upon previous reports, the IOM in 
2009 summarized research published in 2002-2008 and found there to be strong evidence 
that health insurance coverage impacts access to care (Institute of Medicine 2009).  The 
IOM report states, “If health insurance affects individuals’ health, functioning, and 
quality of life, it is by enabling access to effective health care services, including 
preventive services, early detection of disease, diagnostic services, treatment, 
rehabilitation, and palliative care.”  It is plausible that insurance coverage in different 
contexts may differentially enable access to beneficial services.    
Turning to the crux of the framework and the economic theory behind it, the 
context of insurance coverage (i.e. market competition and bargaining power) can shape 
the enabling benefits of insurance coverage and therefore alter health access and 
consumer satisfaction.  Notably, models of competition in health care may produce 
results that deviate from those predicted by standard theory since “competition in health 
markets is complex because of asymmetric information, the interrelationship between 
insurance and physician and hospital markets, and the role of employers and government 
in financing health care.” (Scanlon, Chernew, et al. 2006). Thus, analysis of health 
insurance competition and its impact on consumers can yield important information about 
how this market differs from expected theory.   
 Health insurers in a concentrated market can exhibit behavior tending toward both 
monopoly and monopsony.  As firms selling a product to employers and individuals, 
there is evidence that insurers in concentrated markets can demand higher premiums for 
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their products in order to maximize profit.  Research findings have generally found that 
increased competition results in lower health insurance premiums (Wholey, Feldman and 
Christianson 1995, Pizer and Frakt 2002).  
Profit is total revenue minus total costs, and the benefits that a plan provides to 
consumers represent costs in the form of spending on medical claims and administrative 
costs like marketing and customer service.  The following equation demonstrates this 
concept: 
Equation 1:                                                            
Here, the term “premiums” is the total revenue collected from individuals and 
employers who purchase coverage from the insurer i in market m in year t. The term 
Claims is the total money paid to providers for the insurer’s enrollees in that market; it is 
the number of claims multiplied by the price of each claim. The term “administration” 
represents the total amount spent on administrative costs in the market. This includes 
both annual administrative costs such as claims processing, customer service, and 
marketing.  Thus, insurers may also seek to maximize profit by providing fewer services 
to consumers.  Quality, like price, could also be influenced by market characteristics 
because quality is also “an endogenous outcome of the competitive process” (Scanlon 
2008).  In markets where prices are regulated (such as in Medicaid), insurers may 
compete primarily on quality in order to gain or maintain market share whereas when 
prices are not determined, insurers could compete both on price and quality (Gaynor 
2006).     
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Consumers experience the “benefits” of a health plan in several ways—the 
medical benefits of covered services, cost sharing requirements, the extent and quality of 
provider networks for covered services, as well as the quality of the health plan’s 
customer service.  Research suggests that an individual’s enrollment choice among 
available health plans is shaped by both insurance characteristics (premiums, out-of-
pocket costs, and extent of covered benefits) and delivery system characteristics (Berki 
and Ashcraft 1980).  Available plans are generally determined by employers or state 
Medicaid offices, but some with non-group coverage purchase plans directly in the 
marketplace.  Consumers use multidimensional evaluative criteria of cost, freedom, 
access, and quality to choose plans (Thomas 2004).  Thus, insurers can modify internal 
characteristics like premiums, cost-sharing, and customer service (reflecting cost and 
quality), as well as the restrictiveness, quality, and accessibility of their contracted 
network.  The level of competition in the insurance market determines the ability of 
insurers to alter the benefits of plans; in concentrated markets, insurers could offer higher 
cost plans with more restrictive networks, lower quality, and reduced access while 
maintaining market share.   
The ability of health insurers in concentrated markets to maximize profits is 
tempered by concentration among providers, particularly hospitals.  As hospital markets 
become more concentrated, insurers have less ability to exert low prices or demand high 
quality services.  Recent research has suggested that there is an important bargaining 
dynamic between providers (hospitals) and insurers.  For example, the concentration of 
hospitals in a market may impact the concentration of health insurers; in markets 
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dominated by one large hospital, an insurance market with many firms of relatively equal 
size would have limited negotiating power while a dominant insurer would hold more 
sway in negotiating with the hospital.  Feldman and Wholey (2001) found that increased 
HMO market power resulted in lower hospital prices, and Ho found that hospitals with 
greater market share could demand higher prices (Ho 2009).  Thus, the bargaining power 
of insurance companies (defined as the ratio of insurer concentration to hospital 
concentration) is an important element of the market structure.   To the extent that 
provider networks, premiums, and covered benefits are a function of the joint market 
structure of hospitals and insurers, this factor may have an appreciable impact on the 
consumer.   Smith (2007) suggests that financial incentives in managed care increase the 
potential for reduced access and quality.  Increased financial pressure on hospitals—
purportedly due to increased consolidation in commercial and Medicaid health insurance 
markets—is associated with an increased likelihood of preventable medical errors.   
Overall, the framework serves as a guideline for considering the various factors that are 
associated with access to care and consumer satisfaction with their health plan.  
Competition and bargaining power may have an impact on the consumer through the 









Following this introduction, this thesis includes three papers and a conclusion.  
The first paper describes alternative methods for developing measures of competition in 
the hospital and health insurance industries.  As decision points in the methodology arise, 
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in hospital and health insurance concentration from 2003-2009 as well as trends in the 
relative concentration of insurance to hospital markets.  It then summarizes existing 
literature on the impact of hospital and health insurance concentration on prices and 
quality.  The paper concludes that, across a variety of approaches to measuring 
concentration, both hospital and health insurance markets on average have remained 
highly concentrated from 2003-2009.  On average, there was no significant change in the 
average HHI over the study period though some markets experienced greater change.  
The paper also finds that in the average metropolitan statistical area (MSA), the health 
insurance market is more concentrated than the hospital market.  The review of literature 
assessing the impact of concentration in hospital and insurance markets finds that greater 
hospital concentration is associated with higher prices, greater insurance concentration is 
associated with higher premiums, and that increased insurance concentration in the 
context of concentrated hospital markets can have a “monopoly busing” effect.  There is 
more mixed evidence on the impact of hospital concentration on quality, and generally 
studies have found no statistically significant association between health insurance 
concentration and quality.  
Using measures of competition developed in the first paper, the second paper 
examines the relationship between market competition and consumers’ reported 
experience with their plans, access to care, and the percentage of spending for selected 
medical services paid out-of-pocket.  The paper explores this relationship in two different 
settings, private group insurance and Medicaid managed care.  This paper finds that in 
general, there is little to no significant association between the level of private or MMC 
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insurance concentration and consumer-reported access to care or experience with their 
health plan.   
The third paper builds upon the second paper by focusing on the health insurance 
market experienced more directly by the consumer, namely whether a consumer has a 
choice of health plans.  The paper concludes that individuals who have a choice in health 
plans at their current main job do report slightly better access to care on most measures 
and higher satisfaction and fewer administrative problems with their health plan than 
those without a choice in plans.    
The conclusion summarizes key findings across the studies and discusses policy 
implications.  The main contribution of the conclusion is a discussion of the three papers. 
While many studies on the impact of competition in health insurance and hospital 
markets have been published, this thesis contributes to the body of research in several 
ways.  As a whole, the thesis focuses on consumer-reported assessments of their 
experience with their health plan and access to care.  Much of the literature has focused 
on the impact on prices or premiums, and the literature on quality has tended to focus on 
process measures of health plan or hospital performance.  In the area of health insurance 
markets, papers historically used measures of HMO concentration.  Enrollment in other 
types of managed care products has grown in recent years, and within the past few years 
data sources like HealthLeaders-Interstudy have started to provide data that includes 
PPOs and other types of plans so that the competition measures better reflect enrollment 
trends in the marketplace.  This thesis includes these newer types of plans in market 
competition measures.   
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Specifically, the first paper summarizes this research and adds an empirical 
demonstration of different approaches to measuring insurance and hospital competition.  
The paper also newly presents trends in the relative concentration of health insurance and 
hospital markets.  The second paper assesses whether insurance and hospital market 
concentration and the relative concentration of the two are associated with consumer-
reported experiences with their health plan, access to care, and out-of-pocket 
expenditures in two distinct markets, private insurance and Medicaid managed care.  The 
two studies in this area have used plan-level summary outcome measures; this paper uses 
individually-reported outcomes as well as individual demographic and health status 
measures to better control for  individual variation in reporting access to care and 
experience with a health plan.  The third paper uses recent survey data to assess whether 
those with a choice report better access and satisfaction than those without a choice.  
Much of the research on consumer health plan choice has focused on the factors that 
influence plan selection or on employer-level effects such as premiums and adverse 




Paper 1: Implications of Market Concentration 
Measures 
Summary  
The hospital and health insurance industries have experienced dynamic changes in 
recent decades, with increased consolidation in both markets and the introduction of new 
players such as preferred provider organizations (PPOs), consumer-directed health plans 
(CDHPs), and physician-owned specialty hospitals.  An important question is whether the 
relative concentration of insurance and hospital markets has changed over time. Policy 
concern has been raised about growing concentration in the hospital and insurance 
industries; research has demonstrated that increased concentration in the insurance 
industry can have a “monopoly busting” effect on hospital markets, meaning that prices 
are lower and output is  higher relative to similarly concentrated hospital markets.  
Increased concentration in both markets may be of less concern so long as the two 
balance each other, but excessive growth in one relative to the other may encourage 
regulators to alter their enforcement activities.   
This paper reviews the literature on methods for developing hospital and 
insurance market concentration measures to understand the implications of various 
approaches to measurement of market concentration and incorporates an empirical 
analysis of insurance and hospital concentration measures and the relative balance of the 
two using recent (2003-2009) data that is likely to be available to policymakers and 
regulators.  The paper describes trends in insurance and hospital market concentration as 
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well as insurer’s market power relative to hospitals.  The paper then examines published 
findings on the impact of hospital and insurance concentration, followed by a 
consideration of other provider concentration measures and findings in light of the 
expansion of Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs).   
This paper finds generally high correlation among measures using different 
methodologies, though we caution that analyst should carefully tailor the measure to the 
research question. We also find that the national mean concentration in hospital and 
health insurance markets did not change significantly over 2003-2009, though there was 
variation across markets in market consolidation over the period.  The body of research 
indicates that increased hospital consolidation is associated with higher hospital prices 
(generally defined as net revenue per discharge), while the effects on quality are mixed.  
Increased insurance concentration is associated with higher premiums and has little to no 
significant effect on quality.   Several research studies support the theory that increased 
insurance consolidation counteracts hospital market power, and regulators and 
policymakers at the state and federal level should be aware that policy efforts to increase 
competition in the health insurance market without addressing hospital market 
concentration could have unanticipated negative effects. 
Context 
The level of competition in health insurance and hospital markets receives 
considerable attention, with policymakers and thought leaders often citing increased 
competition as a way to reform the U.S. health care system.  The health insurance 
industry has experienced consolidation among insurers—large firms have acquired 
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smaller plans and merged with other large firms (Robinson 2004).  The American 
Medical Association (AMA) publishes an annual report on concentration in the health 
insurance industry and concluded the majority of metropolitan markets like Atlanta or 
Denver are highly concentrated and dominated by one or two insurers. In two thirds 
(67%) of metropolitan areas, one insurer had a market share of 50% or more (American 
Medical Association, 2012). The hospital industry has also experienced consolidation in 
recent years, resulting in increased costs and potential reductions in quality (Vogt, Town, 
& Williams, 2006).  A recent New York Times article highlighted the uptick in hospital 
merger activity in recent years, with 105 mergers in 2012 compared to 50 in 2005 
(Creswell & Abelson, 2013).  The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Department of 
Justice (DOJ) are the two federal agencies that have the primary responsibility for 
regulating the level of competition in hospital and health insurance markets, evaluating 
and challenging mergers that could have anti-competitive effect within a local market.   
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA) impacts the 
structure of both hospital and provider markets.  Through the establishment of new 
insurance exchanges, plans will compete for additional market share in an environment 
where consumers select plans directly on the basis of price and quality information.  
Anticipated increases in Medicaid managed care enrollment may also shift the dynamics 
of health insurance markets (Holahan 2012).  At the same time, the emphasis on hospital-
provider integration through Accountable Care Organizations and bundled payments to 
improve care coordination affects market structure on the provider side.  As these 
changes unfold, improved understanding about baseline market concentration and the 
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relationship between health insurance and hospital markets will provide a richer, more 
nuanced knowledge base to aid in effective evaluation and regulatory efforts.   
Concentration from the Perspective of Insurers and Hospitals 
Previous literature has examined methods for developing hospital and insurance 
market concentration measures in isolation (Gaynor & Town, 2012) (Scanlon, Chernew, 
Swaminathan, & Lee, 2006) (Wong, Zahn, & Mutter, 2005) (Zwanziger, Melnick, & 
Eyre, 1994).  This paper adds to the literature by addressing measures of the relative 
concentration of the two markets, highlighting particular challenges and presenting trends 
in the relative concentration of insurance to hospital markets from 2003 to 2009.  The 
organization of the paper proceeds as follows: we first review recent literature on 
measures of hospital and insurance market concentration, highlighting analytic decisions 
in the development of these measures.  As these issues are discussed, the paper compares 
market concentration measures that analysts may encounter.   
In the discussion of approaches to developing concentration measures, we focus 
on data sources that produce national estimates of market concentration likely available 
to policymakers and regulators, including: the American Hospital Association, 
HealthLeaders-Interstudy (HLI), and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS).  We analyze trends in health insurance and hospital market concentration 
independently to provide a systematic description of changes in market structure across 
the US and then focus on the joint concentration of these two markets to assess whether 
one market is growing more concentrated relative to the other over time.   
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A review of the literature assessing the impact of market concentration in 
hospitals, insurance, and the combination of the two on prices and quality follows the 
discussion of market concentration measures.  With an eye to the growing emphasis on 
integrated care through organizations such as Accountable Care Organizations, we 
address literature on market concentration for providers beyond hospitals and raise 
considerations for measures of market concentration that incorporate a more integrated 
delivery system.  While growing concentration in one market alone may be cause for 
policy attention, changes in the relative concentration of the health insurance and hospital 
markets may point to different policy approaches given current knowledge about the 
impact of concentration and market leverage on prices and quality.  For example, a 
merger of two health plans in a local market may raise independent competitive concerns 
to initiate a regulatory challenge; if the hospital market is monopolistic, however, it may 
be in the consumers’ best interest to allow the health plan merger to proceed.   
Hospital Markets 
An effort to assess trends in market concentration requires the analyst to address two 
fundamental questions: how the markets are defined and what measures are used to 
describe the level of competition.  While there is considerable literature assessing 
approaches to defining hospital market competition, describing the level of hospital 
competition, and analyzing the effect of hospital market concentration, the body of 
literature regarding insurance markets is smaller in comparison. 
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 Turning first to hospital markets, the literature has utilized four primary approaches 
to defining hospital market boundaries: geopolitical, fixed radius, variable radius, and 
patient flow.  In a 2005 review, Wong and colleagues discussed various methods for 
defining competition in hospital markets (Wong, Zahn, & Mutter, 2005).  As they 
discuss, classical theory-based approaches to defining hospital markets—such as 
assessing cross-price elasticity of demand to determine whether products are substitutes 
or an Elzinga-Hogarty approach of inside-out and outside-in flow of goods—have largely 
remained unused by researchers based on practical challenges of widespread hospital 
price data availability and the effective size of created markets.  For example, Elzinga-
Hogarty hospital markets are based on patient flows between hospital areas such that no 
more than a certain percentage of the hospital services used by people residing in an area 
come from outside and no more than that percentage of hospital services are used by 
people residing outside the area.  Ten percent is the traditional level used in the Elzinga-
Hogarty assessment, though others have proposed alternative thresholds.  When the 
number of people in an area is large, as is the case in urban markets, the Elzinga-Hogarty 
markets tend to be very large as the number of total people treated in the boundaries 
increases.  Hospital markets may also appear larger if there is considerable flow between 
two hospitals providing heterogeneous services like trauma and cancer treatments, 
grouping the hospitals in the same market even though they are not truly competitors 
(Zwanziger, Melnick, & Eyre, 1994).   
Hospital Market Boundaries 
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Geopolitical boundaries such as states or Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) are 
commonly used in studies and appealing for their ease of use, compatibility with other 
datasets, and relevance to diverse audiences (Gaynor & Vogt, Antitrust and Competition 
in Health Care Markets, 2000).  Geopolitical boundary-based approaches result in a 
common level of competition assigned to all the hospitals within a market; other 
approaches can yield a more fine-grained, hospital-specific measure of competition that 
assesses the level of competition a given hospital experiences (Sohn M. , 2002) and 
create as many markets as there are hospitals.    
Geopolitical boundaries originated for reasons other than defining hospital markets. 
MSAs are aggregates of counties constructed by the Office of Management to represent 
highly populated areas with “a high degree of social and economic integration with the 
core as measured by commuting ties” (OMB Bulletin No. 10-02).  Thus, while MSAs are 
based on a political boundary (counties), they also include an economic component as 
well.  Geopolitical boundaries can include potential competitors as well as actual 
competitors, though the boundary can serve as a false demarcation.  For example, 
hospitals located across state lines may in fact compete with one another but would not 
appear to do so in a state-based measure of competition.  In this case, each state’s hospital 
market would appear more concentrated; however, conclusions about market structure 
may be biased in the other direction if hospitals in remote areas of a geopolitical region 
are grouped in the same market as hospitals in an urbanized core on the other side of the 
state, with whom they are unlikely to compete.  Geopolitical boundaries create one 
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measure of competition for all hospitals within the area, though local hospitals can 
encounter different levels of competitive intensity (Zwanziger, Melnick, & Eyre, 1994).  
An alternative approach to defining hospital markets was proposed by Luft and 
Maerki that addresses the cross-boundary issue by using a fixed radius approach (Luft & 
Maerki, Competitive Potential of Hospitals and Their Neighbors, 1984-1985).  Each 
hospital is assigned a fixed radius that defines a circle around the hospital, and all other 
hospitals within that circle (including those in other states, counties, etc.) are included in 
its market.  Luft and Maerki based their suggested radius of 15 miles on the premise that 
physicians have considerable influence on hospital admissions and would be unwilling to 
travel more than 15 miles between hospitals.  Further empirical work in California 
suggested that this distance reasonably accounts for 90% of a hospital’s admissions in 
urban areas (Luft, Phibbs, Garnick, & Robinson, 1989).  This approach creates unique 
hospital-level measure of competition, but the fixed radius may not be appropriate across 
all hospitals.  For example, hospitals in rural areas and those offering highly specialized 
services may draw patients from a much larger area than that proscribed by the radius 
distance.  A similar approach allows the radius describing the hospital’s market area to 
vary such that each hospital is assigned a distance that captures a certain percentage 
(usually 75% or 90%) of its discharges (Phibbs & Robinson, 1993), (Gresenz, 2004).  
This approach requires hospital-specific data on the geographic distribution of its 
discharges, and it also does not clearly account for the market area of different hospitals 
within a system.   
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A fourth approach to defining hospital markets is the patient flow approach.  While 
both the variable radius and patient flow methods use patient origin data, the patient flow 
method does not require the hospital market area to be circular.  Instead, the hospital’s 
market area is an aggregation of zip codes or some other geographic unit that contributes 
a significant portion of the hospital’s patient population, with allowances for the 
researcher to determine which areas should be excluded.     
Using data from the American Hospital Association (AHA) Annual Survey data for 
2003-2009, we create hospital market concentration measures at the Hospital Referral 
Region (HRR) and Core-Based Statistical Area (CBSA) levels, two variants of the 
geopolitical boundary approach to market definition described above.  Variable radius 
and patient flow methods both require hospital-level patient origin data that was not 
available on a large scale for this analysis.  The AHA’s Health Forum administers the 
annual survey for the purpose of “collecting utilization, financial, and personnel 
information from each of the nation’s hospitals.”
1
 The AHA sends the survey to 
registered hospitals, which comprise 98% of the 6,500 hospitals in the survey universe; 
non-registered hospitals are identified through state and local hospital associations, the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, and other national organizations and 
governmental bodies.  The overall response rate for the Annual Survey is approximately 
85% of the 6,500 hospitals in the survey universe each year.  Hospitals report data for 
their fiscal year, generally a 365-day period, primarily through an online portal.  In 
keeping with methods used by the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission and other 
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research organizations, we analyze the AHA database as reported.
2
  We imputed Hospital 
Referral Regions (HRR) for hospitals missing this data in the AHA Database using a zip 
code-HRR crosswalk from the Dartmouth Atlas.
3
    
We use a “chain-adjusted HHI as a measure of market concentration (Robinson J. , 
2011).  We take into account hospitals that are members of the same health care system 
within the same geographic area that are likely to negotiate jointly with insurers over 
contracts and reimbursement rates (Berenson R. , Ginsburg, Christianson, & Yee, 2012).  
Hospitals that are members of multi-hospital systems are able to charge higher prices 
than non-system members, exerting greater bargaining power with insurers (Melnick & 
Keeler, 2007).  Roughly 55% of hospitals are members of a multi-hospital health care 
system each year, though these systems may be spread out over multiple geographic 
markets.  
Table 1 shows mean HHIs for two example geographies, HRRs and CBSAs, for 
2003-2009.  In this analysis, rural non-CBSA areas within in a state were combined.  For 
HRRs, the HHI decreases slightly in the first period and then increases through 2009, for 
a net mean increase from 2004-2009 of 131.3, though this increase is not statistically 
significant.  This is roughly the difference in a market moving from nine firms with equal 
market share to eight firms.  The unweighted mean HHIs for CBSAs are much higher, 
reflecting the higher number of CBSAs than HRRs (929 CBSAs vs. 306 HRRs), smaller 
geographic delineation of markets, and influence of less competitive rural areas in the 
unweighted estimate.  Weighting the CBSA values by the CBSA population lowers the 
                                                 
2
 Personal communication with Nguyen Nguyen, Senior Resarch Scientist at HHS/OS/ASPE.  
3
 Dartmouth Atlas zip code crosswalks, 2002-2010, http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/tools/downloads.aspx  
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mean HHIs significantly, such that the CBSA values are similar to the HRR values in 
magnitude and trend.  Consistent with the HRR measure, the CBSA HHI is not 
statistically significantly different in 2009 compared to 2004.   
 
Table 1: HRR and CBSA HHIs, 2004-2009  
 Mean HRR HHI 
(SD) 
Mean CBSA HHI 
(SD) 
Mean CBSAHHI, 
weighted by CBSA 
Pop 
2004 2898.7  (1806.3) 7027.3 (3146.4) 2881.2 (2801.8) 
2005 2878.9  (1788.1) 7000.3 (3134.0) 2871.8 (2786.8) 
2006 2929.0  (1784.0) 7036.4 (3127.0) 2904.4 (2803.0) 
2007 2955.4  (1800.8) 7010.3 (3121.5) 2911.9 (2894.0) 
2008 2999.8  (1802.6) 7009.4 (3110.0) 2933.0 (2783.4) 
2009 3030.0  (1848.1) 7015.7 (3114.2) 2928.3 (2772.4) 
Notes: CBSAs were not included in the AHA file in 2003.  HHI is unweighted except where 
noted and based on Medicare inpatient days, chain-adjusted to combine market shares of 
hospitals in the same system and HRR or CBSA, and includes short-term general acute, surgical, 
cancer, heart, obstetrics and gynecology, eye, ear, nose and throat, rehabilitation, orthopedic, 
chronic disease, other specialty, and children’s general hospitals.   
 
Hospitals in Scope for Market 
An additional element to defining the hospital market includes assessing which types 
of hospitals will be included as competitors.  In addition to general acute-care hospitals, 
hospitals can focus on particular patient populations such as children or women or on a 
subset of services like cardiac or orthopedic services.  Acute care hospitals may also offer 
long-term care services such as rehabilitation, substance abuse, or psychiatric care 
(Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2012). For example, an 
analyst could focus only on competition between short-term, general acute care hospitals 
or include other types such as surgical, children’s, orthopedic, or cardiac hospitals.  In a 
2003 report on specialty hospitals, the GAO found “…although general hospitals 
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typically have more beds than specialty hospitals, the focused mission of specialty 
hospitals often resulted in their treating more patients in their given fields of 
specialization.” (Government Accountability Office, 2003a)   
In this step, the purpose of the competition measure will shape the kinds of hospitals 
that are appropriate to include.   As a practical application of the kinds of hospitals to 
include, the FTC looks to the services offered by the subject hospitals in their analyses of 
potential hospital mergers or acquisitions to assess competitive effects of the merger.  For 
example, a recent FTC opinion on the acquisition of St. Luke’s Hospital by Promedica 
Health Systems in Toledo, OH in 2011 looked at the pre- and post-merger general acute 
care services and obstetrical (OB) services in the area (In the Matter of Promedica Health 
System, Inc., 2011).  Thus, in this case it would be appropriate to include the subset of 
specialty hospitals in the area that offer inpatient OB care such as a women’s hospital but 
not other types of specialty hospitals. Another analysis looking at competition for 
cardiology services should include different types of specialty hospitals such as cardiac 
hospitals. 
When the purpose of the market concentration measure is to describe trends in 
market concentration more generally across time or geography, the choice regarding 
which types of hospitals to include is more open because is not defined by the types of 
services present in a local market nor by a targeted empirical investigation of the effects 
of competition within a particular service area or on a particular outcome.  The GAO 
report found that in 2003, the 92 cardiac, orthopedic, surgical, and women’s hospitals 
accounted for less than 2% of all short-term acute care hospitals in the country.  These 
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specialty hospitals were also concentrated in certain states (Government Accountability 
Office, 2003b).  Thus, the inclusion of these types of specialty hospitals is unlikely to 
affect average market shares across the country but may have more impact at the local 
level.   
We compare three approaches to defining hospitals in scope in the markets.  The 
primary definition of hospital markets includes general acute care hospitals as well as 
specialty hospitals that are likely to compete with general hospitals and in some cases 
provide more services than general hospitals.  This set of hospitals is referred to as the 
“medium” definition in subsequent tables and analyses in this paper. These hospitals 
represent about 89% of hospitals short term hospitals in the 50 states and DC each year.  
We include a narrower (short-term general medical/surgical hospitals only) and broader 
(adding hospitals for tuberculosis and other respiratory diseases and specialty hospitals 
for children) market definition. In all three subsets, we exclude hospitals located in US 
territories and long-term hospitals.
4
  In the AHA data, admissions are reported separately 
for hospital and long-term care units within a hospital, and thus it is possible to exclude 
long-term unit discharges from calculations of an acute care hospital’s market share or, 
alternatively, to create a specific HHI measure for long-term services performed at both 
acute care and long-term hospitals.  
Table 2: Mean HHIs with Varying Hospital Types in Scope for Market 
 Mean HHI, Narrow Mean HHI, Medium Mean HHI, Broad 
2003 2948.8 (1777.9) 2899.2 (1772.1) 2899.0 (1772.3) 
2004 2937.6 (1769.6) 2884.8 (1767.9) 2884.7 (1768.0) 
2005 2946.8 (1762.1) 2870.7 (1744.5) 2870.1 (1745.0) 
                                                 
4
 The AHA identifies long-term hospitals as1) hospitals reporting a separate long-term unit and whose 
long-term unit admissions are greater than the short-term admissions or 2) a hospital that does not report a 
separate long-term unit but whose average ratio of inpatient days to admissions is 30 or more. 
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2006 3006.4 (1794.1) 2924.5 (1775.9) 2924.2 (1776.1) 
2007 3049.0 (1818.4) 2974.1 (1795.1) 2973.8 (1795.3) 
2008 3079.0 (1800.2) 3005.0 (1782.5) 3004.8 (1782.6) 
2009 3130.8 (1835.4) 3061.1 (1821.8) 3060.9 (1822.0) 
Note: HHI is unweighted and based on HRR-level Medicare discharges, chain-adjusted to 
combine market shares of hospitals in the same system and HRR.   
 
As expected, the mean HHI values for the narrow definition of hospital types in 
scope for the markets are higher than the medium or broad definitions, suggesting a 
slightly more concentrated market.  There is almost no difference in mean HHI between 
the medium and broad definitions, indicating tuberculosis, and other respiratory diseases 
and children’s specialty hospitals do not have sufficient market share to affect the HHI 
appreciably.  The correlation between these two measures was 1.00, while the correlation 
between the narrow definition and the broad and medium-based measures still very high 
at 0.996.  Statistical tests indicate the HHI based on the narrow definition is not 
significantly different from the medium or broad approach, and this finding was 
consistent when other products such as total beds or total admissions were used as the 
basis for the HHI (to be discussed in greater detail below).  In addition, the trends in 
hospital concentration over time are consistent across the three definitions tested—though 
it appears the average hospital market has grown slightly more concentrated over time by 
roughly 100-200 points, in all three approaches the higher HHI in the 2009 is not 
statistically different from the 2003 HHI.    
When the goal of creating the hospital concentration measure is an assessment of 
market concentration across the range of services hospitals provide, the analytic choice of 
which definition of the hospital is used does not appear to affect the concentration 
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measure.  The larger, general medical surgical hospitals predominate the market share for 
products such as Medicare discharges, and thus the addition of smaller specialty hospitals 
does not impact the measures.  However, for more tailored analysis such as an 
examination of the concentration of cardiology services or pediatric surgery in a market, 
the hospitals in scope could have a more appreciable impact.   
Hospital Market Share Measures 
Once the hospital market area and hospitals in scope have been defined, the level of 
competition in that market can be described through a variety of measures.  At a basic 
level, one might consider the number of hospitals in a market as an indicator of the level 
of competition, based upon the theory that more firms competing in a market leads to 
increased competition (Scanlon et al., 2006).  This measure has intuitive appeal, is easily 
obtained, and is understandable for a lay audience; however, it is rarely used in academic 
literature as a measure of hospital competition.  The number of firms in the market 
assumes that each firm contributes uniformly to the level of competition in the market 
and thus does not account for the distribution of market share among the firms in the 
market, potential competitors, barriers to entry, etc.  To be fair, many of the measures that 
express competition as a single number—including the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI), discussed below—do not fully address the complex nature of competition.   
The HHI is commonly used in studies with hospital competition.  The Federal Trade 
Commission-Department of Justice Horizontal Merger Guidelines (“Merger Guidelines”) 
that were issued in 1992 and updated in 2010 base analyses of competitive effects of 
mergers on the HHI.  If the post-merger HHI in a market exceeds 2,500 and the merger or 
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acquisition increases the HHI by more than 200 points, the merger or acquisition is 
presumed likely to create or enhance market power and thus be presumably illegal. (U.S. 
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, 2010). The FTC also has 
referenced the number of “significant competitors” and post-merger market shares in a 
market.  
The HHI is the sum of the squared market shares S of firms (hospitals) i in market m, 
as depicted in Equation 1 below:  
        
 
 
   
 
The higher the HHI, the more concentrated the market; a perfect monopoly has an 
HHI of 10,000.  The HHI was first used in the 1940s as a measure of market skewness; in 
1976 the HHI was formally linked to the Cournot theory of competition (Cowling & 
Waterson, 1976), which assumes fixed quantities and homogenous products.  In 1984, the 
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) adopted the HHI as a concentration measure for 
merger reviews.  Although it is widely used, the HHI has been criticized for two main 
shortcomings: it is sensitive to geographic boundaries and products used in the market 
definition, and as a measure only of concentration it fails to incorporate other important 
aspects of market power such as barriers to entry (Lijesen, 2004).  Gaynor and Town 
suggest the HHI may be interpreted more as a measure of the potential for competition 
with some measurement error rather than a measure grounded in economic theory 
(Gaynor and Town, 2012).  The use of the HHI in analyses of the impact of concentration 





argument: while prices and quality are generally the outcomes of interest, firms with 
lower prices or higher quality could attract greater market share such that the outcomes 
precede the independent variable of interest (the HHI) in the causal pathway. In more 
recent economic analysis, researchers such Kessler and McClellan (2000) and 
Gowrisinkaran and Town (2003) have created hospital-specific HHIs, which are 
generally the weighted zipcode HHIs of the patients using the hospital, to mitigate 
concern about the potential endogeneity of market share measures and avoid ex ante 
analytic decisions about geopolitical boundaries for the market. 
Some analysts have developed models that are related to the HHI, generating pricing 
power as a function of market share that are appropriate in markets with differentiated 
products.  For example, Antwi and colleagues (2006) use a Logit of Competition Index 
(LOCI) to model hospital prices.  The LOCI (   is a function of the hospitals j in the 
market, the number (    of consumers of different types t in the market, the average 
quantity (   consumed by each type, and the proportion of each type of consumer (     
using each hospital in the market.   
 
     
    
       
        
 
   
       
 
   
 
 
Prices at each hospital are then determined by the LOCI, the hospital’s marginal 




This approach generates prices as a function of market share within a coherent economic 
framework.   
In addition to the HHI, some analyses have used the older four-firm concentration 
ratio.  The concentration ratio is a measure of the total output in an industry produced by 
a certain (4) number of firms.  When the DOJ adopted the HHI in 1984, it justified its 
selection by stating “Unlike the traditional four-firm concentration ratio, the HHI reflects 
both the distribution of the market shares of the top four firms and the composition of the 
market outside the top four firms. It also gives proportionately greater weight to the 
market shares of the larger firms, which probably accords with their relative importance 
in any collusive interaction.” (Department of Justice, 1984).   
Using the AHA Annual Survey data, we compare an HHI concentration measure to 
the number of hospitals in the HRR to demonstrate differences in these two approaches.  
The overall correlation of these two measures was -0.54; a negative correlation is 
expected because of the inverse relationship of the HHI to competition (i.e., the HHI 
increases as competition decreases while the number of firms increases as competition 
increases).  The overall strength of the correlation is weak, however, indicating the two 
measures likely capture different aspects of the market.  In the hospital market, the mean 
number of hospitals in an HRR changes very little from 2003-2009, remaining between 
16.3 and 16.7 hospitals on average.  The mean HRR HHI appears to display greater 
variation over time, reflecting both the larger scale of the HHI measure and its potential 
to demonstrate changes in market share as well as the number of firms.   
 
Table 3: Mean HRR HHI and # Hospitals, 2003-2009 
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 Mean HRR HHI Mean HRR # Hospitals 
2003 2899.2 (1772.1) 16.3 (14.9) 
2004 2884.8 (1767.9) 16.4 (14.9) 
2005 2870.7 (1744.5) 16.7 (15.1) 
2006 2924.5 (1775.9) 16.6 (15.1) 
2007 2974.1 (1795.1) 16.6 (15.3) 
2008 3005.0 (1782.5) 16.7 (15.2) 
2009 3061.1 (1821.8) 16.6 (15.2) 
Note: Both HHI and # hospitals are unweighted and include short-term general 
acute, surgical, cancer, heart, obstetrics and gynecology, eye, ear, nose and throat, 
rehabilitation, orthopedic, chronic disease, other specialty, and children’s general 
hospitals.  The HHI is based on HRR-level Medicare discharges, chain-adjusted to 
combine market shares of hospitals in the same system and HRR.   
 
Furthermore, different types of hospital “products” can serve as the basis of a 
hospital’s market share in that market.  Depending on the research question an analyst 
might appropriately measure market share based on staffed hospital beds, admissions, 
inpatient days, average daily census, volume of a particular procedure such as surgeries 
or births, medical staff, or outpatient visits.  In the revised Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 
it states “the Agencies measure market shares based on the best available indicator of 
firms’ future competitive significance in the relevant market. This may depend upon the 
type of competitive effect being considered, and on the availability of data.” (U.S. 
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, 2010). Hospital beds are 
commonly reported, easy to measure and reflect hospital capacity; occupancy rates may 
vary across hospitals that would affect true market share, though a hospital’s investment 
in staffing a bed suggests an expectation that the bed will be filled.  Occupancy rates are 
correlated with hospital size and ownership status, with smaller hospitals and for-profit 
hospitals reporting lower occupancy rates (Table 4). 
 
Table 4: Occupancy Rates by Hospital Type, 1975-2009 
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 1975 1980 1990 1995 2000 2009 
All hospitals 76.7 77.7 69.5 65.7 66.1 67.8 
Federal 80.7 80.1 72.9 72.6 68.2 69.1 
Nonfederal 76.3 77.4 69.2 65.1 65.9 67.8 
Community 75.0 75.6 66.8 62.8 63.9 65.5 
Nonprofit 77.5 78.2 69.3 64.5 65.5 57.4 
For-profit 65.9 65.2 52.8 51.8 55.9 57.7 
State/local Govt 70.4 71.1 65.3 63.7 63.2 65.0 
6-24 beds 48.0 46.8 32.3 36.9 31.7 33.6 
25-49 beds 56.7 52.8 41.3 42.6 41.3 46.0 
50-99 beds 64.7 64.2 53.8 54.1 54.8 55.9 
100-199 beds 71.2 71.4 61.5 58.8 60.0 61.3 
200-299 beds 77.1 77.4 67.1 63.1 65.0 65.6 
300-399 beds 79.7 79.7 70.0 64.8 65.7 67.9 
400-499 beds 81.1 81.2 73.5 68.1 69.1 70.1 
500 + beds 80.9 82.1 77.3 71.4 72.2 74.0 
Source: American Hospital Association Annual Survey of Hospitals. Hospital Statistics, 1976, 1981, 
1991–2011 editions. Chicago, IL. (Copyright 1976, 1981, 1991–2011 
 
We compare various hospital outputs that could serve as the basis for an HHI, 
including admissions, staffed beds, total inpatient days and inpatient days by Medicare, 
Medicaid and private payer, Medicare discharges, Medicaid discharges, total visits, and 
admissions and inpatient days adjusted to account for a hospital’s outpatient volume.  
Overall, the correlation among these measures was high, ranging from 0.81 to 0.98 
(Table 5), suggesting that the choice of output generally does not have a large impact on 
conclusions about the level of market.  For each of the measures, the change in within-
market HHIs was concentrated in a few HRRs as measured by the standard deviation of 
each HRR’s HHIs from 2003-2009.  The median HRR standard deviation ranged from 
from 130.7 to 295.4 across the measures and the mean ranged from 217.9 to 404.7—
Table 6, bottom row), indicating skewness in the data.   
The HHIs based on the two Medicaid volume-related measures were less strongly 
correlated with the other measures and depict the greatest amount of concentration in 
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hospital markets, reflecting the concentration of care for low-income and vulnerable 
populations at selected safety net hospitals.  Adjusted inpatient days and total beds show 
less concentrated markets relative to Medicaid, with Medicaid discharges higher on 
average by 595.1 for adjusted days and 596.3 for total beds.  The Medicaid measures also 
had the highest within-HRR variation over 2003-2009, while the HHI based on total 
admissions was more stable.  The distinction of the Medicaid-based HHIs suggests these 
measures are useful in analyses of services for low-income individuals or safety-net 



































1.0000           
Total 
Admissions 
0.9476 1.0000          
Medicare 
Discharges 
0.9499 0.9872 1.0000         
Medicare 
Inpatient Days 
0.9611 0.9689 0.9833 1.0000        
Medicaid 
Discharges 
0.9109 0.9529 0.9323 0.9142 1.0000       
Medicaid 
Inpatient Days 
0.9123 0.8560 0.8465 0.8576 0.8851 1.0000      
Private 
Inpatient Days 
0.9508 0.9286 0.9123 0.9254 0.8787 0.8911 1.0000     
Total Inpatient 
Days 
0.9854 0.9494 0.9480 0.9650 0.9071 0.9222 0.9716 1.0000    
Adjusted 
Admissions 
0.9447 0.9821 0.9762 0.9518 0.9409 0.8538 0.9140 0.9383 1.0000   
Adjusted 
Patient Days 
0.9791 0.9346 0.9380 0.9487 0.8955 0.9214 0.9547 0.9860 0.9456 1.0000  

































2003 2565.2 2960.4 2899.2 2933.1 3116.4 3115.0 3046.4 2788.2 2708.1 2586.3 2727.4 
2004 2567.6 2965.4 2884.8 2898.7 3121.4 3067.9 3047.0 2775.1 2715.5 2565.3 2711.2 
2005 2578.9 2971.2 2870.7 2878.9 3162.2 3138.8 3066.7 2797.7 2686.2 2577.7 2737.6 
2006 2620.7 3004.2 2924.5 2929.0 3220.2 3198.4 3116.0 2849.8 2700.0 2612.3 2755.0 
2007 2642.0 3052.1 2974.1 2955.4 3249.7 3193.7 3092.6 2870.3 2748.4 2633.6 2821.2 
2008 2672.8 3079.6 3005.0 2999.8 3284 3255.3 3120.3 2917.5 2776.8 2675.5 2829.0 





Deviations 222.8 217.9 251.6 285.1 335.5 404.7 342.8 241.8 229.8 245.0 303.3 
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Figure 2: Mean HRR HHIs based on Selected Hospital Measures, 2003-2009 
 
Insurance Market Concentration Measures 
In contrast to concentration in hospital markets, there is relatively little empirical 
research examining methods for describing concentration in insurance markets.  Rather, 
the research has tended to focus on assessing causes and effects of insurance market 
concentration and used “off the shelf” measures.  Scanlon and colleagues assessed 
commonly used measures of insurance market concentration in a 2006 review (Scanlon, 
Chernew, Swaminathan, & Lee, 2006).  In the 35 studies included in their review, the 
authors identified 3 primary measures of insurance competition: the HMO HHI, the 
number of HMOs, and the HMO penetration.  The authors suggest most studies of the 
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plan or insurance products that are included in the market definition (e.g. Medicare and 
Medicaid HMO enrollment, administrative services only (ASO) enrollment, etc) and 
instead rely on Interstudy’s “off the shelf” measures of the HHI, which combines 
commercial, Medicare, and Medicaid enrollment, omits  ASO enrollment, and treats 
insurance products from the same firm in a market as separate competitors.  The authors 
do not address the role of different geographic boundaries for health insurance markets, 
though the Interstudy measures are created for MSAs. 
To test whether these implicit or explicit decisions about insurance market 
definition were important empirically, the authors examined the correlations between 
HHIs created using various arrangements of market segment (commercial HMO HHI, the 
Interstudy HMO HHI), different products under common plan ownership, and including 
ASO enrollment.  The authors concluded that these decisions are not likely to be 
important empirically given the high cross-sectional (range 0.83 to 0.99) and longitudinal 
(0.69 to 0.97) correlations in the unadjusted and adjusted HHIs.  This conclusion is 
testable; one could estimate models with various measures and assess whether 
conclusions about the significance and magnitude of the coefficient on insurance 
concentration are robust.  However, the authors do not estimate models with their 
measures nor provide the full correlation matrices and thus it is difficult to evaluate 
where correlations fall within the somewhat wide ranges and whether there are any 
patterns to the correlations.  The authors also suggest the need to include other types of 
products such as PPOs that have grown in enrollment in recent years.   
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The authors also tested the sensitivity of competition measures to low-enrollment 
plans and the choice of the competition measure.  In the case of low-enrollment plans, the 
inclusion of these plans would not have a large effect on the HHI or penetration measure 
but could have a more pronounced effect on the number of HMOs in a market.  The 
cross-sectional correlation in the number of plans was 0.87 when comparing the total 
number of plans to only those plans with 1,000 or more enrollees.  Plan entry and exit 
from the market is driven by low-enrollment firms, and consequently the authors found 
more longitudinal variation in the average number of HMOs in an MSA from 1998-2002.  
The mean HMO HHI and HMO penetration remained more stable over the time period.  
In assessing sensitivity to the choice of measure, the authors note that the pairwise 
correlations between the measures is significant but “not high enough to eliminate 
concern that in some applications, the choice of measure might matter.”  The HHI is 
negatively correlated with competition, and so the authors expected a negative correlation 
with the HMO penetration and number of HMO measures.   
Table 7:Cross-Sectional and Longitudinal Correlations in HMO Competition 
Measures (Scanlon, Chernew, Swaminathan, & Lee, 2006) 
Variable Pairs Range in Cross-sectional 
Correlation Coefficients 
(1998-2002) 
Correlation Coefficients for 
Longitudinal Changes in 
Competition (1998-2002) 
HMO, # HMOs -0.67 ~ -0.71 -0.4827 
HHI, HMO Penetration -0.40 ~ -0.47 -0.1187 
# HMOs, HMO 
Penetration 
0.49 ~ 0.60 0.2655 
Note: All correlations are different from zero at <0.01 level.  HHI uses commercial enrollment and pools 
market share for affiliated plans within an MSA.  The HMO penetration rate includes commercial, 
Medicare, and Medicaid HMO enrollment.  The number of HMOs excludes plans with fewer than 1,000 
commercial enrollees.  The longitudinal correlations are computed using the different between the 2002 
and 1998 values for each measure. 
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Longitudinal variation in insurance concentration measures is important for 
statistical models that attempt to control for omitted variables bias through fixed effects.  
These models rely on variation within markets over time to identify the association 
between the independent variable and outcome measures.  Scanlon and colleagues found 
that the average market experienced little change through time, though some markets 
experienced greater change: 41.7% of MSAs experienced a 5-year change in the HMO 
HHI of more than 1000, 24.6% experienced a 5-year change in HMO penetration of more 
than 10%, and 33.6% had a change of two or more HMOs. The number of HMOs varied 
most within markets. The authors also estimated the degree to which variation in the 
commercial HMO HHI is due to enrollment changes between plans or structural changes 
resulting from new entrants, exiting firms, or mergers and acquisitions, finding that 35%-
39% of the variance in the HHI is due to annual enrollment changes that may reflect 
endogenous factors such as lower prices or better quality in the plan with enrollment 
growth while 61%-65% is because of structural changes.   
 The review of existing measures of health insurance concentration Scanlon and 
colleagues provide suggests that the measure selected for use in empirical studies could 
matter depending on whether the analysis requires longitudinal or cross-sectional 
variation, given the relatively weak correlations between measures.  Furthermore, the 
review highlights the need to control for market characteristics such as population, per 
capita income, or hospital competition in cross-sectional designs; in longitudinal designs, 
results may be driven by within-case changes in a few markets and may also reflect 
endogenous enrollment changes as well structural changes in the market.  Finally, 
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important elements of market competition—such as barriers to entry, selective 
contracting arrangements, and other environmental aspects of the insurance market—are 
not included in current measures of insurance market concentration.   
 One element of competition measures often discussed in the literature on hospital 
markets is the geographic definition of a “service area”; the review above does not raise 
issues related to the geographic definition of insurance concentration measures.  The 
Annual American Medical Association report on concentration in the health insurance 
industry uses MSAs as the geographic market, based on HealthLeaders-Interstudy data 
(American Medical Association, 2012).  The large number of studies included in 
Scanlon’s review that use the “off the shelf” HealthLeaders HMO concentration 
measures also use MSAs as the geographic market.  The Federal Trade Commission 
begins its geographic analysis of health insurance mergers by determining whether the 
two firms sell insurance in the same area.  In its case against a potential Aetna merger, 
the FTC alleged "[t]he relevant geographic markets in which HMO and HMO-POS 
health plans compete are ... no larger than the local areas within which managed care 
companies market their respective HMO and HMO-POS plans ...patients seeking medical 
care generally prefer to receive treatment close to where they work or live, and many 
employers require managed care companies to offer a network that contains a certain 
number of health care providers within a specified distance of each employee's home" 
(United States v. Aetna Inc., 1999).  In this case, the relevant geographic markets were 
the MSAs in and around Houston and Dallas, Texas.  
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While MSAs have strong intuitive appeal as a geographic market for commercial 
insurance with their establishment based on economic ties and commuting patterns, 
published literature has not established whether MSAs do, in fact, reflect the actual sales 
and enrollment patterns of health plans.  To use an analogous term from the hospital 
literature, there is a lack of widely available “patient flow” data describing the health plan 
enrollment by zip code or another geographic unit that makes comparable empirical 
determinations of health insurance markets challenging.  MSAs may also not be an 
appropriate market for other types of insurance, such as Medicaid or Medicare managed 
care, the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP), coverage purchased 
through the individual or small-group market, large employers with offices in multiple 
locations, or the new state-based health insurance marketplaces established through the 
Affordable Care Act.
5
   
While provider locations are generally fixed with a heavy investment of capital 
resources, health insurance plans can more rapidly change their geographic market by 
negotiating contracts with providers in a new area and advertising its insurance products 
to different firms without the same level of capital investment.  In addition,  the DOJ 
distinguishes between the definition of monopoly and monopsony markets in health 
insurance, noting that the "purchasers of the input need not compete in the output market 
to be included in the relevant market for the purchase of the input” (US Federal Trade 
Commission and Department of Justicce, 2004).  For example, the merger of two health 
                                                 
5
 Medicare Managed Care is marketed at a county level; the regions for Medicaid managed care vary by 
state but do not cross state lines as do MSAs; FEHBP has both state-specific and nationwide plans; the 
availability and nature of individual and small-group coverage varies by state; and some larger employers 
may select one health plan that has partner networks around the country.  
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plans may pose monopolistic concerns in the market for commercial health insurance 
among employers, but it may not pose the same degree of monopsonistic concerns in 
markets with substantial public payer or self-insured presence.  The boundaries of the 
markets in which the health plan advertises and negotiates with providers may be 
determined independently.  Therefore, the appropriate geographic market definition 
depends on the purpose of the analysis and that definition may change over time.   
To conduct our assessment of different approaches to defining insurance market 
concentration, we use county-level HealthLeaders-Interstudy plan enrollment data for 
2003-2009 to develop HHIs that vary along several dimensions.  The county-level data 
provides the flexibility to create concentration measures at the county, state, or MSA 
level.  We assess whether the HHI is sensitive to market segment (Medicare, Medicaid, 
and commercial insurance), commercial product type (HMOs, PPOs, and POS plans), 
geography (county, state, and MSA), insurance risk arrangement (self-insured and fully-
insured plans), and level of analysis (individual health plan versus managed care 
organization (MCO).  The data source also includes information that enables the 
calculation of managed care penetration rates by plan for each MSA for the commercially 
insured population and the number of plans that are available in each market.  The 
available information from HealthLeaders-Interstudy changed over the study period, with 
more refinement of insurance categories over time.  For example, HMOs, Medicare, and 
Medicaid enrollment was consistently available from 2003-2009, while PPOs were added 
in 2005 and consumer-directed health plans were included in 2008.  Enrollment was 
summed by plan type and combinations of plan type: HMO only, PPO only, total 
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commercial (HMO, PPO, and POS plans), total private (commercial and self-insured 
HMOs, PPOs, and POS plans) and total lives (HMO, PPO, POS, managed Medicare, and 
managed Medicaid).  Using the HLI data, private market HHIs were created by summing 
county enrollment to the MSA level for each plan.  Appendix A lists the HealthLeaders 
variables and definitions that were included each year.  For all years, plans likely to be 
rental networks, in which the provider network is negotiated without health plan 
enrollment information, were excluded.    















2003 3906.8    3461.0 9.8 
2004 3609.4    3305.6 11.3 
2005 3930.1 3974.0 3014.9 2938.8 2725.5 23.3 
2006 3369.1 4040.4 2921.4 2536.4 2295.1 22.3 
2007 4169.0 4954.8 3735.9 3121.6 2733.6 14.7 
2008 4087.0 4229.4 3400.3 2897.1 2541.2 14.8 
2009 4122.3 4077.0 3239.8 2598.6 2195.7 16.5 
NOTE: Estimates include micro and non-MSA areas and are weighted by population. 
 
Allowing commercial HMOs and PPOs to act as competitors, as in the total 
commercial HHI data above, yields HHIs that are lower than those calculated for the 
HMO or PPO market separately.  All three measures on average remain well above the 
FTC threshold for a highly concentrated market.  Factoring in the self-insured, 
administrative services only (ASO) plans further reduces the HHI.  While these ASO 
plans may not compete for fully insured business, MCOs may use the self-insured 
enrollment as additional leverage when negotiating with providers.  The addition of 
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additional types of insurance such as Medicare and Medicaid managed care further 
reduces the average HHI, bringing the mean HHI within the FTC threshold for a 
moderately concentrated market rather than a highly concentrated market.  When 
considering the relationship between hospitals and insurers, it is likely more appropriate 
to include self-insured or Medicare and Medicaid enrollment given the potential for 
greater insurer leverage, and the inclusion of these product sectors generates a more 
competitive HHI.   
In 2003 and 2004, the number of plans in the MSA measure includes only 
commercial HMOs, while later years include other types of plans like PPOs, POS plans, 
and CDHPs.  Whereas the number of hospitals in an HRR changed very little over time, 
the number of MCOs with commercial enrollment was much more variable.  This could 
reflect sensitivity of this measure to plans with very small enrollment as suggested by 
Scanlon and colleagues (2006) that is less of a factor in the HHI measures.  It may also 
reflect changes in HLI reporting and categorization of plan types rather than true 
variation over time.   
We also created concentration measures for Medicaid Managed Care (MMC) to 
enhance the analysis of private insurance.  The National Summary of State Medicaid 
Managed Care Programs from CMS supplements the Medicaid enrollment data from 
HLI.  This data source was added to ensure adequate representation of Medicaid-only 
MCOs in the analysis (Herring & Adams, 2011).  The CMS source provides information 
at the plan level—whether the plan operates statewide or in specific counties, its total 
enrollment, and the type of plan (PCCM, MCO, prepaid inpatient health plan, or PHIP, 
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etc).  Markets in the Medicaid portion of this analysis are defined at the county level 
because states often vary the structure of MMC programs by county.  Previous research 
on Medicaid managed care has used a county as the geographic unit ( (Coughlin, Long, & 
Graves, 2009), (Smith, Cheung, Owens, Wilson, & Simpson, 2007).  To match the HLI 
county-level data, total plan-level enrollment from CMS is apportioned across its service 
area based on the county’s share of the service area population in poverty.   
 The resulting county-level MMC enrollment data from CMS was matched to the 
HLI Medicaid data, and CMS  plans already present in the HLI data were excluded.  
County-level HHIs were created based on summing the squared market shares (based on 
enrollment) of MMC plans.  The number of MMC plans in each county was also 
tabulated.  These county-level HHIs and plan counts were aggregated to the state level, 
weighted by the share of a state’s MMC population residing in the county.  State-level 
HHIs were created based on the statewide enrollment of each MCO.   
 
Table 9: Mean Medicaid HHIs, County vs. State, 2003-2009 
 County-based Medicaid HHI State-based Medicaid HHI 
2003 5998.4  (2841.9) 3352.3   (2566.4) 
2004 5933.5  (2905.5) 3476.8    (2555.6) 
2005 6447.2   (2936.3) 4035.7    (2906.5) 
2006 5557.0   (2788.1) 5674.5   (3774.7) 
2007 5067.9   (2311.7) 5377.6   (3575.6) 
2008 4911.8   (2316.4) 2793.1   (1982.3) 
2009 4610.5   (2104.8) 2753.4   (1835.0) 
Note: Medicaid HHIs are unweighted. 
 
Table 10: Comparison of Mean Commercial HMO HHIs using States, Counties, 




                        
                                             
On average, HHIs developed with the state as the geographic market appear the 
most competitive of the three geographic areas examined.  Counties appear the most 
concentrated on average, and CBSAs fall in between the two.  Weighting by population 
does moderate the differences between the approaches some, but the state-based HHIs are 
still significantly lower than CBSAs or counties.  In a criticism of an article by Robinson 
suggesting that increased insurance consolidation measured at the state level was 
associated with higher premiums (Robinson J. , 2004), Kopit emphasizes that health 
insurance markets are very local in nature.  He argues, “In a state the size of Rhode 
Island, the geographic market could be the entire state, but in larger states, such as 
Pennsylvania, the sale of health insurance products in Pittsburgh does nothing for local 
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Note: CBSAs include MetroSAs, MicroSAs, and rural areas within a state 
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employers in Philadelphia or even Harrisburg.” (Kopit, 2004) Without additional data it 
is difficult to label any of these as the “right” approach, but it is clear that a state-based 
insurance market HHI likely overstates the level of competition in the health insurance 
market.  As enrollment grows in new state-based ACA marketplaces, however, the state 
may become a more appropriate geographic unit because plans may compete more 
broadly across a state.  
Managed Care organizations can report enrollment in multiple products or plans 
within the same geographic area.  For example, in one county in Alabama, the parent 
MCO Wellpoint, Inc. reported commercial fully insured enrollment in several subsidiary 
companies, including Anthem BCBS of Colorado, Anthem BCBS of Connecticut, 
Empire BCBS of New York, Unicare, and BCBS of Georgia.   This may reflect mergers 
or acquisitions of companies, the effect of multisite employers with a health plan 
covering employees across sites, or some other strategic business decision by the MCO.  
When horizontal integration occurs that reduces the number of effective competitors, 
Baker suggests it is increasingly important to account for it in measures of competition 
(Baker L. , 2001).  In 2008 and 2009, HealthLeaders-Interstudy provided enrollment 
information at both the company and MCO level.  The table below provides MSA-level 
HHIs using total commercial enrollment (including fully insured HMOs, PPOs, and POS 
plans) with market share defined at the product level compared with MCO-level market 
share.  The HHIs based on aggregated MCO-level data accounting for common plan 
ownership were on average 380 points higher than the product-level HHI, a statistically 
significant difference.  The overall correlation between the two approaches was 0.93, 
54 
 
indicating that the general trends across MSAs in the measures were similar, even though 
the MCO-based HHI was higher.  These findings suggest it is important to account for 
common ownership of health plans in concentration measures by using MCO-level 
enrollment rather than company-level enrollment. 
Table 11: Total Commercial HHIs with and without adjusting for 
Common MCO ownership, 2008 and 2009 
 Company Level Total 
Commercial HHI 
MCO Level Total 
Commercial HHI 
2008 2905.8 (1595.6) 3233.0 (1463.7) 
2009 2812.3 (1347.4) 3154.7 (1263.2) 
Note: HHIs are weighted by MSA total population and exclude non-MSA areas.  When non-
MSA areas are included, the respective weighted HHIs are: 2962.7 (2008 product level), 
3289.4 (2008 MCO level), 2856 (2009 product level), and 3202.1 (2009 MCO level).   
 
In summary, measures of insurance concentration have typically taken two forms: 
the number of competing firms in a market and the HHI.  In recent years, data has 
become more available to include insurance products beyond HMOs in the HHI, which 
reflects changing enrollment patterns in health insurance.  These findings suggest that 
including these other types of insurance products leads to lower HHIs that are more 
reflective of current enrollment patterns in the insurance marketplace.  The correlations 
among insurance concentration measures developed using different analytic choices 
remains moderately strong to strong, though in some cases the HHI using one method 
may be significantly higher than another.  The CBSA-level HHIs were significantly 
higher than the state-based HHIs, as were HHIs that accounted for common plan 
ownership by MCOs relative to HHIs that did not account for common ownership.  These 
differences highlight that conclusions about the level of competition in a market can be 
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affected by analytic choices in the construction of the concentration measure. The 
relevance of this difference depends on the analytic question. For example, econometric 
studies using fixed effects methods relying on within-case variation over time may be 
less sensitive the absolute value of the HHI than policy decisions regarding enforcement 
or regulation in which the concentration value is more important.   
Relative Insurance Market to Hospital Market Concentration 
 There are several key features of hospital markets in the United States that play an 
important role in affecting competitive interactions between hospitals (Gaynor & Town, 
2012).  The majority of individuals in the US access and pay for hospital care through 
their health insurance plans, and so choice set of available hospitals will depend on their 
health insurance plan and price differentials between hospitals are largely not reflected in 
a patient’s out of pocket costs.  Individuals generally select health plans before the need 
for care arises, though individuals with chronic health needs may have some prior 
knowledge of anticipated provider needs.  Finally, hospitals negotiate inclusion in a 
plan’s provider network and the reimbursement rates the plan pays, as well as utilization 
review and quality monitoring.  Health insurers develop premiums based on these 
reimbursement rates as well as marketing and administrative costs and anticipated profit.  
Health plans compete for market share based upon these premiums, their provider 
networks, and plan quality (when known).  The issue of insurer-hospital bargaining is 
important, therefore, in determining how consumers fare in terms of the prices they pay 
and their experience seeking care in a given market.  As discussed below in more detail, 
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research has found that increased insurance concentration can have a “monopoly busting” 
effect against higher prices charged in more concentrated hospital markets. 
 Gaynor and Town outline a simple model of hospital-insurer bargaining that has 
three main phases: 1) health plans and hospitals bargain to determine the set of hospitals 
in the plan networks and the per-patient reimbursement 2) patients choose health plans 
and 3) patients seek care when the need arises and choose a hospital based on need and 
the plan’s provider network.  In the first phase, insurers and hospitals negotiate over the 
price of inpatient care, aiming to settle on a base price for each admission that is 
multiplied by a disease weight (analogous to a Diagnostic Related Group, or DRG).  
Gaynor and Town calculate the Nash bargaining outcome in which each insurer-hospital 
pair is taken in isolation, though they acknowledge this ignores the effect of negotiations 
on other insurer-hospital diads.  The authors develop agreement and disagreement values 
for each hospital and insurer.  The agreement value for the hospital is the net revenue 
they receive from an insurer’s patient population obtaining care at the hospital, while the 
disagreement outcome assumes the hospital receives a fixed net revenue.  The agreement 
value for the insurer is the gross revenue they gain by having the hospital in the network, 
less expenditures on patient care at the hospital.   The authors conclude that the Nash 
bargaining outcome predicts that a hospital’s price increases with increasing costs, 
bargaining ability, prices of competing hospitals, and the value that the hospital brings to 
the insurer’s network.   
In the second phase, a patient’s choice in health plans is determined by the 
insurance premium for the plan, the hospitals in the plan’s provider network, some 
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unmeasured desirability for the plan, and the error term.  In the final stage of the model, 
patient utility is defined as a function of hospital characteristics such as size, ownership, 
or service offerings, patient characteristics such as age, sex, race, and diagnosis, the 
distance to the hospital from the patient’s home, and error term.   
Researchers have used various approaches to incorporate the relative 
concentration of health insurance and hospital markets into their analytic models.  In an 
exploration of whether HMOs possess monopsony power in the market for hospital 
inpatient and ambulatory services, Feldman and Wholey (2001) define health insurance 
buying power for hospital services as the percentage of inpatient days in the market area 
purchased by each HMO.  Buying power for ambulatory services is measured by the 
number of ambulatory visits purchased by each HMO per 1,000 active physicians in the 
market area.  Bates and Santerre (2008) define health plan buying power as the MSA-
level HHIs for HMOs and PPOs based on enrollment.   
This analysis includes a measure of the relative concentration of insurance 
markets to hospital markets, operationalized by the ratio of insurance to hospital HHIs 
(see Appendix B for detailed methods).  The ratio of insurance HHIs to hospital HHIs 
suggest that, on average, the insurance markets are more concentrated than hospital 
markets.  Across various formulations of hospital and insurance market HHIs, the mean 
ratio of insurance concentration to hospital market concentration remained above 1.0 






Table 12: Mean MSA-level Ratio of Insurance Market HHI to 
Hospital Market HHI, 2003-2009 
  Commercial HMOs Total Privately Insured  
Year Mean Sd Mean Sd 
2003 2.3 1.6 - - 
2004 2 1.3 - - 
2005 2.3 1.6 1.7 1.4 
2006 1.8 1.4 1.4 1.2 
2007 2.3 1.6 1.8 1.3 
2008 2.1 1.5 1.5 1.1 
2009 2.1 1.6 1.4 1 
Note: Hospital HHI based on Medicare discharges for the medium definition of hospitals 
in scope. 
 
We also categorize areas into four groups based on the joint competitiveness of 
their insurance and hospital markets: hospital and insurance markets are both 
competitive, competitive hospital and concentrated insurance market, concentrated 
hospital and competitive insurance markets, and both markets concentrated.  Competitive 
is defined as an HHI below 2500 following FTC guidelines (Table 13).   In this table, the 
categorization is based on three formulations of insurance HHIs (HMO only, Total 
Private, and Total Lives) relative to the Medium, Medicare Discharges hospital HHI 
only.  We include commercial HMO HHIs to provide data for 2003 and 2004 and include 
the total private HHI, which includes the self-insured, to represent the insurance market 
environment hospitals experience when negotiating with insurers.   
The categorization of markets based on the competitiveness of insurance and 
hospital markets shows that most MSAs have hospital HHIs below 2,500, and it was rare 
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than hospital HHIs were above this threshold.  Insurance HHIs were more evenly split 
above and below the threshold.   
 
Table 13:  Categorization of MSAs based on Competitiveness of Private Insurance 















2003 HMO Commercial 12% 53% 3% 32% 
   Total Lives 20% 45% 5% 30% 
2004 HMO Commercial 21% 43% 7% 29% 
  Total Lives 25% 39% 8% 28% 
2005 HMO Commercial 13% 52% 4% 30% 
  Total Private 30% 36% 14% 21% 
  Total Lives 33% 33% 16% 19% 
2006 HMO Commercial 20% 42% 8% 30% 
  Total Private 39% 23% 24% 14% 
  Total Lives 40% 22% 26% 13% 
2007 HMO Commercial 8% 54% 3% 35% 
  Total Private 25% 38% 12% 26% 
  Total Lives 35% 28% 17% 21% 
2008 HMO Commercial 13% 47% 4% 36% 
  Total Private 31% 29% 16% 24% 
  Total Lives 37% 22% 23% 17% 
2009 HMO Commercial 10% 49% 5% 36% 
  Total Private 38% 22% 20% 20% 
  Total Lives 44% 16% 23% 17% 
Notes:  Row percents may not sum to 100 due to rounding.   
Competitive market defined as one with an HHI below 2500.   
Plan enrollment in PPOs was not available in 2003 and 2004, and so the total private HHI could not be 
calculated.  Total Lives in these two years includes HMO, Medicare, and Medicaid managed care 
enrollment.   
Hospital Market HHIs based on the medium definition of markets and use Medicare Hospital Discharges 




Looking Toward ACOs: Other Provider Concentration 
Measures 
In recent years, there has been a push to organize and pay for health care services in 
a more integrated fashion.  One major example is the establishment of Accountable Care 
Organizations (ACOs) as part of the ACA.  These organizations encourage hospitals, 
physicians, and other providers to come together to coordinate care across settings to 
better manage patients, improve quality, and reduce costs.  As the provider community 
becomes more integrated, measures of concentration will need to adapt to this changed 
environment to reflect more accurately the market structure for health care services. 
While the bulk of research assessing concentration in health care services has focused on 
hospitals, some research on the level of competition among other types of health care 
providers, such as nursing homes, dialysis centers, and pharmaceuticals, and the impact 
of competition on associated outcomes has also been conducted.  One possible reason for 
the focus on hospital services is that spending on hospital services accounted for roughly 
one third (31.4%) of total national health care expenditures in 2011, more than any other 
service category.  However, the efforts by payers and policymakers to look to payment 
bundling approaches that hold providers across settings accountable for patient care and 
outcomes has implications for competition in multiple provider markets.  Understanding 
how provider competition is defined in those markets, the extent of the knowledge base 
on the effects of competition, and where gaps remain could aid efforts in evaluating the 
competitive effects of new delivery system approaches.   
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In 1988, Nyman examined the impact of competition in nursing home markets—
using the number of empty nursing home beds at the county level to reflect excess 
demand—on nursing home expenditures per patient (Nyman, 1988).  Nyman found that if 
the average nursing home in an underbedded areas with little competition had been 
located an area with more available beds, it would spend more money each day per 
patient in order to compete in that market.   More recently, Gruneir and colleagues 
examined the relationship between long-term care market competition and the odds of 
having a dementia special care unit, using counties as the definition of a long-term care 
market and the nursing home’s share of beds as the measure of market share (Gruneir, 
Lapane, Miller, & Mor, 2007).  This article found that the presence of a dementia special 
care unit in a nursing home was influenced by the behavior of other nursing homes in the 
market, though the study did not examine the effect of nursing home competition on 
prices or quality.   DeLellis and Oxcan found a positive association between the level of 
nursing home competition, measured at the county level alternatively using the HHI and 
the number of home health agencies, and higher efficiency nursing homes (DeLellis & 
Ozcan, 2013).  Thus, for nursing homes we see market structure based on the number of 
beds, the number of agencies, and the HHI, typically at the county level.   
Some work in both research and anti-trust regulation has also been done in the area 
of dialysis.  In the regulatory area, the FTC required Fresenius Medical Care in 2012 to 
divest 60 dialysis centers in 43 markets around the country in its proposal to acquire rival 
Liberty Dialysis Holdings, Inc. (Federal Trade Commission, 2012).  Cutler, Dafny, and 
Ody performed an analysis of the impact competition on quality, using dialysis as a case 
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study.  Operationalizing dialysis market concentration as the HHI at Dartmouth’s 
Hospital Service Area (HSA) level, the authors found no significant effects of 
competition in the dialysis market on outcomes such as mortality rates, dialysis adequacy, 
and staffing ratios (Cutler, Dafny, & Ody, 2012).  In an analysis examining the 
association between dialysis center for-profit status and hospital days per patient, Lee and 
colleagues include a measure of dialysis market competition defined as the HHI (with 
market share based on number of patients) for all facilities within 30 miles of a given 
facility’s zip code (Lee, Chertow, & Zenios, 2010).  In dialysis, then, we find the HHI 
more commonly used with different geographic definitions (HSAs and a fixed radius 
approach) for the market.   
Historically, physicians practiced predominately as solo providers or in small groups.  
Evidence suggests that the percentage of doctors who are practicing in medium and large-
sized groups is growing.  In addition, hospitals are increasingly purchasing physician 
practices and groups in anticipation of the Affordable Care Act and the advent of ACOs 
(Kocher & Sahni, 2011). Using survey data from the Physician Survey component of the 
Community Tracking Study, Casalino and colleages reported that in 2001, 47% of 
physicians practices in groups of 1-2, down from 54% in 1997 (Casalino, Devers, Lake, 
Reed, & Stoddard, 2003).  The authors also conducted a qualitative study of perceived 
benefits of and barriers to large group medical practice.  The most frequently cited 
benefit of large medical group practices was to gain leverage with health plans, cited by 
81% of the physician group interviewees in the study.  A more recent study of all 
physicians billing Medicare Fee for Service using Medicare claims and provider 
63 
 
enrollment data finds that the percentage of physicians in groups of more than 50 
providers rose from 30.9% in 2009 to 35.6% in 2011 (Welch, Stearns, Bindman, & 
Cuellar, 2013).  In an effort to define geographic markets for physician services and 
assess concentration, Kleiner, Lyons and White use 2009 Medicare patient flow data to 
create specialty-specific physician markets based on the Elzinga-Hogarty methodology.  
This study found considerable variation in the size of geographic markets by physician 
specialty and evidence of concentration in physician markets, particularly for specialists 
practicing in smaller geographic areas (Kleiner, Lyons, & White, 2012).  Berenson and 
colleagues use California’s experience with joint physician-hospital negotiations with 
insurers as a cautionary tale that integrated care through organizations like ACOs may 
lead to higher rates for private payers (Berenson, Ginsburg, & Kemper, 2010).   
Though little evidence about the positive effects of increased concentration in 
physician markets, proponents claim that larger groups, particularly multi-specialty 
groups, can more effectively coordinate care, improve efficiency, and enhance quality 
(Fisher, Staiger, Bynum, & Gottlieb, 2007).  In a study of physician group characteristics 
and outcomes for Medicare beneficiaries, McWilliams and colleagues did find that larger 
independent physician groups exhibited lower per beneficiary expenditures and better 
performance on quality measures, though larger hospital-based groups did not show the 
same benefits (McWilliams, Chernew, Zaslavsky, Hamed, & Landon, 2013).  At the 
same time, larger medical groups have the potential for increased market power with 
health plans given lower transactional costs, larger patient panels, and other incumbent 
advantages such as existing admitting privileges with hospitals (Haas-Wilson & Gaynor, 
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1998).  Dunn and Shapiro linked physician-firm concentration measures based on a fixed 
travel time HHI to commercial insurance claims and found that physicians in more 
concentrated markets charge higher service prices (Dunn & Shapiro, 2013).The relevance 
of this market power will increase as ACOs are implemented and physicians share 
financial and clinical arrangements with other types of providers (Burke & Rosenbaum, 
2010).    
Several aspects of ACOs need to be considered when developing measures of ACO 
market competition.  First, in the review of hospital and insurance concentration 
measures described above, the appropriate design of the concentration measure related 
directly to particular analytic question about the level or effects of competition.  
Researchers and policymakers should identify key questions about ACOs and associated 
effects that account for their distinct nature in the health care delivery system, to spur the 
development of useful competition measures.  This includes both the outcomes for 
Medicare beneficiaries and commercially insured individuals participating in the ACO as 
well as spillover effects (positive or negative) in local health care markets.  Any effects 
ACOs have on the local health care delivery system at large may impact evaluations of 
ACO program effectiveness for Medicare beneficiaries; studies may seek to include 
several comparison groups including non-ACO individuals within and external to the 
local health care market.  With the analytic question in mind, policymakers should 
consider whether to create one summary measure of ACO concentration that incorporates 
service use across sectors or continue to analyze market structure in a more sector-
specific way.  The review above suggests that disparate approaches to measuring market 
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structure have thus far been used, with more sophisticated analytic approaches used in 
areas such as physician concentration.  .    
In addition, CMS currently has a large role in determining which beneficiaries are 
assigned to ACO providers as well as the regions in which ACOs are located through its 
approval process for Pioneer ACOs
6
.  The risk structure, population size, and share of 
savings differ between Pioneer ACOs and ACOS in the Medicare Shared Savings 
Program, and these differences could affect the outcomes of interest in research studies.  
Importantly, ACOs are also virtual in nature and span providers delivering a range of 
services under different payment systems.  Creating a single competition measure for 
ACOs requires determining a common denominator across these varied systems.  Also, 
competition measures and econometric techniques that rely on distance from a fixed 
point—for example, the fixed or variable radius measures for hospitals or Kessler and 
McClellan’s prediction-based instrument for hospital market share (Kessler & McClellan, 
2000) – are unlikely to be feasible for analyses of ACOs.   
The FTC has considered some of these issues in crafting a policy statement 
published in conjunction with the ACO final rule that provided guidance for a “safety 
zone” determination for ACOs that were highly unlikely to cause competitive concerns 
(Federal Trade Commission, 2011).  The FTC focused on three areas--physician services, 
inpatient hospital services, and outpatient services—and used a “primary service area” 
(PSA) definition for each type of service that includes the zip codes from which the ACO 
                                                 
6
 Pioneer ACOs are selected competitively by CMS; all applicant ACOs in the Medicare shared savings 
program that meet program criteria (which may be subject to some bias) are approved to participate in the 
program.   
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members draw 75% of users.  The PSA for each of the three service areas may be 
different.  To be considered in the “safety zone,” the combined market share of the ACO 
members should not exceed 30% of the Medicare allowed charges in the previous year 
(for physicians by specialty), all-payer inpatient discharges or Medicare fee-for-service 
payments (for inpatient services), and Medicare fee-for-service payments for hospital 
outpatient and allowed charges for Ambulatory Surgical Centers (for outpatient services).  
The FTC notes that ACOs outside the safety zone can still be pro-competitive.  This 
approach lends itself to evaluating the effects of ACOs within certain service categories 
rather than across the spectrum of services the ACO provides.   
Some alternative approaches to defining ACO concentration could span all the 
services an ACO provides.  For example, one could base the market share on the number 
of FTE equivalent Medicare-certified providers affiliated with the ACO.  Providers have 
the option to be exclusive to ACOs or provide care to other individuals outside the ACO. 
Thus, determining the appropriate weight to give each provider for the share of their 
practice devoted to the ACO would be challenging and require claims data as well as a 
datafile with beneficiaries assigned to an ACO to match to claims.  Another simple 
measure akin to the HMO penetration measures in studies described above is an ACO 
penetration measure that describes the percentage of Medicare beneficiaries and 
commercially insured enrollees when applicable who are assigned to the ACO.  This 
approach would be simple but would not depict actual utilization, only potential market 
share based on enrollment.  An additional alternative would follow the approach of 
Zwanziger (Zwanziger, Melnick, & Eyre, 1994) and create ACO-level weighted zip code 
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measures of the share of Medicare payments and allowed charges flowing to ACO 
providers.  Though this latter approach would require substantial claims data to 
implement, the common units of money across service types would allow for a range of 
health sectors to be included.  The market would also be defined based on patient flow 
data rather than an arbitrary geographic unit. 
To summarize, while the bulk of research on competition in health care has 
focused on hospitals and health insurance markets, some research has been conducted on 
other sectors as well that includes varied approaches to defining market concentration in 
those sectors.  Compared with hospitals and health insurance, there is relatively little 
empirical research supporting the measures of competition used in this body of literature.  
As vertical integration and care coordination across provider sectors becomes more 
common and more important in the financing and delivery of care, supporting the 
development of competition measures that reflect the unique nature of organizations like 
ACOs will be valuable in understanding the market-based effects and assessing outcomes 




Impact of Health Insurance and Hospital Market 
Concentration  
Understanding the level of competition in hospital and health insurance markets is 
important because competition theoretically has the potential to affect both price and non-
price aspects of health care and consequently consumer welfare.  The following literature 
review assesses whether the theoretical relationship between competition and prices and 
quality has been detected in empirical studies of the real world. 
Effects on Prices: Hospitals 
 The recent literature (since 2000) on the association between hospital competition 
and prices has largely found a positive association between more concentrated hospital 
markets and higher prices.  There is some indication this association grew more 
attenuated in the era of the managed care backlash, when health plans felt pressure to 
include a wider array of providers in their networks and the bargaining position of 
hospitals increases vis a vis health plans. Many reduced-form (also referred to as 
structure-conduct-performance) studies of hospital concentration are based on California, 
a state which has both a long history of managed care and data that facilitate empirical 
analyses, though several recent studies have moved to national data sources.   
Burgess and colleagues used California inpatient hospital data for 1994-1998 to 
create hospital network-level weighted average zip code HHIs, finding that hospital 
system HHI is positively correlated with the average net private revenue per private 
discharge (Burgess, Carey, & Young, 2005).  Zwanziger and Mooney studied the effect 
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of hospital pricing deregulation in New York state in 1997 and found a positive, 
significant relationship between the hospital system HHI (based on the weighted zip-code 
average HHI) and HMO payments per risk-adjusted discharge after the reform  
(Zwanziger & Mooney, 2005).   Another study based on California inpatient data by 
Melnick and Keeler found the hospital-system level HHI  was positively associated with 
growth in private net revenue per private discharge, and hospitals in large systems were 
able to grow prices more than comparable small-system hospitals relative to non-system 
hospitals from 1999 to 2003 (34% vs. 17%) (Melnick & Keeler, 2007).  Using data from 
Florida and California, Dranove and colleagues found that the association between 
concentration and price increased in the 1990s during the growth of managed care and 
leveled off during the 2000s during the managed care backlash (Dranove, Lindrooth, 
White, & Zwanziger, 2008).  This study constructed hospital system HHIs based on 
actual and predicted patient flow data, and employed OLS and IV regression methods to 
estimate the association between hospital concentration, managed care price shopping 
sensitivity (measured as a dichotomous version of managed care penetration), and price 
(measured as the weighted average net revenue per discharge for 10 DRGs).  Antwi and 
colleagues used inpatient data from California to develop county-level HHIs on the 
average net revenue per discharge.  This study found that private pay prices were nearly 
twice as high in 2006 as in 1999, with the highest growth in monopoly markets.  
However, the greatest changes in prices were not geographically correlated with the 
highest changes in hospital concentration (Akosa Antwi, Gaynor, & Vogt, 2009).   
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In a national study examining the anti-competitive effect of hospital closures on 
rival hospitals in urban areas, Wu found that hospitals experiencing the closure of a rival 
located within 5 miles were able to extract greater price growth than other rivals located 
further away within the same market over 1990-2002 (Wu, 2008).  Wu defines price as 
the average private net revenue per private admission, estimated from CMS Medicare 
Cost Reports. Wu employs data at a range of market levels to address different 
methodological concerns.  To control for very local hospital concentration changes that 
may affect treatment and control groups differently, Wu includes the initial HSA-level 
HHI in the model.  However, she uses the HRR to define hospitals within the same 
market and includes HRR fixed effects, based on the theory that hospital prices are 
defined by both hospital and health insurance market structure, and health plans would 
have broader markets for purchasing hospital services.  Wu also includes two measures of 
health plan market structure, the HMO penetration and MSA-level HMO HHI, to control 
for potential differential effects of insurance market structure on treatment and control 
groups.   
Studies of hospital mergers also provide evidence about the impact of hospital 
market structure on prices.  On the whole, studies of hospital mergers find higher prices 
at merging hospitals relative to non-merging hospitals, though the magnitude of this 
effect differs across hospitals and settings.  These studies tend to use a difference-in-
differences approach, examining the effect of the merger on prices for hospitals involved 
in the merger relative to the prices or trend in prices for non-merging hospitals.  Several 
studies have used aggregated price data at the state or national level to examine the effect 
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of mergers on prices, finding a positive association between mergers and prices (Sacher 
& Vitu, 2001), (Krishnan, 2001).  Other studies have used insurance claims as the basis 
for prices.  Capps and Dranove studied the effects of 12 mergers, deriving prices from 
insurance claims paid for inpatient services in 1997-2001.  This study found that nine of 
the mergers experienced price increases that were greater than the median increase 
(Capps & Dranove, Hospital consolidation and negotiated PPO prices, 2004).  Haas-
Wilson and Garmon also use insurer claims from 1997 to 2003 to estimate the effect of 
two mergers in the Chicago area, finding that one merged hospital had prices about 20% 
higher than non-merger hospitals (Haas-Wilson & Garmon, 2011).  A similar study 
examined the effect of mergers in the San Francisco area One challenge with this 
approach is the tension between selecting proximal control hospitals that experience the 
same demand and shocks as the merging hospitals and selecting hospitals further away 
that are unlikely to have their own prices directly affected by the merger but less likely to 
experience the same external factors.  Using an instrumental variables approach to 
address potential endogeneity of hospitals selecting into mergers, Dafny found that prices 
at merging hospitals were 40% higher than at non-merging hospitals (Dafny, Estimation 
and identification of merger effects: An application to hospital mergers., 2009).  Thus, in 
both reduced-form studies and in examinations of hospital mergers, increased hospital 
concentration is associated with higher prices.  
In recent years, economists have turned to nascent methods of structural and 
semi-structural models to estimate the effect of concentration on prices.  The structural 
approach involves estimating economic primitives according to a specific economic 
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model that can then be used to predict outcomes.  Semi-structural approaches estimate 
some of the economic primitives but do not impose a specific economic model on the 
estimation process.  As a result, semi-structural approaches are somewhat less susceptible 
to potential bias from model misspecification in the fully structural approaches.  At the 
same time, the additional flexibility of semi-structural approaches can lead to primitive 
parameter estimates that could vary with costs, demand, or market structure.  An early 
example of a semi-structural approach is outlined in a study by Capps and colleagues in 
which the authors estimated a “willingness to pay” parameter that represents the value 
each hospital brings to a health plan’s provider network (Capps, Dranove, & 
Satterthwaite, 2003).  The willingness to pay value is estimated from patient discharge 
data as a function of patient demographics, zip code, diagnosis, and the hospital to which 
the patient was admitted.  Capps and colleagues then model the price effect of the merger 
as a function of the change in willingness to pay or bargaining leverage.  In their study, 
Capps and colleagues found a positive association between willingness to pay and 
hospital profits.  A similar approach is used by Lewis and Pflum, who find that hospital’s 
willingness to pay is correlated with market power and that hospitals in systems operating 
in multiple markets have greater bargaining power (Lewis & Pflum, 2011).  Ho estimates 
the parameters of a hosptial’s profit function based on consumer preferences about MCO 
characteristics, including the plan’s provider network, and the health plan’s realized 
provider network (Ho K. , 2009).  This study found that hospitals in systems take a bigger 
share of the economic surplus as well as hospitals that are attractive to patients.  Across a 
range of methodological approaches, increased concentration in hospital markets is 
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associated with higher prices.  The magnitude of the associated differs, but the basic 
conclusion is largely consistent across studies.   
Effects on Prices: Health Insurance 
Turning to health insurance, recent literature has generally found that increased 
concentration in health insurance markets leads to increased premiums.  Studies have 
spanned various markets for health insurance coverage, including private employer-
sponsored coverage, Medicare Advantage (formerly known as Medicare plus Choice), 
and Medigap, which is a supplemental policy Medicare beneficiaries can purchase to 
cover cost sharing and benefit gaps in traditional fee-for-service Medicare.  In a study of 
private insurance plans at large employers spanning 1997-2005, Dafny evaluates the 
bargaining relationship between employers and insurers and postulates that insurers with 
greater market power will be able to extract more in premiums from more profitable 
employers as a form of direct price discrimination occurring in an imperfectly 
competitive market (Dafny, 2010).  The findings from this study are consistent with this 
hypothesis—premiums do rise with employer profitability, and the market power of 
health plans to capture employer profitability decreases as the number of health plans in 
the market increases.   
In a related study using the same dataset, Dafny and colleagues estimate the 
association between health insurance market concentration (based on the HHI) and 
growth in employers’ health premiums, controlling for factors that could affect medical 
spending or administrative costs (Dafny, Duggan, & Ramanarayanan, 2011).  In a 
traditional OLS regression, the study did not find an association between the HHI and 
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premium growth.  However, after using an instrumental variables approach to address 
potential endogeneity of the HHI, the association between market concentration and 
premium growth was stronger.   The study also examines the relationship between 
insurance concentration and provider wages, finding that higher concentration is 
associated with lower wages for physicians and slightly higher wages for nurses.   
An alternative approach used by Dranove and colleagues estimates the ratio of the 
population necessary to support a given number of HMOs in a market to the population 
necessary to support one additional HMO (Dranove, Gron, & Mazzeo, 2003).  The 
authors base their model on the theory that a ratio greater than 1 (meaning a greater 
population is necessary to support the additional firm) indicates decreasing profitability.  
National and local HMOs may appeal to different purchasers within the market, and 
Dranove and colleagues estimate the model for all HMOs together as well as various 
combinations of national and local HMOs.  Their findings suggest that national and local 
HMOs do not compete with one another, but additional HMOs of the same type reduces 
insurer profitability.    
In the Medigap insurance market, plan benefit packages are standardized 
according to National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) standards.  
Despite this standardization, Maestas and colleagues found substantial variation in prices 
(Maestas, Schroeder, & Goldman, 2009).  This study uses a search cost model and found 
that insurers experience variation in costs, and therefore loading fees, that contributes to 
the variation in premiums.  This price variation was consistent with findings by 
Sheingold and colleagues, which also documented substantial variation in average 
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monthly premiums for Medigap plans C and F (Sheingold, Shartzer, & Ly, 2010).  
Medigap premiums were more strongly associated with average state Medicare spending 
per beneficiary (reflecting expected medical expenditures), plan size, and policy 
characteristics such as rating strategy than concentration.  However, Medigap monthly 
premiums were significantly higher with increasing market concentration for Medigap 
Plan C, accounting for about 15% of Medigap enrollment in 2010.  A study by Starc also 
found substantial price variation in Medigap, a highly concentrated market, and a greater 
association between market power and prices (Starc, 2010).  Using the two-firm 
concentration ratio as the primary measure of concentration, this study found that a one 
percent increase in the ratio was associated with a 0.26 percent increase in premiums.  
Starc models both adverse selection and market power, finding evidence of both and an 
interesting interrelationship between the two.  In order to keep policies attractive to lower 
risk individuals in an environment of adverse selection, insurers add a smaller market 
over marginal costs to policies than they normally would under monopoly, reducing the 
effects.   
Lustig also models adverse selection and market power, though he focuses on 
insurer behavior in the Medicare plus Choice (M+C, now called Medicare Advantage) 
market (Lustig, 2010).  Comparing the social welfare if no adverse selection were present 
to the welfare observed in the data, Lustig estimates models for markets with increasing 
numbers of M+C firms.  He finds that the welfare loss due to adverse selection increases 
with increasing numbers of firms.  For example, eliminating adverse selection accounts 
for 17% of the welfare difference in a monopoly but about 35% when there are two firms 
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and 50% when there are six or more firms. The lack of competition accounts for a greater 
share of the welfare loss in more concentrated markets.  Thus, across several health 
insurance sectors and various methodological approaches, there is a consistent finding 
that increased concentration is associated with higher premiums and increased insurer 
profitability.   
A small number of studies have examined the impact of increased health 
insurance concentration relative to hospital concentration. In one early study, Feldman 
and Wholey examine HMOs from 1985 to 1997 and the association between one HMO’s 
importance as a purchaser of hospital services (as defined above) on hospital output and 
price (Feldman & Wholey, 2001).  This study finds that increased HMO buying power is 
associated with lower hospital costs and increased output.  Another more recent study by 
Bates and Santerre includes PPOs and more recent data, using an instrumental variables 
approach to find evidence that increased insurance concentration is not associated with 
monopsony power, characterized by a fall in hospital output, and they find some evidence 
to suggest that metropolitan hospitals offer increased services when health insurance 
concentration increases (Bates & Santerre, 2008).  In another national study with data 
from 2001-2003, Moriya and colleagues estimated the relationship between the state-
level insurance HHI and Health Service Area (HSA)  hospital system-level market HHI 
(based on staffed hospital beds) and transaction price, measured as DRG-adjusted 
payments per inpatient admission.   This study found that increased insurer concentration 
is negatively associated with hospital prices while increased hospital concentration is not 
associated with higher prices (Moriya, Vogt, & Gaynor, 2010).  All three of these studies 
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suggest that increased insurance concentration has a countervailing effect on hospital 
prices.    
Effects on Quality: Hospitals 
 In addition to competing on price, hospitals—particularly in settings with 
administratively-set prices such as Medicare—may compete on non-price factors 
including quality.  A number of studies have been conducted assessing the impact of 
competition on quality in Medicare, which may reflect both the theoretical appeal of a 
regulated-price environment and the greater availability of data allowing for quality 
measurement.  These studies typically adopt a conceptual framework of structure-
conduct-performance in keeping with Donabedian’s quality framework (Donabedian, 
1965), in which the market and institutional structure affects firm conduct, which in turn 
affect industry performance   
While the research on the effect of hospital competition and price is generally 
consistent in demonstrating that increased competition lowers hospital prices, the 
findings from Medicare studies examining the relationship to quality have been more 
mixed.  In some cases, increased competition increases quality and in others quality is 
unaffected or decreased.  For example, Kessler and McClellan (2000), find that increased 
hospital concentration reduces quality.  In one of the earlier studies on this topic, Kessler 
and McClellan examine risk-adjusted one year AMI mortality, using instruments for the 
hospital HHI with market shares based on patient zip code distance from the hospital.  
The probability of 1-year mortality increased by about 4 percent for beneficiaries in the 
most concentrated hospital markets relative to the least concentrated markets.   
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 In contrast, several studies have found that hospital competition has no effect on 
quality or even that quality is worse in more competitive hospital markets.  
Gowrisankaran and Town (2003) study the effects of competition on AMI and 
pneumonia mortality in Los Angeles County and also use a measure of hospital 
competition based on patient distance similar to that in Kessler and McClellan.  In this 
case, the researchers develop hospital-specific HHIs for Medicare, HMOs, and other 
payers and find that mortality is higher for   Medicare beneficiaries in more competitive 
Medicare hospital markets.  More recently, Maeda and Lo Sasso examined the 
relationship between competition (measured as the HRR-level HHI based on the share of 
heart failure patients at each hospital) and short- and long-term mortality from heart 
failure (Maeda & Lo Sasso, 2012).  This study found no significant association between 
hospital competition and performance measures or mortality.  In an analysis that included 
hospital competition as well as HMO penetration and competition, Mukamel and 
colleagues similarly found no association between hospital competition and risk-adjusted 
mortality (Mukamel, Zwanziger, & Tomaszewski, 2001).   
 Though the theoretical relationship between competition and quality is less clear 
in environments where the market determines prices (Gaynor M. , 2006), several studies 
have been conducted that adopt the SCP model or evaluated the effects of mergers or 
price deregulation.  As with the literature in the Medicare domain, the findings regarding 
the relationship of competition and quality are inconsistent in the studies based on the 
private market with some studies concluding that competition has no effect on or 
decreases quality (Encinosa & Bernard, 2005) (Ho & Hamilton, 2000), (Capps C. , 2005) 
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or quality increases (Sohn & Rathouz, 2003), (Rogowski, Jain, & Escarce, 2007).  
However, these studies tend to focus on one or a small number of states.  The two 
exceptions are national studies by Howard (2005) and Abraham and colleagues (2007), 
both of which find a small increase in quality associated with more competitive markets.  
Mutter and colleagues (Mutter, Romano, & Wong, 2011) study the effects of mergers in 
16 states on 25 patient quality or patient safety indicators, finding heterogeneous effects 
on quality based on the merger and quality indicator analyzed.  While there was a 
consistent finding regarding the effect of hospital concentration on prices, the review of 
the studies above suggests that the effect on quality is more heterogenous and may 
depend on the quality outcome assessed.   
 
Effects on Quality: Health Insurance 
Relatively fewer studies have been conducted on the impact of health insurance 
concentration or market structure on quality.  Building upon their two previous studies 
examining HMO competition and quality (Scanlon, Swaminathan, Chernew, Bost, & 
Shevock, 2005), (Scanlon D. , Swaminathan, Chernew, & Lee, 2006) that found no 
association between insurance competition and quality, Scanlon and colleagues improve 
upon their methods by using market fixed effects along with plan-level data from the 
National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA) reporting Healthcare Effectiveness 
Data and Information Set (HEDIS) and Consumer Assessment of Health Plans (CAHPS) 
measures (Scanlon D. , Swaminathan, Lee, & Chernew, 2008). This study is a reduced-
form approach that used Interstudy data to create MSA-level HHIs for the commercially 
insured HMO population, with enrollment aggregated to the MCO level when applicable, 
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as well as the number of HMOs in the market.  After including MSA-level fixed effects 
to control for time-invariant unobservable factors that may be associated with quality, 
this study found that increased HMO competition is not associated with improved 
quality.    
However, another study examining competition in Medicaid managed care 
(MMC) in three states did find higher rates of inpatient pediatric adverse events with 
decreased competition (Smith, Cheung, Owens, Wilson, & Simpson, 2007).  This study 
includes a measure of hospital market concentration, defined as the hospital-level 
weighted average of patient zip code HHIs.  The researchers developed an index of MMC 
concentration based on the county-level HHI as well as the proportion of Medicaid 
discharges occurring at that hospital.  The researchers then dichotomize these indices into 
dummy variables based on whether the HHI falls above or below 1,800.  In the model 
that includes state and year fixed effects, the odds of a pediatric safety event was about 
60% higher in concentrated Medicaid markets relative to competitive markets.  After 
including county-year dummy variables, the MMC concentration was significant only at 
the 10% level, though the interaction of hospital and MMC market concentration 
continued to be significant at the 5% level.   
 In another state-specific study focused on MMC, Millet and colleagues examine 
beneficiaries living in counties with a choice in MMC plans have higher rates of 
ambulatory care-sensitive hospital admissions (Millett, Chattopadhyay, & Bindman, 
2010).  The study found that beneficiaries with a choice in plans had 6.58 ambulatory 
care-sensitive admissions per 1,000 compared with 6.27 for beneficiaries with no choice 
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in plans.  The authors suggest this “unhealthy effect” of competition largely reflects 
delayed enrollment in MMC plans associated with plan choice; nearly 95% of 
beneficiaries with no choice in plans had 12 months of continuous enrollment, compared 
with 79.2% for beneficiaries with a choice in plans.    
 In summary, the national studies of the association between health insurance 
competition and quality suggest there is no statistically significant association between 
concentration and quality.  One state study ound higher rates of adverse events with 
decreased competition, and another state-specific study defining competition as 
beneficiary choice in MMC plans found a negative association between competition and 
quality.  On the balance, then, it appears that health insurance competition does not have 
an established, statistically significant association with quality as measured by the 
studies.   
Discussion 
Consistent with published findings, the approach in this study found that hospital 
and health insurance markets (both Medicaid Managed Care and private insurance 
markets) are concentrated.  The average state-level HHI in Medicaid managed care has 
remained above 3,600 since 2003, MSA-level total commercial HHI has remained above 
2,900 since 2005, and the HRR-level hospital HHI has remained above 2,875 since 2003.  
The findings do not suggest large changes in the relative balance of insurer to hospital 
market concentration in the previous decade at the national level.  In general, there was 
high correlation among the measures created using different analytic choices regarding 
market definition. However, some decision points such as the geographic area or 
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measures based on Medicaid enrollment and discharges stand out as having a greater 
impact on measured market concentration.   Thus, analysts interested in concentration in 
safety net services would be well-served to use one of the Medicaid-based HHIs, whereas 
analysts searching for a more general measure of hospital concentration should avoid 
Medicaid-based measures given the potentially different conclusions about market 
concentration that may result.  As always, the researcher should be careful to use a 
measure of competition that is appropriate for the analytic question at hand, matching the 
market definition to the scope of the analytic question and understanding the needs of the 
intended audience.  The best measure for a broad assessment of hospital concentration 
may be quite different than the ideal measure for a more targeted analysis focusing on the 
effects of concentration in cataracts surgery on vision outcomes.  Similarly, policymakers 
should understand the implications of tracking concentration or implementing policy to 
address issues based on a particular measure of concentration, including a familiarity 
with what the measure does and does not describe in terms of market structure and the 
strengths and limitations of various measures.  The longitudinal trends in these measures 
was also consistent, and so methods that draw upon longitudinal variation are likely to be 
as affected by the choice in measure than methods that rely on cross-sectional variation.    
While this paper attempts to compare many different approaches to measuring 
market competition in hospitals and health insurance, data limitations prevented us from 
empirically comparing every approach discussed or used in the literature.  As such, this 
study cannot determine whether the measured level of market concentration based on 
those measures is consistent with or different from the measures included in this study.   
83 
 
The review of studies assessing the impact of competition in hospital and 
insurance markets finds great consistency among the literature addressing hospital 
competition and price.  These studies, using a variety of measures of hospital 
concentration, find that more concentrated hospital markets are associated with higher 
prices.  The literature was less consistent regarding the impact of hospital competition on 
quality, with some studies reporting a negative effect of increased concentration on 
quality and some finding a positive association.  This could reflect the more diverse array 
of outcomes and conditions assessed in quality studies compared with price, which was 
defined largely as either the net revenue per discharge or inpatient prices from claims 
data.  As suggested by Gaynor (2006), the association between competition and price 
may be tighter than that for quality, and failure to account for possible confounding 
variables or sources of bias could consequently have a greater impact on studies with 
quality as the outcome.  The studies of health insurance competition also generally find 
increased prices associated with increased health insurance concentration; the few studies 
of health insurance competition and quality have found no significant association 
between competition and quality.  The studies that have carefully examined the relative 
concentration of health insurance and hospital markets through health plan buying power 
or leverage have demonstrated a “monopoly busting” relationship such that prices are 
lower and output higher with increased health plan market power relative to hospitals 
compared to less concentrated health insurance markets.      
The Affordable Care Act seeks to make changes in both health insurance and 
delivery system that will improve quality of care and reduce costs.  As the research 
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community evaluates the effectiveness of these initiatives, it is important to include an 
assessment of the effects on market concentration and to gain an improved understanding 
of the function of new markets such as insurance marketplaces and ACOs.  Researchers 
should explore new measures of concentration for these more integrated markets and 
pursue evidence to substantiate these measures and also to assess the impact of integrated 





Paper 2: Health Insurance Competition and Its Impact 
on Consumer Access and Satisfaction 
Abstract 
Increased competition is often discussed as a tool for improving shortcomings in 
the current US health care system.  While research finds that the level of market 
competition is associated with health care prices, the effect on consumers’ access to care 
and satisfaction is largely unexplored.  This study uses measures of competition in health 
insurance and hospital markets and consumer-reported information from the Medical 
Expenditure Panel Survey from 2003-2009 to assess the impact of health insurance and 
hospital competition and the balance of the two on consumer’s experiences in Medicaid 
managed care (MMC) and private insurance.  On average, health insurance markets were 
concentrated during this time—the average Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) at the 
state level for MMC was 5991 (SD 2703) in 2003 and 4385 (SD 1970) in 2009.  The 
average MSA-level private market HHI was 2842 (1595) in 2005 and 2784 (1509) in 
2009.  Controlling for individual and market-level characteristics that could influence 
access to care and consumer satisfaction with their health plan, this study found that the 
level of competition in a market is largely an insignificant factor in consumers’ 
experiences.  However, the number of MCOs was a statistically significant positive 
predictor of overall health plan satisfaction (0.005, p<=0.00) as was the ratio of the 
private HHI to hospital HHI (0.67, p<0.007) after including MSA fixed effects.   
Privately insured respondents were slightly more likely to have a usual source of care in 
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MSAs where the relative insurance concentration was higher (OR 1.058, p. 0.068), other 
factors held constant.   An imbalance in the relative concentration of insurance and 
hospital markets was also associated with delaying or not getting care; privately insured 
individuals were more likely to delay or not get care in MSAs where the health insurance 
market was competitive and the hospital market concentrated relative to MSAs 
competitive in both markets (1.218, p<0.039), with a smaller and less significant effect 
when the hospital market was competitive and the insurance market concentrated.  These 
results suggest that the effect of increased competition in health care markets on 
consumers’ access to care and health plan satisfaction is moderate at best; while policies 
to increase competition in health care may be warranted, this study indicates these 
policies are not likely to have a significant impact on consumers’ experiences with their 
health plan.   
Introduction 
The health insurance industry has experienced consolidation among insurers—
large firms have acquired smaller plans and merged with other large firms (Robinson 
2004) (Kirchoff, 2013).  The hospital industry has also experienced consolidation in 
recent years, resulting in increased costs and potential reductions in quality (Vogt, Town, 
& Williams, 2006).  The American Medical Association (AMA) publishes an annual 
report on concentration in the health insurance industry and concluded the majority of 
metropolitan markets like Atlanta or Denver are highly concentrated and dominated by 
one or two insurers. In nearly half (38%) of metropolitan areas, one insurer had a market 
share of 50% or more (American Medical Association, 2012). The two largest health 
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insurers (Wellpoint and United) controlled 36% of the commercial market nationwide, or 
67 million covered lives.   
 While a robust body of literature has demonstrated that increased hospital and 
insurance concentration is associated with higher prices and premiums, (Moriya, Vogt, & 
Gaynor, 2010; Frakt, 2010) (Gaynor & Town, 2012), there is little information on how 
competition impacts the consumer in other ways—namely, consumers’ perceptions about 
health quality and access.  This study adds to the body of research by examining the 
impact of health insurance competition and insurers’ relative bargaining power with 
hospitals on consumers’ perceptions of quality, focusing on access to care and 
satisfaction with their health plan.  This study examines both the private insurance and 
the Medicaid markets, providing the opportunity to determine if market concentration has 
similar effects across these markets.   
Though research on insurance competition has largely focused on private HMOs, 
the share of Americans who receive public coverage through Medicaid managed care 
(MMC) contracts is significant and growing.  In 2008, 71% of Medicaid beneficiaries 
were enrolled in managed care (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2010).  With its very low 
consumer cost sharing requirements and limited consumer premiums, the Medicaid 
program provides an opportunity to examine the impact of concentration on consumers’ 
perceived quality and access while removing the effect of prices on consumer plan 




Competition in the health insurance industry remains a key policy issue through 
the implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordability Act of 2010 (ACA).  
Millions of individuals are expected to gain Medicaid coverage in 2014, and a large 
proportion of them will likely enroll in managed care.  Further, regulators are charged 
with determining requirements for plans participating in the health insurance exchange 
and certifying compliance.  In addition, federal and state regulators have some influence 
over the number of plans participating in the exchange.  This study provides information 
to guide discussion about the appropriate level of competition, particularly as it relates to 
the impact on consumers. 
This study focuses on the impact of market structure on consumer experiences in two 
different insurance markets, MMC and private group health insurance.  Following upon 
previous work describing the level of competition in MMC and private insurance markets 
as well as the relationship to hospital market concentration at the local level (Shartzer, 
2013), this study seeks to answer the following research questions: what is the impact of 
health insurance concentration and the relative concentration of insurance and hospital 
markets on consumers’ reported access to care and experience with their health plan?  
According to economic theory, price competition in health care is desirable because 
it can lead to lower costs for consumers, creating broader access to services and products.  
Non-price competition can lead to improved quality and enhanced innovation (U.S. 
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, 2004).  As markets become more 
monopolistic, consumer welfare is compromised because the monopolist can charge 
higher prices and reap more profit than under competitive market dynamics.  Health 
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insurers are both sellers of insurance as well as purchasers of medical services from 
hospitals, doctors, and other health providers, and so according to theory concentrated 
insurance markets can raise both monopolistic and monopsonistic concerns.  Research 
has found that insurers in more concentrated markets can extract greater profits from 
employers and charge higher premiums (Dafny, 2010), (Dafny, Duggan, & 
Ramanarayanan, 2011). 
The hospital industry has also grown more concentrated over time, raising 
independent concerns about the impact on costs and quality (Vogt, Town, & Williams, 
2006).  Hospital costs represent about a third of every dollar spent on personal health care 
in 2009 (Martin, 2011), making the negotiation between insurers and hospitals an 
important determinant of the overall premium.  Looking at the balance of power between 
insurers and hospitals in this negotiation, concentration in the health insurance market 
could have the “monopoly busting” effect of eliciting lower prices or higher quality from 
hospitals.  Research has shown that the “monopoly busting” effect exists for prices such 
that output is higher and prices lower in areas with more concentrated health insurance 
markets relative to hospital markets , but the research has not examined whether this 
holds true for quality (Bates & Santerre, 2008; Moriya, Vogt, & Gaynor, 2010).   
The association between competition in insurance markets and the impact on the 
consumer has also largely focused on prices rather than quality.  These studies have 
generally found there to be a positive association between the level of consolidation in 
the health insurance market and prices, in terms of profit, premiums, and growth in 
premiums. For example, Dafny and colleagues estimated insurance premiums rose 7 
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percentage points in a typical market from 1998 to 2006 due to the rise in insurance 
concentration (Dafny, Duggan, & Ramanarayanan, 2011).   In theory, health insurers can 
maximize profit by increasing revenue through prices or by constraining spending on its 
costs such as medical claims or plan administration.  Quality, like price, could be 
influenced by market characteristics because quality is also “an endogenous outcome of 
the competitive process” (Scanlon 2008). In markets where prices are regulated (such as 
in Medicaid), insurers may compete primarily on quality in order to gain or maintain 
market share whereas when prices are not determined, insurers could compete both on 
price and quality (Gaynor, 2006). 
Consumers experience the “benefits” of a health plan in several ways—the medical 
benefits of covered services, cost sharing requirements, the extent and quality of provider 
networks for covered services, as well as the quality of the health plan’s customer 
service. Research suggests that an individual’s enrollment choice among available health 
plans is shaped by both insurance characteristics (premiums, out-of-pocket costs, and 
extent of covered benefits) and delivery system characteristics (Berki & Ashcraft, 1980). 
Available plans are generally determined by employers or state Medicaid offices, but 
some with non-group coverage purchase plans directly in the marketplace. Consumers 
use multidimensional evaluative criteria of cost, freedom, access, and quality to choose 
plans (Thomas, 2004). Thus, insurers can modify internal characteristics like premiums, 
cost-sharing, and customer service (reflecting cost and quality) as well as the 
restrictiveness, quality, and accessibility of their contracted network. Theoretically, the 
level of market competition determines the ability of insurers to alter the benefits of 
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plans; in concentrated markets, insurers could offer higher cost plans with more 
restrictive networks, lower quality, and reduced access while maintaining market share. 
One pioneering study examined the relationship between competition and quality 
using plan-level outcome and control variables in a fixed effects model (Scanlon, 
Swaminathan, Lee, & Chernew, 2008).  This study assessed a plan’s mean HEDIS and 
CAHPS scores, including the plan’s mean CAHPS health plan rating as a function of 
health plan ownership and other plan and market traits.  This analysis found no 
significant association between quality and health insurance competition.  However, 
another study examining competition in Medicaid managed care in three states found 
higher rates of pediatric adverse events with decreased competition (Smith, Cheung, 
Owens, Wilson, & Simpson, 2007). These early studies do not provide a clear consensus 
about the effect of insurance concentration on quality.  In an effort to further explore this 
relationship, this national study uses a model that includes individual characteristics such 
as age and health status to control for relevant factors that are correlated with market 
structure or access and satisfaction and are not included in the plan-level model used by 
Scanlon and colleagues.   
This study features a distinct analysis within the Medicaid program, which provides 
an opportunity to examine the impact of competition and bargaining power while 
consumer premiums and cost sharing relatively constant across individuals because both 
are extremely limited in MMC.  In effect, the analysis in Medicaid filters out the role of 
premiums in the self-reported quality and access measures. Further, this study uses 
recent, nationally representative data that includes PPOs over several years, enhancing 
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the generalizability and validity of the research findings beyond previous studies that 
only include measures of HMO competition.  This study also explicitly examines the 
issue of insurer-hospital bargaining power and its impact on consumer-reported quality 
and access, whereas previous research in this area has focused on price.   
Methods 
This study uses a quasi-experimental design to assess the impact of market 
structure on consumer experiences with health plans, taking advantage of changes in 
health insurance and hospital market structure over time within areas to identify the 
impact on the consumer.  With multiple years of data, this study employs a longitudinal 
analysis of cross-sectional data with multivariate statistical regressions.   
Market Concentration Measures 
This study included individual and market-level variables from several data 
sources and developed market concentration measures specific to private insurance, 
Medicaid, and hospitals using the geographic area most appropriate for each.  The 
primary data source for health insurance competition was HealthLeaders-Interstudy 
(HLI) data.  This source contained plan-level enrollment information at the county level 
for managed Medicaid and Medicare, HMOs, PPOs, and POS plans and reports 
enrollment separately for self-insured and fully-insured plans, however only HMO, 
Medicare, and Medicaid enrollment were reported in 2003 and 2004 with other types 
added in subsequent years.  In addition to insurance market HHIs, we calculate managed 
care penetration rates using the HLI data.  We created product-specific HHIs (i.e. PPOs 
only) as well as market wide analyses (aggregated HMO, PPO, managed Medicare, etc) 
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by managed care organization (MCO), for each MSA for the commercially insured 
population.  The HLI data is used by the health insurance industry and researchers as a 
reliable measure of enrollment across plans; 93% of published studies using the HHI to 
examine the impact of health insurance competition use Interstudy data (Baker, 2001; 
Scanlon, Chernew, Swaminathan, & Lee, 2006).   
The National Summary of State Medicaid Managed Care Programs from CMS 
supplemented the Medicaid enrollment data from HLI.  This data source was added to 
ensure adequate representation of Medicaid-only MCOs in the analysis (Herring & 
Adams, 2011).  The CMS source provides information at the plan level—whether the 
plan operates statewide or in specific counties, its total enrollment, and the type of plan 
(PCCM, MCO, prepaid inpatient health plan, or PHIP, etc).  Markets in the Medicaid 
portion of this analysis were defined at the county level because states often vary the 
structure of MMC programs by county.  Previous research on Medicaid managed care has 
used a county as the geographic unit (Coughlin, Long, & Graves, 2009), (Smith, Cheung, 
Owens, Wilson, & Simpson, 2007).  To match the HLI county-level data, we apportioned 
total plan-level enrollment from CMS across its service area based on the county’s share 
of the service area population in poverty.   
 We matched the resulting county-level MMC enrollment data from CMS to the 
HLI Medicaid data and removed CMS plans already present in the HLI data.  County-
level HHIs were created based on summing the squared market shares (based on 
enrollment in January of each year) of MMC plans.  The number of MMC plans in each 
county was also tabulated.  Next, these county-level HHIs and plan counts were 
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aggregated to the state level, weighted by the share of a state’s MMC population residing 
in the county. 
 Using the HLI data, private market HHIs were created by summing county-level 
MCO enrollment to the MSAs level, aggregating plans operated by the same MCO when 
applicable.  For example, we summed enrollment for all of Wellpoint’s plans with 
members living in an area.  Enrollment was summed by plan type and combinations of 
plan type: HMO only, PPO only, total commercial (HMO + PPO), and total lives (HMO, 
PPO, managed Medicare, and managed Medicaid).  We create HHIs for commercial 
HMOs and total enrollment for 2003-2009, though the total enrollment in 2003 and 2004 
does not include commercial PPOs; the HHIs for PPO-only, total commercial, and total 
private market share were created for 2005-2009 based on HLI reporting.  Table 14 
summarizes the plan types included in the private market measures each year.  For all 
years, plans likely to be “rental networks” in which a provider network forms 
independently and is then contracted out to interested parties like smaller insurers were 
excluded because these products fall outside the traditional insurance-provider 
negotiating paradigm.   
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 The measure of hospital market concentration was a Hospital Referral Region 
(HRR)-level HHI, developed using American Hospital Association (AHA) Annual 
Survey data for 2003-2009.  The AHA’s Health Forum administers the annual survey for 
the purpose of “collecting utilization, financial, and personnel information from each of 
the nation’s hospitals.”
7
 The AHA sends the survey to registered hospitals, which 
                                                 
7
 American Hospital Association Annual Survey Database 2010 Estimation Document, 
http://www.ahadata.com/ahadata/html/AHASurvey.html  
Table 14: HLI Private Plan Enrollments Included in HHI by Year  
 HMO HHI PPO HHI Total Commercial 
HHI 
Total Private HHI  
includes self-insured  
2003  Fully-insured 
Commercial HMO  no separate PPO enrollment reported 
 2004 Fully-insured 
Commercial HMO 
2005 Fully-insured 





Commercial PPO + 
Commercial HMO 
Fully-insured 
Commercial PPO + 
Commercial HMO + 
PPO self-insured 
2006 Fully-insured 





Commercial PPO + 
Commercial HMO 
Fully-insured 
Commercial PPO + 
Commercial HMO + 
PPO self-insured 
2007 Fully-insured 





Commercial PPO + 
Commercial HMO 
Fully-insured 
Commercial PPO + 
Commercial HMO + 
PPO self-insured 
2008 Fully-insured 






Commercial PPO + 
Commercial HMO + 





Commercial PPO + 
Commercial HMO + 
POS fully-insured + 
PPO self-insured + POS 
self-insured  
2009 Fully-insured 





Commercial PPO + 





Commercial PPO + 
Commercial HMO + 
POS fully-insured + 
PPO self-insured + POS 
self-insured 
NOTES  
1 Replaced two hmos with negative enrollment with zero enrollment 
2 CDHP enrollment in January 2008 was allocated to PPO SI and FI based on the FI/SI split from July 2008 
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comprise 98% of the 6,500 hospitals in the survey universe; non-registered hospitals are 
identified through state and local hospital associations, the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services, and other national organizations and governmental bodies.  The 
overall response rate for the Annual Survey was approximately 85% of the 6,500 
hospitals in the survey universe each year.  Hospitals report data for their fiscal year, 
generally a 365-day period, primarily through an online portal.  Data was analyzed for the 
hospital fiscal year as reported in the AHA survey. 
 Based upon our research assessing various approaches to defining competition in 
hospital markets, this study included general acute care hospitals as well as specialty 
hospitals that are likely to compete with general hospitals and in some cases provide 
more services than general hospitals in their field of specialization (Government 
Accountability Office, 2003).  The hospital types included: surgical; cancer; heart; 
obstetrics and gynecology; eye, ear, nose and throat; rehabilitation; orthopedic; chronic 
disease; other specialty; and children’s general hospitals.  These hospitals represent about 
89% of short term hospitals in the 50 states and DC each year.  We excluded hospitals 
located in US territories, long-term hospitals, and hospitals of other service categories 
like children’s specialty hospitals.
8
   
 We used a “chain-adjusted” Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) as a measure of 
market concentration (Robinson J. , 2011).  We took into account hospitals that are 
members of the same health care system within the same geographic area that are likely 
                                                 
8
 The AHA identifies long-term hospitals as1) hospitals reporting a separate long-term unit and whose 
long-term unit admissions are greater than the short-term admissions or 2) a hospital that does not report a 
separate long-term unit but whose average ratio of inpatient days to admissions is 30 or more. 
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to negotiate jointly with insurance companies.  Hospitals that are members of multi-
hospital systems are able to charge higher prices than non-system members, exerting 
greater bargaining power with insurers (Melnick G. K., 2007).  Roughly 55% of hospitals 
are members of a multi-hospital health care system each year, though these systems may 
be spread out over multiple geographic markets. A geographic unit (hospital referral 
regions) determines market boundaries.  We imputed Hospital Referral Regions (HRR) 
for hospitals missing this data in the AHA Database using a zip code-HRR crosswalk 
from the Dartmouth Atlas.
9
    
 The number of total Medicare discharges served as the basis for calculating 
hospital market share in this study.  Researchers have also used staffed beds and total 
discharges to calculate the hospital market Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (Keeler, 1999).  
Fee-for-service Medicare beneficiaries have the freedom to choose health care providers 
and hospitals, and so utilization based on Medicare beneficiaries is unrelated to network 
contracts private insurers negotiate with hospitals and is thus exogenous to private health 
plan competition.  Discharges are preferable to staffed beds and inpatient days, which 
respectively reflect capacity rather than true utilization and exaggerate the market share 
of hospitals with sicker patients and longer average stays.  While the AHA annual survey 
does include measures of outpatient hospital utilization, we followed the practice of the 
Federal Trade Commission in its evaluation of hospital mergers and focused on inpatient 
acute care.
10
  For verification, we created HHIs based upon multiple measures and 
                                                 
9
 Dartmouth Atlas zip code crosswalks, 2002-2010, http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/tools/downloads.aspx  
10
 See, for example, Federal Trade Commission administrative complaint “In the Matter of Inova Health 




examined the consistency of conclusions about hospital market concentration based on 
the different iterations of the HHI.   
 This analysis included a measure of the relative concentration of insurance 
markets to hospital markets, measured by the ratio of insurance to hospital HHIs.  In 
order to have a common geographic unit and capture the insurance environment 
experienced by hospitals, we apportioned the county-level insurance enrollment data to 
HRRs using another crosswalk from Dartmouth.  We constructed the ratios at the HRR 
level and then weighted the ratios as well as the hospital HHIs back to states or MSAs 
using the county-HRR crosswalk to be consistent with other variables in the analysis.  
Finally, we categorized areas into four groups based on the competitiveness (defined as 
an HHI < 2500 following FTC guidelines for a highly concentrated market) of their 
insurance and hospital markets as depicted in Figure 3 below: hospital and insurance 
markets are both competitive, competitive hospital and concentrated insurance market, 
concentrated hospital and competitive insurance markets, and both markets concentrated.   








Competitive Insurance Market Type 1 Type 3 
Concentrated Insurance Market Type 2 Type 4 
 
Local Area Characteristics 
For the MMC analysis, the CMS managed care data was used to develop control 
variables reflecting the MMC environment in each county—indicators for mandatory 
99 
 
MMC enrollment for parents and children, the length in months of plan lock-in, 
availability of primary care case management (PCCM) as an alternative to enrollment in 
an MCO, and whether the state operated multiple MMC waivers.  Additional market-
level control variables for this analysis were drawn from the Area Resource File (ARF), a 
collection of county-level statistics compiled by the Health Resources and Services 
Administration (HRSA).  The ARF has a range of demographic, health insurance market, 
and geographic characteristics.  Multiple years of the ARF were used to provide control 
variables through the study period.   
The local area characteristics from the ARF included to control for regional 
factors that could influence access and satisfaction based on the availability of providers 
and local utilization patterns, are median household income, hospital admissions per 
10,000, total doctors per 10,000, total specialists per 10,000, the percentage of hospitals 
that are for profit, and the number of FQHCs per 100,000 people.  We selected these 
factors based on the Andersen-Aday model of access to care (Aday & Andersen, 1974).  
We summed the county-level data from the ARF to the state or MSA, weighting by the 
county population.  To control for plan premiums and generosity, we used the MSA 
average premium for family coverage from the Kaiser/HRET annual survey of employer 
health benefits in the private market analysis and the state average Medicaid payments 
per adult in the MMC analysis. 
Access to Care and Health Plan Satisfaction 
Dependent variables measuring consumers’ reported access to care and 
experience with health plans in both analyses came from the Medical Expenditure Panel 
100 
 
Survey (MEPS) Household Component, which is overseen by the Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality (AHRQ).  The MEPS is a nationally-representative household 
survey of a subsample of households who participate in the National Health Interview 
Survey.   The satisfaction with plans supplement and the access to care supplement are 
administered in the second and fourth rounds of the MEPS, and question wording is 
based on the Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (CAHPS). For 
public plans, these and other relevant variables are located in the full-year consolidated 
data file; for private plans, these satisfaction with plans variables are located in the 
Person Round Plan (PRPL) file each year.   
 MEPS includes restricted-use geographic identifying variables that indicate the 
respondent’s state and county of residence.  The private market and Medicaid files 
containing independent and control variables were merged to the MEPS by state for 
MMC and MSA for the private market analysis.  In the years 2003-2009, MEPS surveyed 
about 32,000 individuals on average.  MEPS respondents eligible for inclusion in the 
Medicaid sample were enrolled in Medicaid HMO coverage at the time the supplements 
were administered in rounds 2 or 4 and did not have private coverage at that time.  The 
private market sample includes all individuals with employer or other group coverage in 
rounds 2 or 4 who did not have Medigap insurance, were eligible for the satisfaction 
questions because someone in the household was covered by the plan at the time of the 
interview, and were a member of the household during the round (for example, not 
stationed abroad). While the access questions reflect a specific person’s experience, the 
CAHPS questions reflect the family’s experience with the health plan covering the 
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policyholder.  To address potential duplicate answers among family members, we created 
Medicaid and private market subsamples for the CAHPS questions including only the 
responses from the survey first respondent.  Table 15 shows the sample sizes each year. 
  
Table 15: Overall MEPS Sample Size for 
Medicaid Managed Care and Private 
Market Analyses 
Year MMC  N Private Market  N 
2003 3,168 16,816 
2004 3,419 16,481 
2005 3,503 16,388 
2006 3,645 16,438 
2007 3,058 15,161 
2008 3,207 15,793 
2009 3,928 16,953 
Total 23,928 114,030 
 
For the study of Medicaid managed care, the access and quality dimensions 
included reflect quality requirements for Medicaid MCOs set forth in the Balanced 
Budget Act of 1997.  Through the CMS regulations released in accordance with this act, 
Medicaid MCOs are required to provide an ongoing source of care for enrollees, to 
consider the expected utilization of services, to provide timely access to services, and to 
consider the geographic location and accessibility of providers when developing 
networks (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2004).  The outcome measures in this 
analysis address the BBA ’97 requirements: whether the respondent has a usual source of 
care (USOC), the time it takes to reach the USOC, the difficulty of reaching the USOC, 
delaying or not getting necessary care, and difficulty finding a doctor.  Access measures 
are identical for the private market analysis.  These measures are frequently used in 
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health services research as indicators of access and are among the measures included in 
AHRQ’s annual National Healthcare Quality Report and National Healthcare Disparities 
Report. 
We use the Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems Survey 
(CAHPS) questions in MEPS as measures of consumers’ satisfaction with their health 
plan. There is a wealth of literature on the validity and measurement properties of 
CAHPS, much of which is synthesized in a 2005 analysis by Mathematica (Lake, Kvam, 
& Gold, 2005).  In this summary, the authors note that “CAHPS is widely used in the 
health care industry and is now viewed as the standard for measuring consumers’ 
experiences with health plans, including commercial products, Medicare, and Medicaid.” 
There is some evidence to suggest that Medicaid beneficiaries respond to CAHPS 
questions differently than commercially insured, using the extreme ends of a scale more 
frequently (Damiano, Elliott, Tyler, & Hays, 2004).  More than 90% of U.S. health plans 
use CAHPS.  CAHPS questions address ease of access to medical care, the need to seek 
approval for medical treatments and delays in care experienced while waiting for 
approval, ease of access to understandable plan information and repercussions of poor 
access, need to complete paperwork and problems filling out paperwork, and an overall 
rating of the health plan.  MEPS includes CAHPS questions in its survey, and a subset of 
these questions are used along with other commonly used measures of access to care 
available in the survey.   
The outcome measures capture ways in which an insurer might alter the benefits 
of health insurance based on market structure through spending on medical claims and 
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plan administration.  Delaying or not getting care and higher out of pocket spending on 
medical care for the privately insured reflect the scope of covered benefits.  Insurers may 
also restrict provider networks to constrain costs; travel time and difficulty with reaching 
a USOC and problems getting a doctor the respondent likes address this pathway.  These 
measures are commonly used in assessments of access to care (Burns, 2009).  Reducing 
spending on plan administration can affect consumers by increasing the “hassle factor” 
and is measured by consumers’ reported problems getting help from the plan’s customer 
service, finding information about the plan, waiting for approval for necessary treatment, 
and problems completing plan paperwork.  Finally, we will use the consumers’ self-
reported satisfaction with their health plan as an overall summary measure. While these 
questions represent different elements, the questions on both medical claims and plan 
administration point to the larger issue of the individual’s perception of access and 
quality available through his or her health plan.  Taken together, these elements describe 
the impact of insurance market concentration and bargaining power on the consumer.    
Statistical Methods 
The study design is a longitudinal analysis of cross-sectional data, employing 
multivariate statistical regressions.  We conducted analyses of dependent variables 
measuring access to care and satisfaction Ypmt for person p with their health plan in 
market m. Each model used a measure of insurance market concentration: the insurance 
market HHI (      ), the number of health plans operating in the market, the relative 
concentration of the insurance and hospital markets (             ), or categorized 
joint hospital-insurance market concentration as described in Figure 3 as key independent 
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variables.  The models also included control variables, Xpmt, for person-level 
characteristics from the MEPS and time-varying market-level characteristics from the 
ARF, unobserved time-invariant market fixed effects,   , and year indicators,   , given 
by the following general form: 
 
                                   
 
It was possible to estimate the MMC models with state fixed effects (  ); small sample 
size in some MSAs limited the private market analysis to year fixed effects only without 
local MSA fixed effects.   
With the exception of the overall rating of plan satisfaction responses on a 0-10 
scale, other outcome measures were collapsed into dichotomous categories for clarity of 
interpretation and to account for small numbers of responses on some questions.  For 
example, respondents who had tried to get help from a plan’s customer service were 
asked whether they experienced a big problem, a small problem, or no problem getting 
help.  We combine those reporting a small or big problem into one group, testing the 
robustness of findings in asubsequent analysis that grouped the middle response category 
differently to determine whether findings were sensitive to this analytic decision. We 
grouped those CAHPS questions that were asked only of individuals who sought 
administrative help together, so that we assessed whether the family experienced any 
administrative problem (big or small) when using the service.  The sample for these 





those who: called customer service, looked for plan information, completed plan 
paperwork, or needed approval for treatment.  Logistic regressions were conducted for 
the dichotomous outcome measures.   
Respondents rate their plan on a 0-10 scale and the majority of respondents rate 
plans very highly.  We first estimated standard OLS linear models for market and 
individual characteristics.  Because the plan rating responses were left-skewed and the 
OLS assumption of normality was in question, we also estimated models with a Heckman 
selection approach, with the first stage predicting the odds of rating satisfaction at 10 
points and the second stage conducting a linear regression for those responses less than 
10.  To account for the complex sampling design of the MEPS, standard errors were 
adjusted to allow for the correlation of responses within sampling clusters.  The analysis 
was conducted in STATA version 12 (StataCorp, College Station, TX). 
Previous research indicates the importance of accounting for unobserved factors 
that may be correlated with access to care and quality, and so a fixed effects model at the 
market (MSA or state) level was the primary methodological approach for the study.  
Fixed effects models address time-invariant unobserved factors that could influence the 
outcome.  Under fixed effects models, it is assumed that the error term is correlated with 
the independent variables.  Fixed effects models require within-market variation in the 
independent variable over time for identification and adequate sample size.   
We conducted sensitivity analyses to test the parameters of some assumptions or 
open questions in the research design.  For example, the primary model for private 
insurance assumes competition between HMOs and PPOs within markets.  Sensitivity 
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analyses using the HMO-only HHI and the PPO-only HHI were conducted to explore 
whether findings are robust under different definitions of the relevant product market. A 
non-linear relationship between the number of plans in the market and the relevant 
outcomes was tested by employing a natural cubic spline model, with knots specified at 
specific intervals. Spline models allow distinct relationships along values of the 
independent variable, with the function between two points (e.g. 0 to 3 plans in a market, 
3 to 6 plans, etc.) determined by a polynomial.  We estimated models restricting the 
sample to MEPS respondents with non-zero medical expenditures. For Medicaid, a sub-
analyses on only those states with statewide MMC programs was conducted 
In addition, potential bias from endogeneity has been raised by previous 
researchers.  To attempt to address this issue, an instrumental variables (IV) approach 
was pursued as a sensitivity analysis to determine whether findings from the fixed effects 
regression hold under IV formulation of the analysis.  The instruments for private group 
insurance concentration were the number of employer firms in the market and the share 
of firms that have greater than 500 employees.  The logic behind these measures is that 
employers often serve as a “customer” purchasing insurance coverage, and more firms in 
a market provides greater demand and a change for greater competition as firms make 
independent insurance purchasing decisions.  Also, large firms are more likely to offer 
health insurance coverage and provide coverage options to employees.  The instrument 
for the Medicaid market concentration was the number of MMC beneficiaries in the state, 
which has been associated with the number of available plans (Howell, 2012). In the 
sensitivity analyses, we verified the strength and excludability of these instruments using 
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accepted techniques (French & Popovici, 2011).  This includes regressing the 
endogenous independent variable on the instrument to determine the strength of the 
instrument and also regressing the outcome of interest on both the endogenous 
independent variable and the instrument to determine whether the instrument truly only 
impacts the outcome through its relation to the endogenous independent variable. 
Results 
The Medicaid Managed Care and private insurance markets were concentrated in 
2003-2009.  The average county-level HHI in Medicaid managed care has remained 
above 4610 since 2003 (Table 16).  In 2003, the average Medicaid beneficiary enrolled in 
Managed Care had a choice of 6.3 plans.  In 2009, the number of plan choices was 
largely unchanged at 6.4 plans. 











2003 5998.4   3906.8 -- -- 
2004 5933.5   3609.4 -- -- 
2005 6447.2    3930.1 3974.0 3014.9 
2006 5557.0    3369.1 4040.4 2921.4 
2007 5067.9    4169.0 4954.8 3735.9 
2008 4911.8    4087.0 4229.4 3400.3 
2009 4610.5    4122.3 4077.0 3239.8 
Note: CBSA-based measures for private insurance include Micro SAs and rural areas 
and are weighted by population.  The county-based measure for MMC is aggregated to 
the state level and weighted by the county’s share of the state MMC enrollment. 
 
 In the private market, the HMO market in general was more concentrated than 
the PPO market with a mean HHI of 4,122 for HMOs compared with 4,077 for PPOs in 
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2009.  As expected, private market HHIs were lower when including HMOs and PPOs as 
potential competitors for commercial market share within an MSA than for separate 
markets (mean HHI 3,240 in 2009).  Similarly, including self-insured MCO enrollment 
further also yielded more competitive markets (mean HHI 2,599 in 2009).  No 
statistically significant time trend was evident in the private market HHIs.  The ratio of 
insurance HHIs to hospital HHIs suggest that, on average, the insurance markets are more 
concentrated than hospital markets.  Across various formulations of hospital and 
insurance market HHIs, the mean ratio of insurance concentration to hospital market 
concentration remained above 1.0 (Table 17).  The categorization of markets based on the 
joint competitiveness of insurance and hospital markets shows that most states and MSAs 
have hospital HHIs below 2,500, and it was rare than hospital HHIs were above this 
threshold.  Insurance HHIs were more evenly split above and below the threshold (Tables 




Table 17: Mean Ratio of Insurance Market HHI to Hospital Market HHI, 2003-2009 




































2003 2.5 2.3 2.4 2.3 - - - - 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.5 
2004 2.2 2 2.1 2 - - - - 1.4 1.6 1.5 1.4 
2005 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.2 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.4 
2006 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.3 
2007 2.5 2.3 2.3 2.2 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.3 1.5 1.4 1.3 
2008 2.2 2.1 2.1 2 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.5 1.3 1.3 







Table 18: Categorization of States according to Competitiveness of Medicaid 
















Medium Medicare Discharges 34% 47% 8% 11% 
Narrow Medicare Discharges 34% 47% 8% 11% 
Medium, Hospital Beds 39% 50% 3% 8% 
Narrow, Hospital Beds 39% 50% 3% 8% 
2004 
Medium Medicare Discharges 53% 31% 8% 8% 
Narrow Medicare Discharges 53% 28% 8% 11% 
Medium, Hospital Beds 56% 33% 6% 6% 
Narrow, Hospital Beds 56% 33% 6% 6% 
2005 
Medium Medicare Discharges 39% 33% 11% 17% 
Narrow Medicare Discharges 39% 33% 11% 17% 
Medium, Hospital Beds 42% 36% 8% 14% 
Narrow, Hospital Beds 42% 33% 8% 17% 
2006 
Medium Medicare Discharges 46% 46% 3% 5% 
Narrow Medicare Discharges 46% 43% 3% 8% 
Medium, Hospital Beds 46% 46% 3% 5% 
Narrow, Hospital Beds 46% 43% 3% 8% 
2007 
Medium Medicare Discharges 44% 36% 3% 17% 
Narrow Medicare Discharges 44% 36% 3% 17% 
Medium, Hospital Beds 44% 42% 3% 11% 
Narrow, Hospital Beds 44% 42% 3% 11% 
2008 
Medium Medicare Discharges 60% 26% 3% 11% 
Narrow Medicare Discharges 60% 26% 3% 11% 
Medium, Hospital Beds 60% 26% 3% 11% 
Narrow, Hospital Beds 60% 26% 3% 11% 
2009 
Medium Medicare Discharges 71% 21% 6% 3% 
Narrow Medicare Discharges 71% 21% 6% 3% 
Medium, Hospital Beds 71% 21% 6% 3% 






Table 19: Categorization of MSAs based on Competitiveness of Private 















2003 HMO Commercial 12% 53% 3% 32% 
  Total Private -- -- -- -- 
   Total Lives 20% 45% 5% 30% 
2004 HMO Commercial 21% 43% 7% 29% 
  Total Private -- -- -- -- 
  Total Lives 25% 39% 8% 28% 
2005 HMO Commercial 13% 52% 4% 30% 
  Total Private 30% 36% 14% 21% 
  Total Lives 33% 33% 16% 19% 
2006 HMO Commercial 20% 42% 8% 30% 
  Total Private 39% 23% 24% 14% 
  Total Lives 40% 22% 26% 13% 
2007 HMO Commercial 8% 54% 3% 35% 
  Total Private 25% 38% 12% 26% 
  Total Lives 35% 28% 17% 21% 
2008 HMO Commercial 13% 47% 4% 36% 
  Total Private 31% 29% 16% 24% 
  Total Lives 37% 22% 23% 17% 
2009 HMO Commercial 10% 49% 5% 36% 
  Total Private 38% 22% 20% 20% 
  Total Lives 44% 16% 23% 17% 
Notes:  Row percents may not sum to 100 due to rounding 
Competitive market defined as one with an HHI below 2500. 
 
  
Plan enrollment in PPOs was not available in 2003 and 2004, and so the total private HHI 
could not be calculated.  Total Lives in these two years includes HMO, Medicare, and 
Medicaid managed care enrollment. 
Hospital Market HHIs based on the medium definition of markets and use Medicare Hospital 




Based upon the sample selection criteria detailed above, Table 20 describes the 
MEPS sample size and characteristics for the MMC and private market full sample and 
subsample for the CAHPS questions.  Of the 23,928 in the full Medicaid sample and 
114,030 in the private group insurance sample, the mean age of the MMC enrollee was 
19.2 years (19) and 35.3 (20) years for the privately insured sample.  The younger 
average age among the Medicaid sample reflects the common practice among states of 
enrolling children eligible through TANF into MMC programs. The private market 
CAHPS subsample largely resembled the full private market sample across a range of 
demographic variables, so the findings based on CAHPS are likely generalizable to the 
broader community of those with private group coverage.   The MMC CAHPS subsample 
of first respondents was older, more likely to be married, more educated, and had a higher 
mean personal income than the full MMC sample so the results based on CAHPS may 
better reflect the experiences of adults with Medicaid rather than the whole population 
enrolled in MMC.  Both the full MMC sample and the CAHPS subsample had a greater 
proportion of women and minorities than the private market sample (57% vs. 51% 
female, 65% vs. 75% white) and were less well-educated, in worse physical and mental 
health, and reported lower income.  The differences between the privately insured and the 
MMC samples are consistent with known differences between these populations in terms 
of age, health status, income, and gender (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2010) The average 
state Medicaid HHI experienced by the sample was 4,409 and MSA total commercial 
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HHI (HMO+PPO) was 3,039.  Almost all respondents lived in states with mandatory 
enrollment for TANF adults and children (0.97, se 0.15).    
Table 20: Sample Characteristics (All Years) 
 
MMC Sample Private Market Sample 
Demographics 
Mean Age 19.2 (19.0) 35.3 (20.0) 
% Female 57.0% 51.5% 
% Hispanic 46.5% 16.9% 
% White only 65.1% 75.7% 
% Black only 27.3% 15.0% 
% Married 11.0% 49.6% 
Mean Family Income $25,111 80,771 
Mean Years of Education 6.9 10.7 (5.6) 
Mean Self-rated Health Status
1
 2.23 (1.10) 2.07 (0.97) 
Mean Self-rated Mental Health Status 2.05 (1.04) 1.85 (0.90) 
Local Area Characteristics  
Urban/Rural Continuum Code
2
 1.62 (0.61) 1.45 (0.7) 
Median Household Income $40,525 (18,871) $44,121 (20,774) 
% For-profit Hospitals 23.6% (17.9) 21.38 (20.69) 
Total MDs per 10,000 20.86 (10.55) 21.56 (12.21) 
Total Specialists per 10,000 6.64  (5.13) 6.88 (5.69) 
Hospital Admissions per 1,000 122.4 (24.8) 120.32 (30.09) 
Hospitals per 100,000 1.28 (0.47) 3.98 (4.29) 
FQHCs per 100,000 0.86 (0.78) 1.20 (0.54) 
Insurance & Hospital Market Environment 





Mean # MMC Plans Available 6.03 (3.97) 
State Hospital HHI (Med, Mcare Dx) 1621 (598) 
Mean Ratio of MMC HHI to Hospital HHI 








Mean PPO HHI 4067 (1287) 
Mean Total Commerical HHI 3039 (1287) 
Mean # MCOs in MSA 27.4 (15.3) 
Mean MSA Hospital HHI (Med, Mcare Dx) 1982 (1074) 
Ratio of Total Private to Hospital HHIs 1.16 (1.10) 
Access to Care 
No Usual Source of Care other than ER 12.8% 16.2% 
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Somewhat/Very Difficult to get to USOC 7.7% 33.4% 
Takes 30+ Minutes to travel to USOC 10.0% 77.4% 
Delayed/Did not get Needed Care 3.6% 3.2% 
Experience with Health Plan 
Overall Plan Rating 8.54 (1.88) 7.90 (1.864) 
Small/Big Problem Getting a Doctor 10.8% 66.1% 
Small/Big Problem with Customer Service 39.1% 35.2% 
Small/Big Problem with Paperwork 26.0% 22.9% 
Small/Big Problem Getting Information 25.6% 30.6% 
Small/Big Problem with Delay Waiting for  Approval 43.0% 29.7% 






OOP Share of Expenditures on Office Visits 18.5% (25.4) 
OOP Share of Prescription Drug Expenditures 29.4% (33.1) 
OOP Share of Inpatient Hospital Expenditures 3.0% (3.2) 
Notes: 
1. Self-rated physical and mental health status was reported on a five-point scale, with a 
response of “1” indicating excellent health and a “5” indicating poor health. 
2. The rural-urban continuum code is reported on a 9-point scale, where 1 an urban county 
with a population of 1 million or more and 9 is a completely rural county with a 




Access to Care 
 Most Medicaid Managed Care enrollees reported having a usual source of care—
one in eight (0.13, SE 0.33) reported having no usual source of care other than a hospital 
emergency room.  Only 4 percent (0.04, SE 0.18) reported delaying or not getting 
necessary care.  About ten percent of MMC enrollees reported it took 30 minutes or more 
to reach their usual source of care (0.10, SE 0.30) and 8 percent reported it was somewhat 
or very difficult to get to their usual source of care (0.08, SE 0.26).   
 Privately insured respondents also generally reported having a USOC, with 16% 
reporting no USOC other than an emergency department (0.16, SE 0.37).  A similarly 
low percentage (0.03, SE 0.18) reported delaying or not getting care and taking more than 
30 minutes to reach the USOC (0.08, SE 0.27).  Only three percent (0.03, SE0.18) 
reported it was somewhat or very difficult to get to their USOC.   
 After including individual demographic characteristics, local health care market 
characteristics, and state and year fixed effects, the MMC HHI was not significantly 
associated with delaying or not getting needed health care.  Older individuals and 
Hispanic individuals were less likely to delay or not get health care, while those who 
reported worse physical and mental health were more likely to delay or not get care, other 
factors held constant (Table 21).  Local health care market supply variables were not 
significant.  The MMC HHI and number of plans were also insignificant in the models 
for problems getting a doctor with which the family was happy, travel time to the USOC, 
difficulty getting to a USOC, or having no USOC other than an ER.  Older individuals, 
116 
 
unmarried individuals, and those in poor physical health were more likely to report that it 
took more than 30 minutes to reach their USOC or was difficult to reach their USOC.  
 
Table 21:Regression Results: Medicaid Managed Care Respondents, Delay/Not 
Get Care Outcome 
Number of strata   =       356                  
Number of PSUs     =       699                    
                                                      
Number of obs      =     15848                                                 
Population size    =  87996923  
F(  62,    282)    =      8.09 
Design df          =       343                                                
Prob > F           =    0.0000 
Delay/Not Get Care Odds 
Ratio      
Std. Err t    P>|t|      95% Conf. Interval 
MMC HHI .9999715    .0000918     -0.31    0.756       .999791     1.000152 
Sex .7824232    .0877187     -2.19    0.029      .6275875     .9754594 
Hispanic .4340175 .077989     -4.65    0.000      .3047982     .6180194 
Age .9901091    .0037102     -2.65    0.008      .9828383     .9974337 
Unmarried .9594437    .1310394     -0.30    0.762      .7334187     1.255125 
Education 1.128818     .023829      5.74    0.000      1.082909     1.176674 
Personal Income .9999973       5.87e-06 -0.46    0.642      .9999857     1.000009 
Race/Ethnicity .8797301    .0697092     -1.62    0.107      .7527694     1.028104 
Physical Health 1.639233    .1157753      7.00    0.000      1.426624     1.883528 
Mental Health 1.187329    .0648598      3.14    0.002       1.06637     1.322008 
PCCM Indicator 1.384049    .5094953      0.88    0.378      .6709618     2.854991 
Months of MMC 
Lock-in 
.9453448     .038456     -1.38   0.168      .8726525     1.024092 
Mixed Waiver Ind. 1.124102    .3747841      0.35    0.726      .5834503     2.165747 
Mandatory MMC Ind. 2.113497    2.137235      0.74    0.460      .2891954     15.44584 
Urban/Rural Cont. Cd .5136066    .2458401     -1.39    0.165      .2003348     1.316754 
Median HH Income 
(state) 
.9999862    .0000374     -0.37    0.713      .9999126      1.00006 
MDs per 10,000 1.005387         .0469218 0.12    0.908      .9172051     1.102046 
Specialists per 10,000 1.031022    .0387907      0.81    0.417      .9574795     1.110214 
Hospitals per 100,000 1.54237    1.029491      0.65    0.517       .414975     5.732645 
Admissions per 1,000 .8460296    .9372031     -0.15    0.880      .0957446     7.475787 
For-profit Hospital % .0556017     .1243395 -1.29    0.197      .0006837     4.521994 
Year       
2004 .9183695    .1963355     -0.40    0.691       .603111      1.39842 
2005 .9644787    .3007246     -0.12    0.908      .5223338      1.78089 
2006 1.592482    .7345977      1.01    0.314      .6427357     3.945632 
2007 1.087683    .4471744      0.20    0.838      .4845204       2.4417 
2008 .9579946    .4385026     -0.09    0.925      .3893706     2.357019 
2009 .7922905    1.593713     -0.12    0.908      .0151568 41.41536 




                                      
In most cases, the ratio of MMC market concentration to hospital concentration 
was not significant in the models for access to care.  One exception is respondents’ 
reports of it being somewhat or very difficult to get to their USOC--a higher relative 
MMC market concentration was associated with about a six percent increase in the odds 
of having difficulty getting to the USOC (OR 1.056, p <0.024) after including state and 
year fixed effects (Table 22).   A higher relative MMC concentration was associated with 
lower odds of reporting no usual source of care other than an ER, so in this case more 
concentrated MMC markets relative to hospital markets were protective (OR 0.971, 
p<0.04) (Table 23).  Both these findings are statistically significant but small in 
magnitude.    
Table 22: Regression Results: Difficult to Get to USOC and the Ratio of the 
MMC HHI to Hospital Market HHI 
    
Number of strata   =       356                                                       
Number of PSUs     =       699                    
               
Number of obs      =     15848 
Population size    =  87996923                                 
Design df          =       343 
F(  67,    277)    =      6.89                                     
Prob > F           =    0.0000 
Difficult to Reach 
USOC 
Odds 
Ratio      
Std. Err t    P>|t|      95% Conf. Interval 
Ratio of MMC HHI to 
Hospital HHI 
1.055579    .0251052      2.27    0.024      1.007337     1.106132 
Sex .9606267    .0767665     -0.50    0.616      .8209028     1.124133 
Hispanic 1.047087    .1390259      0.35    0.729       .806427     1.359566 
Black 1.0597    .1360005      0.45    0.652      .8232924     1.363992 
American Indian/AK 
Native 
.9942321    .2827213     -0.02    0.984      .5683054     1.739377 
Asian .8096984    .2656471     -0.64    0.520      .4246889     1.543745 
Native Hawaiian/ 
Pacific Islander 
.7677725    .2699137     -0.75    0.453      .3845292     1.532977 
MultiRacial .7664283    .2113042     -0.96        0.335 .4456197     1.318192 
Age 1.011772    .0027755      4.27    0.000      1.006327     1.017245 
Unmarried 1.431989    .1943392      2.65    0.009      1.096507     1.870112 
Education 9753265    .0107708     -2.26    0.024      .9543698     .9967434 
Personal Income .9999893    6.46e-06     -1.66    0.099      .9999766     1.000002 
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Physical Health 1.377568    .0741694      5.95    0.000      1.239143     1.531457 
Mental Health 1.122543    .0548332      2.37    0.019          1.019711 1.235746 
PCCM Indicator .9950787    .2982746     -0.02    0.987      .5518315     1.794355 
Months of MMC 
Lock-in 
1.014679    .0267812      0.55    0.581      .9633471     1.068747 
Mixed Waiver Ind. .83942    .2135631     -0.69    0.492      .5089228     1.384544 
Mandatory MMC Ind. .6059758    .5646454     -0.54    0.591      .0969396     3.787995 
Urban/Rural Cont. Cd .7520694    .3679498      -0.58    0.561      .2872983     1.968714 
Median HH Income 
(state) 
.9999896    .0000302     -0.34    0.732      .9999302    1.000049 
MDs per 10,000 .9680821    .0461764     -0.68    0.497      .8813879     1.063304 
Specialists per 10,000 1.021774    .0372506      0.59    0.555       .951071     1.097733 
Hospitals per 100,000 .816 .665337     -0.25    0.803    .1641321      4.05683 
Admissions per 1,000 1.239533     1.40732      0.19    0.850       .1328657 11.56386 
For-profit Hospital % 26.35361    57.01593      1.51    0.131         .3738932 1857.516 
Avg Mcaid Payment 
for Adult 
1.000248    .0001894      1.31    0.191      .9998759     1.000621 
Year       
2004 1.053791    .2023198      0.27    0.785      .7223563     1.537295 
2005 1.086096    .2809043      0.32    0.750      .6530355     1.806341 
2006 1.344149    .6623761      0.60    0.549      .5099211     3.543169 
2007 1.00218 .3781647      0.01    0.995      .4771054     2.105122 
2008 .5500656    .2597278     -1.27    0.206      .2173073      1.39237 
2009 .272952    .4270348     -0.83    0.407      .0125794     5.922583 
constant .083511    .2143105     -0.97    0.334      .0005365      12.9981 
Note: Coefficients for state fixed effects not shown.   
          
Table 23: Regression Results: No USOC Other than an ER and the Ratio of 
MMC HHI to Hospital Market HHI 
Number of strata   =       356                                                       
Number of PSUs     =     700                               
    
Number of obs      =     15879 
Population size    =  88155944                                              
Design df          =       344 
F(  68,    277)    =     21.47 
Prob > F           =    0.0000 
No USOC Other than 
an ER 
Odds 
Ratio      
Std. Err t    P>|t|      95% Conf. Interval 
Ratio of MMC HHI to 
Hospital HHI 
.9608008    .0199594     -1.92    0.055      .9223342     1.000872 
Sex 1.167779    .0841843      2.15    0.032      1.013402     1.345674 
Hispanic 1.231353     .143526      1.79    0.075      .9790766     1.548634 
Black .9371513    .1172561     -0.52    0.604      .7327091     1.198637 
American Indian/AK 
Native 
1.315533    .3551728      1.02    0.310       .7735346 2.237299 
Asian 1.161524    .2964993      0.59    0.558      .7030352      1.91902 




MultiRacial 1.139395    .2604887      0.57    0.569      .7267503     1.786336 
Age .9845547    .0031131     -4.92    0.000      .9784506      .990697 
Unmarried .7668748    .0974241     -2.09    0.037          .5973182 .9845624 
Education 1.135622    .0133551     10.81    0.000      1.109655     1.162196 
Personal Income 1.00001    4.13e-06      2.45    0.015      1.000002     1.000018 
Physical Health .8442097    .0412639     -3.46    0.001      .7668278     .9294004 
Mental Health 1.080965    .0525831      1.60    0.110          .9823341 1.189499 
PCCM Indicator 1.408904    .3447358      1.40 0.162      .8707044     2.279774 
Months of MMC 
Lock-in 
.9813043    .0302879     -0.61    0.541      .9235037     1.042723 
Mixed Waiver Ind. .8176978        .1530377 -1.08    0.283         .5658772 1.181581 
Mandatory MMC Ind. .4434328    .3568079     -1.01    0.313      .0910942     2.158563 
Urban/Rural Cont. Cd 1.06128    .4541119      0.14    0.890      .4574282     2.462279 
Median HH Income 
(state) 
1.000012    .0000233      0.53    0.593      .9999666     1.000058 
MDs per 10,000 .979021       .0351813 -0.59    0.556      .9122123     1.050723 
Specialists per 10,000 9632378    .0337699     -1.07    0.286      .8990547     1.032003 
Hospitals per 100,000 .6242724    .4602883     -0.64    0.523      .1464032     2.661936 
Admissions per 1,000 1.132133    1.314537      0.11    0.915      .1153624     11.11042 
For-profit Hospital % .5039636    .9635858     -0.36    0.720         .0117258 21.65984 
Avg Mcaid Payment 
for Adult 
1.000222    .0001524      1.45    0.147      .9999219     1.000521 
Year       
2004 .6196279    .1056918     -2.81    0.005      .4430231     .8666337 
2005 .5995685    .1179956     -2.60    0.010      .4071273     .8829731 
2006 .3975842    .1704535     -2.15    0.032      .1710846     .9239476 
2007 .5999773    .1870776     -1.64    0.102      .3249275 1.107856 
2008 .5632315    .2131803     -1.52    0.130      .2675308 1.185769 
2009 .4590349    .6444924     -0.55    0.580      .0290085     7.263835 
constant .1087643     .226563     -1.07    0.288      .0018077     6.544163 
Note: Coefficients for state fixed effects not shown.   
 
For the privately insured, the association between the total commercial HHI and 
access measures was largely insignificant in the unadjusted model and the full models 
including year fixed effects.  The HMO HHI was not associated with the odds of delaying 
or not getting care or reported problems getting a doctor; it was associated with 
statistically significant but very slight increased odds of having no usual source of care 
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other than an ER (1.000035, p<0.012) (Table 24).  The total commercial insurance HHI 
which includes HMOs and PPOs as competitors was not significantly associated with any 
access outcomes.  The number of MCOs present in an MSA was associated with a lower 
odds of delaying or not getting necessary care (OR 0.9880363, p<0.00, Table 25) but 
higher odds of reported problems finding a doctor (1.007665, p<0.046) (Table 26) and 
higher odds of taking 30 or more minutes to get to a USOC (1.015799, p<0.001) (Table 
27).  As the insurance HHI increased relative to the hospital market HHI, respondents 
reported higher odds of delaying or not getting care (1.056, p<0.049, Table 28).   
Table 24:No Usual Source of Care Other than an ER and the HMO HHI 
Number of strata   =       367                 
Number of PSUs     =       812                 
                                               
Number of obs = 95639  
Population size =1073533081  
Design df = 445                                         F(  
28,418 = 69.73                               Prob > F = 
0.0000 
 
No USOC Other than 
an ER 
Odds 
Ratio      
Std. Err t    P>|t|      95% Conf. Interval 
HMO HHI 1.000035     .000014      2.53    0.012      1.000008     1.000063 
Sex 1.690895     .043639     20.35    0.000      1.607269     1.778871 
Hispanic 1.761159    .0866436     11.50    0.000       1.59885     1.939944 
Black 1.489694    .0735976      8.07    0.000      1.351852     1.641591 
American Indian/AK 
Native 
.7414104    .1600752     -1.39    0.167        .48504     1.133286 
Asian 1.600129    .1020448      7.37    0.000      1.411638     1.813788 
Native Hawaiian/ 
Pacific Islander 
1.391841    .4399296      1.05    0.296      .7478427     2.590413 
MultiRacial 1.0207    .1305844      0.16    0.873      .7937826     1.312485 
Age .9769627    
 
.0012253    -18.58    0.000      .9745577     .9793737 
Unmarried 1.222894    .0458758      5.36    0.000      1.135978     1.316461 
Education 1.157314    .0052282     32.34    0.000      1.147085     1.167635 
Personal Income .9999996    4.45e-07     -1.00    0.316                 .9999987 1 
Physical Health .894464    .0173319     -5.76    0.000      .8610418     .9291835 
Mental Health 1.034424    .0205066      1.71    0.088      .9948976     1.075522 
Urban/Rural Cont. Cd .9613705    .0443377     -0.85    0.393      .8780655     1.052579 
Median HH Income 
(state) 
.9999982    3.76e-06     -0.47    0.639      .9999908     1.000006 
MDs per 10,000 .9892346    .0049928     -2.14    0.033      .9794708     .9990958 
Specialists per 10,000 .9999073    .0109896    -0.01    0.993      .9785408      1.02174 
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Hospitals per 100,000 1.025093    .0674745      0.38    0.707       .900704     1.166661 
Admissions per 1,000 1.00199    .0010805      1.84    0.066      .9998688     1.004116 
For-profit Hospital % 1.009725    .0011706      8.35    0.000      1.007427     1.012029 
Avg. Family Premium .9999623    .0000299     -1.26    0.209      .9999034     1.000021 
Year       
2004 1.107382     .066204      1.71    0.089      .9846231     1.245445 
2005 1.100861    .0870211      1.22    0.225      .9424602     1.285884 
2006 1.138704    .1891244      0.78    0.435       .821583      1.57823 
2007 1.206143    .1256038      1.80    0.073      .9829145     1.480069 
2008 1.266118      .14921      2.00    0.046      1.004357     1.596102 
2009 .8086783    .1366176     -1.26    0.209       .580206     1.127118 
constant .0584057     .023546     -7.05    0.000      .0264461     .1289879 
 
Table 25: Delaying/Not Getting Care and the Number of Commercial MCOs 
 Number of strata =  367 
Number of PSUs = 809                                  
Number of obs      =      84512 
Population size    =  971112541                                     
Design df          =        442 
F(  28,    415)    =      29.99 




Ratio      
Std. Err t    P>|t|      95% Conf. Interval 
Number of MCOs .9880258    .0032699     -3.64    0.000          .9816201 .9944732 
Sex .7921498    .0381835     -4.83    0.000       .720551     .8708631 
Hispanic .7439206    .0678476     -3.24    0.001      .6218441     .8899625 
Black .7046297    .0537916     -4.59    0.000      .6064592     .8186915 
American Indian/AK 
Native 
1.647901    .4080831      2.02    0.044       1.01289     2.681019 
Asian .5269772    .0661838     -5.10    0.000       .411713      .674511 
Native Hawaiian/ Pacific 
Islander 
.3927448    .1745386     -2.10    0.036      .1639803     .9406526 
MultiRacial 1.30642    .1939051      1.80    0.072      .9758804     1.748917 
Age .9946886   .0016266     -3.26    0.001           .991497 .9978905 
Unmarried 1.567619    .0970259      7.26    0.000      1.388071     1.770392 
Education 1.071713    .0084391      8.80    0.000      1.055255     1.088428 
Personal Income .9999985    8.51e-07     -1.71    0.087      .9999969            1 
Physical Health 1.663769    .0540795     15.66    0.000      1.560808     1.773522 
Mental Health 1.191167    .0375701      5.55    0.000      1.119571     1.267342 
Urban/Rural Cont. Cd .8547975    .0447042     -3.00    0.003      .7713028     .9473307 
Median HH Income 
(state) 
.9999953    5.46e-06     -0.85    0.393      .9999846     1.000006 
MDs per 10,000 1.006532     .006745      0.97    0.332      .9933632     1.019876 
Specialists per 10,000 .9867165    .0151447     -0.87    0.384      .9573964     1.016934 
Hospitals per 100,000 1.026407    .0748117      0.36    0.721      .8894215      1.18449 
Admissions per 1,000 .9950845    .0016447     -2.98    0.003      .9918573     .9983221 
For-profit Hospital % .9993577    .0016369     -0.39    0.695      .9961457      1.00258 
Avg. Family Premium .9999263    .0000368     -2.00    0.046       .999854     .9999986 
Year       
2004 1.143418 .0919754      1.67    0.096      .9762194     1.339254 
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2005 1.62003    .2060858      3.79    0.000      1.261663     2.080189 
2006 1.800573    .3945676      2.68    0.008      1.170499     2.769813 
2007 1.386059    .1930126      2.34    0.019      1.054203     1.822382 
2008 1.504944    .2088274      2.95    0.003      1.145731     1.976779 
2009 1.298489    .4385103      0.77    0.440      .6686381     2.521652 
constant .0265634    .0124735     -7.73    0.000      .0105556     .0668475 
 
Table 26: Problems Finding a Doctor and the Number of Commerical MCOs 
 Number of strata =  367 
Number of PSUs = 812                                  
Number of obs = 96607 
Population size = 1084542765                             
Design df = 445                                     
 F(  28, 418)= 9.02                             
 Prob > F = 0.0000 
Any Problem Finding a 
Doctor 
Odds 
Ratio      
Std. Err t    P>|t|      95% Conf. Interval 
Number of MCOs 1.007665    .0038388      2.00    0.046      1.000149     1.015238 
Sex .8784267    .0239001     -4.76    0.000      .8326893     .9266763 
Hispanic .7932743    .0645104       -2.85 0.005       .676104     .9307504 
Black .7800298     .061307     -3.16    0.002       .668387     .9103206 
American Indian/AK 
Native 
.8183927    .2673542     -0.61    0.540      .4306567     1.555222 
Asian 1.335847    .1263067      3.06    0.002      1.109314      1.60864 
Native Hawaiian/ Pacific 
Islander 
.6275887    .2187581     -1.34    0.182      .3163467      1.24505 
MultiRacial 1.352455     .189958      2.15    0.032      1.026223     1.782394 
Age .990703   .0015783     -5.86    0.000      .9876061     .9938097 
Unmarried .9194523    .0417529     -1.85    0.065      .8409501     1.005283 
Education .9988071    .0061534     -0.19    0.846      .9867867     1.010974 
Personal Income 1.000002    6.17e-07      2.88    0.004      1.000001     1.000003 
Physical Health 1.134887    .0271848      5.28    0.000      1.082699     1.189591 
Mental Health 1.159878    .0273785      6.28    0.000        1.1073     1.214953 
Urban/Rural Cont. Cd 1.104539    .0627205      1.75    0.081      .9879027     1.234945 
Median HH Income 
(state) 
1.000006    5.92e-06      0.95    0.342       .999994     1.000017 
MDs per 10,000 .9943017    .0075465     -0.75    0.452      .9795805     1.009244 
Specialists per 10,000 .9917904    .0146298     -0.56    0.577       .963451     1.020963 
Hospitals per 100,000 .7461223    .0591727     -3.69    0.000      .6384395     .8719675 
Admissions per 1,000 .998805    .0017093     -0.70    0.485      .9954513      1.00217 
For-profit Hospital % 1.005396    .0017317      3.12    0.002      1.001998     1.008805 
Avg. Family Premium .999963    .0000458     -0.81    0.420      .9998731     1.000053 
Year       
2004 .8440432    .0689815     -2.07    0.039      .7188005     .9911079 
2005 .6392903    .0869172     -3.29    0.001      .4893888     .8351071 
2006 .5966733    .1454712     -2.12    0.035      .3695256     .9634491 
2007 .6968066    .1082851     -2.32    0.021      .5134204     .9456956 
2008 .5665252    .0978219     -3.29    0.001       .403498      .795421 
2009 .692124    .2407656     -1.06    0.291      .3493601      1.37118 






Table 27: Takes 30+ Minutes to Reach USOC and the Number of MCOs 
 Number of strata =  367 
Number of PSUs = 812                                  
Number of obs      =       96607 
Population size    =  1084542765 
Design df          =         445 
F(  28,    418)    =        5.78 
Prob > F           =      0.0000 
Takes 30+ Minutes to 
Reach USOC 
Odds 
Ratio      
Std. Err t    P>|t|      95% Conf. Interval 
Number of MCOs 1.015799    .0036494      4.36    0.000      1.008652     1.022997 
Sex .9209201    .0280814     -2.70    0.007      .8673525     .9777961 
Hispanic .9772804    .0770098     -0.29    0.771      .8370695     1.140977 
Black 1.229436    .0941898      2.70    0.007      1.057586     1.429211 
American Indian/AK 
Native 
1.801885     .503905      2.11    0.036      1.040006     3.121896 
Asian .9557426    .0967934     -0.45    0.655      .7832491     1.166224 
Native Hawaiian/ Pacific 
Islander 
.6740545    .2305707     -1.15    0.249      .3441394     1.320248 
MultiRacial 1.026279     .194284      0.14    0.891       .707434     1.488831 
Age 1.004564    .0014554      3.14    0.002      1.001708     1.007428 
Unmarried 1.018276    .0491628      0.38    0.708      .9260987     1.119629 
Education .9760603    .0048537     -4.87    0.000      .9665678      .985646 
Personal Income 1.000001    6.37e-07      1.44    0.150      .9999997    1.000002 
Physical Health 1.120416    .0273625      4.66    0.000      1.067911     1.175503 
Mental Health 1.000115    .0272784      0.00          0.997 .947916     1.055188 
Urban/Rural Cont. Cd .9462383    .0743882     -0.70    0.482      .8107765     1.104333 
Median HH Income 
(state) 
.9999935    5.73e-06     -1.13    0.258          .9999823 1.000005 
MDs per 10,000 .9911617    .0079719     -1.10    0.270      .9756176     1.006954 
Specialists per 10,000 1.020232    .0140248      1.46    0.146      .9930385     1.048171 
Hospitals per 100,000 .9883163    .0929425     -0.12    0.901      .8215416     1.188947 
Admissions per 1,000 1.000051    .0016625         0.03 0.976      .9967889     1.003324 
For-profit Hospital % .9992022    .0018093     -0.44    0.660      .9956527     1.002764 
Avg. Family Premium .9999609    .0000421     -0.93    0.353      .9998782     1.000044 
Year       
2004 .9745759    .0801214     -0.31    0.754      .8291751     1.145474 
2005 .6538731    .0971476     -2.86    0.004      .4882963     .8755955 
2006 .8291473    .1620079     -0.96    0.338      .5647562     1.217313 
2007 .8397702     .115186 -1.27    0.204      .6413396     1.099595 
2008 .6863044    .1159221     -2.23    0.026      .4924365     .9564965 
2009 .5062066    .1926863     -1.79    0.074      .2395722     1.069595 
constant .1336544    .0672541     -4.00    0.000      .0497159     .3593115 
          




Table 28: Delaying or Not Getting Care, Ratio of Insurance HHI to Hospital 
Market HHI 
 Number of strata =  367 
Number of PSUs = 812                                  
Number of obs      =       96618 
Population size    =  1084729746 
Design df          =         445 
F(  28,    418)    =       32.84 
Prob > F           =      0.0000 
Delayed/Did Not Get Care Odds 
Ratio      
Std. Err t    P>|t|      95% Conf. Interval 
Ratio of Total Private Insurance 
HHI to Hospital HHI 
1.056465     .029354      1.98    0.049      1.000322     1.115759 
Sex .7559948    .0355341     -5.95    0.000      .6892878     .8291576 
Hispanic .6745354    .0630478     -4.21    0.000      .5613416     .8105547 
Black .6476118    .0475038     -5.92    0.000      .5606694     .7480362 
American Indian/AK Native 1.569111     .381016      1.86    0.064      .9736407     2.528765 
Asian .4967408    .0603586     -5.76    0.000      .3912181      .630726 
Native Hawaiian/ Pacific 
Islander 
.3553676    .1580846     -2.33    0.020      .1482483     .8518555 
MultiRacial 1.237512    .1793743      1.47    0.142      .9307511     1.645377 
Age .9955274    .0015836     -2.82    0.005        .99242     .9986446 
Unmarried 1.566805    .0948464      7.42    0.000      1.391064     1.764749 
Education 1.069015    .0082268      8.67    0.000      1.052969     1.085306 
Personal Income .9999986    8.44e-07     -1.69    0.092      .9999969            1
Physical Health 1.69045    .0551748     16.08    0.000      1.585419     1.802439 
Mental Health 1.189447    .0382379      5.40    0.000      1.116623     1.267021 
Urban/Rural Cont. Cd .908429    .0483677     -1.80    0.072      .8181759     1.008638 
Median HH Income (state) .999993    5.78e-06     -1.22    0.224      .9999816     1.000004 
MDs per 10,000 1.009468    .0070171      1.36    0.176      .9957709     1.023353 
Specialists per 10,000 .977884       .0146153 -1.50    0.135      .9495782     1.007034 
Hospitals per 100,000 1.071084    .0784813 0.94    0.349      .9274355     1.236983 
Admissions per 1,000 .9937652    .0016054     -3.87    0.000       .990615     .9969255 
For-profit Hospital % .9991762    .0016724     -0.49    0.623      .9958948     1.002468 
Avg. Family Premium .9999063    .0000371     -2.53    0.012      .9998335     .9999792 
Year       
2004 1.088735    .0829655      1.12    0.265      .9373047     1.264631 
2005 1.063611    .1151477      0.57    0.569      .8597648     1.315789 
2006 1.147903    .2340075      0.68    0.499      .7689692     1.713568 
2007 1.176386    .1762796      1.08    0.279      .8762959     1.579243 
2008 1.147281    .1635243      0.96    0.336       .866993     1.518183 
2009 .8621475    .2964771     -0.43    .666      0.438602       1.6947 
constant .0314275    .0158758     -6.85    0.000      .0116452     .0848152 
   
                      
A statistically significant effect on delaying or not getting care was also evident in 
the joint categorization of the two markets.  When the market concentration was 
imbalanced, respondents were more likely to report delaying or not getting care relative 
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to consumers where both markets were competitive. The effect was most pronounced for 
respondents living in areas with a competitive insurance and concentrated hospital market 
(1.218, p<0.039) (Table 29), with a smaller and less significant effect for respondents 
living in a concentrated insurance and competitive hospital market (1.160, p<0.062).  
However, respondents living in markets where both insurance and hospital markets were 
concentrated were not significantly more likely to report delaying care relative to those in 
jointly competitive markets.   Interestingly, those in jointly concentrated markets were 
less likely to report it took 30 or more minutes to reach a USOC than those in jointly 
competitive markets (0.776, p<0.043) (Table 30) while there was no significant effect for 
imbalanced markets.  Respondents in areas with a competitive insurance and 
concentrated hospital market were significantly more likely to report having no USOC 
other than an ER (1.172, p<0.005) (Table 31) than those in jointly competitive markets, 




Table 29: Delaying or Not Getting Care and the Joint Categorization of Total 
Private Insurance and Hospital Markets 
 Number of strata =  367 
Number of PSUs = 812                                  
Number of obs      =       96618 
Population size    =  1084729746 
Design df          =         445 
F(  30,    416)    =       31.48 
Prob > F           =      0.0000 
Delayed/Did Not Get Care Odds 
Ratio      
Std. Err t    P>|t|      95% Conf. Interval 
Both Markets Competitive (ref)       
Conc. Insurance, Comp Hosp 1.160146    .0920736      1.87    0.062      .9925993     1.355975 
Comp. Insurance, Conc. Hosp 1.217801    .1158001      2.07    0.039      1.010218     1.468038 
Both Markets Concentrated 1.00659    .1150977      0.06    0.954      .8040021     1.260225 
Sex .7567295    .0354862     -5.94    0.000      .6901053     .8297858 
Hispanic .6820553    .0637287     -4.10    0.000      .5676356     .8195388 
Black .6534832    .0478961     -5.80    0.000      .5658179     .7547309 
American Indian/AK Native 1.559461    .3831194      1.81    0.071        .9622455 2.527337 
Asian .502222    .0610033     -5.67    0.000      .3955678     .6376325 
Native Hawaiian/ Pacific 
Islander 
.3560123    .1587465     -2.32    0.021        .14821       .85517 
MultiRacial 1.242849    .1805688      1.50    0.135      .9341432     1.653574 
Age .9955222    .0015923     -2.81    0.005      .9923977     .9986565 
Unmarried 1.567191    .0948623      7.42    0.000      1.391419     1.765167 
Education 1.068928    .0082191      8.67    0.000      1.052897     1.085204 
Personal Income .9999986    8.47e-07     -1.61    0.108       .999997            1
Physical Health 1.689756    .0552017     16.06    0.000      1.584677     1.801803 
Mental Health 1.189411    .0381111      5.41   0.000      1.116821      1.26672 
Urban/Rural Cont. Cd .8902873    .0484919     -2.13    0.033      .7999093     .9908767 
Median HH Income (state) .9999915    5.62e-06     -1.51    0.133      .9999805     1.000003 
MDs per 10,000 1.011518    .0070804      1.64    0.103      .9976984      1.02553 
Specialists per 10,000 .9792244    .0143226     -1.44    0.152      .9514769     1.007781 
Hospitals per 100,000 1.075402    .0795533      0.98    0.326      .9298885     1.243685 
Admissions per 1,000 .9932527    .0015854     -4.24    0.000      .9901417     .9963734 
For-profit Hospital % .9994447    .0016737     -0.33    0.740      .9961608     1.002739 
Avg. Family Premium .9999003     .000037     -2.69    0.007      .9998276     .9999731 
Year       
2004 1. 090758    .0834344      1.14    0.257      .9385133     1.267699 
2005 1.150128    .1195997      1.35    0.179      .9375403      1.41092 
2006 1.257972    .2465894 1.17    0.242      .8557802     1.849182 
2007 1.298682    .1888917      1.80    0.073      .9757956     1.728409 
 
2008 1.282721    .1798325      1.78    0.076      .9738039     1.689634 
2009 .9485597    .3143991     -0.16    0.873       .494499      1.81955 
constant .0343077    .0170637     -6.78    0.000      .0129084     .0911823 
                         




Table 30: Time to USOC and Joint Categorization of Total Private Insurance 
and Hospital Markets 
 Number of strata =  367 
Number of PSUs = 812                                  
Number of obs      =       96618 
Population size    =  1084729746 
Design df          =         445 
F(  30,    416)    =        4.27 
Prob > F           =      0.0000 
Takes 30+ Minutes to Reach 
USOC 
Odds 
Ratio      
Std. Err t    P>|t|      95% Conf. Interval 
Both Markets Competitive (ref)       
Conc. Insurance, Comp Hosp .9452672    .0739537     -0.72    0.472      .8105476     1.102378 
Comp. Insurance, Conc. Hosp .9354227    .0876571     -0.71    0.477      .7780823      1.12458 
Both Markets Concentrated .7760043    .0971927     -2.02    0.043      .6066838     .9925806 
Sex .9212667    .0279821     -2.70    0.007      .8678825     .9779347 
Hispanic 1.003969    .0789385      0.05    0.960      .8602226     1.171736 
Black 1.244217    .0936707      2.90    0.004      1.073096     1.442625 
American Indian/AK Native 1.772166    .4904269      2.07    0.039       1.02873     3.052862 
Asian .9599309    .0971083     -0.40    0.686      .7868576     1.171073 
Native Hawaiian/ Pacific 
Islander 
.6452799    .2219621     -1.27    0.203      .3282124     1.268648 
MultiRacial 1.008732    .1910468      0.05    0.963      .6952234     1.463615 
Age 1.004406     .001458      3.03    0.003      1.001545     1.007276 
Unmarried 1.015404    .0489408      0.32    0.751      .9236355     1.116291 
Education .975931    .0048068     -4.95    0.000      .9665298     .9854236 
Personal Income 1.000001    6.36e-07      1.47    0.143      .9999997     1.000002 
Physical Health 1.121882     .027219      4.74    0.000      1.069643     1.176672 
Mental Health .9990872     .027066     -0.03    0.973      .9472854     1.053722 
Urban/Rural Cont. Cd .8875219    .0651339     -1.63    0.105     .7683168 1.025222 
Median HH Income (state) .9999959    5.63e-06     -0.74    0.462      .9999848     1.000007 
MDs per 10,000 .9869314    .0078571     -1.65    0.099      .9716099     1.002494 
Specialists per 10,000 1.026103    .0146559      1.80    0.072      .9976997     1.055314 
Hospitals per 100,000 .9124827    .0838426     -1.00    0.319      .7617273     1.093075 
Admissions per 1,000 1.001842    .0015138      1.22    0.224      .9988718     1.004822 
For-profit Hospital % .9989609    .0017918     -0.58    0.562      .9954457     1.002489 
Avg. Family Premium 1.000012      .0000411 0.30    0.765      .9999316     1.000093 
Year       
2004 .9783235    .0805546     -0.27    0.790      .8321544     1.150167 
 
2005 1.007393    .1132407      0.07    0.948      .8077086     1.256444 
2006 1.24532    .2279967      1.20    0.231      .8689916     1.784622 
2007 .9270338 .1322574     -0.53    0.596      .7003672     1.227059 
2008 .8549058    .1427425     -0.94    0.348      .6157532     1.186943 
2009 .662266    .2408621     -1.13    0.258      .3240495     1.353485 
constant .0916955    .0470204     4.66    -0.00      .0334712     .2512028 





Table 31: No USOC Other than an ER and Joint Categorization of Insurance 
and Hospital Markets 
 Number of strata =  367 
Number of PSUs = 812                                  
Number of obs      =       96618 
Population size    =  1084729746 
Design df          =         445 
F(  30,    416)    =       66.31 
Prob > F           =      0.0000 
No USOC Other than an ER Odds 
Ratio      
Std. Err t    P>|t|      95% Conf. Interval 
Both Markets Competitive (ref)       
Conc. Insurance, Comp Hosp .9233021        .0546333 -1.35    0.178      .8219389     1.037166 
Comp. Insurance, Conc. Hosp 1.171723    .0650786      2.85    0.005      1.050557     1.306864 
Both Markets Concentrated .9093333    .0750604     -1.15    0.250      .7731602      1.06949 
Sex 1.688547    .0441419     20.04    0.000      1.603985     1.777566 
Hispanic 1.729661    .0847225     11.19    0.000      1.570919     1.904445 
Black 1.482312    .0728799      8.01    0.000      1.345783     1.632692 
American Indian/AK Native .7336106    .1591749     -1.43    0.154          .4789307 1.123721 
Asian 1.600762    .1011895      7.44    0.000      1.413751     1.812512 
Native Hawaiian/ Pacific 
Islander 
1.391644    .4429666      1.04    0.300       .744471     2.601407 
MultiRacial 1.030773    .1315011      0.24    0.812       .802185     1.324498 
Age .9769145    .0012396    -18.41    0.000      .9744814     .9793537 
Unmarried 1.217145    .0461059      5.19    0.000      1.129823     1.311216 
Education 1.157229    .0052977     31.90    0.000      1.146864     1.167687 
Personal Income .9999996    4.47e-07    -1.00 0.318      .9999987            1
Physical Health .8921091    .0172832     -5.89    0.000      .8587807     .9267309 
Mental Health 1.033883    .0202902      1.70    0.090      .9947654     1.074538 
Urban/Rural Cont. Cd .9832494    .0422617     -0.39    0.694      .9036033     1.069916 
Median HH Income (state) .9999972    3.63e-06     -0.78    0.434        .99999     1.000004 
MDs per 10,000 .991889     .005304     -1.52    0.128      .9815196     1.002368 
Specialists per 10,000 .9935284    .0105554     -0.61    0.541      .9729989     1.014491 
Hospitals per 100,000 1.045639    .0664591      0.70    0.483      .9228543     1.184759 
Admissions per 1,000 1.001897    .0010637      1.78    0.075      .9998083     1.003989 
For-profit Hospital % 1.009294    .0011645      8.02    0.000      1.007008     1.011586 
Avg. Family Premium .9999618    .0000297     -1.29    0.199      .999903 1.00002 
Year       
2004 1.094525    .0636646      1.55    0.121      .9762909     1.227078 
2005 1.179233    .0935582      2.08    0.038      1.008981     1.378214 
2006 1.089674    .1663219 0.56    0.574      .8072709     1.470868 
2007 1.318188    .1354049      2.69    0.007      1.077217     1.613065 
2008 1.364958    .1571088      2.70    0.007      1.088623     1.711438 
2009 .8230591    .1412567     -1.13    0.257      .5874163      1.15323 
constant .066105    .0263947     -6.80    0.000      .0301603     .1448881 




Experience with Health Plan 
Looking at the overall, unadjusted experiences with health plans reported by 
Medicaid managed care enrollees, the mean plan rating (on a scale of 0-10) was 8.5 (1.8).  
While the prevalence of administrative problems among the total sample was low, 
administrative problems among those who used administrative services like calling 
customer service or needing approval for treatment were more common.  Forty percent of 
those who sought help from customer service or needed approval for a treatment 
experienced a problem getting needed help (0.39, SE 0.48 and -0.43, SE 0.50 
respectively).  One in four of those who sought plan information or completed plan 
paperwork experienced a problem (0.26, SE 0.44 and 0.26, SE 0.44). 
In the full model, the MMC HHI was not significantly associated with respondent 
reports of any administrative problems with their plan.  Respondents in worse physical 
health status (1.27, p<0.001) or mental health status (1.22, p<0.01) were more likely to 
report having administrative problems while African American and Hispanic respondents 
were less likely to report administrative problems, other factors held constant (Table 32).  
The number of MMC plans available, expressed in linear terms as well as non-linear 
through a natural cubic spline, did not significantly affect the odds of reported 
administrative problems.  The ratio of the MMC HHI to hospital market HHI as well as 
the joint categorization of MMC and hospital markets were also not significantly 




Table 32: Administrative Problems and the MMC HHI 
    
Number of strata   =       309                                                     
Number of PSUs     =      512                               
Number of obs      =      2000 
Population size    =  13727132 
Design df          =       203 
F(  67,    137)    =     12.54 




Ratio      
Std. Err t    P>|t|      95% Conf. Interval 
MMC HHI  .9998816    .0000931     -1.27    0.205          .999698 1.000065 
Sex 1.400761    .2621855      1.80    0.073      .9684699     2.026012 
Hispanic .646833    .1176006     -2.40    0.017      .4519676     .9257146 
Black .6743318    .1111498     -2.39    0.018      .4872243     .9332937 
American Indian/AK 
Native 
1.202046    .5631895      0.39    0.695      .4772208     3.027769 
Asian .8664441    .3384122     -0.37    0.714      .4011324     1.871515 
Native Hawaiian/ Pacific 
Islander 
.2189954    .3138892     -1.06    0.291      .0129741     3.696506 
MultiRacial 1.058416    .4021319      0.15    0.881      .5003959     2.238718 
Age .990854    .0055657     -1.64    0.103      .9799405     1.001889 
Unmarried 1.034038    .1842007      0.19    0.851      .7277738     1.469186 
Education 1.033691     .023408      1.46    0.145      .9885523     1.080891 
Personal Income 1.000009    8.02e-06      1.14    0.257      .9999933     1.000025 
Physical Health 1.274606    .0928659      3.33    0.001      1.104045     1.471517 
Mental Health 1.219797    .0937799      2.58    0.010      1.048222     1.419455 
PCCM Indicator 9950234    .3997797     -0.01    0.990      .4505958      2.19725 
Months of MMC Lock-
in 
.9777769     .043419     -0.51    0.613      .8958076     1.067247 
Mixed Waiver Ind. .7410103    .2628058     -0.85    0.399      .3682372     1.491148 
Mandatory MMC Ind. .4274179    .4542912     -0.80    0.425      .0525663     3.475349 
Urban/Rural Cont. Cd .8043082    .5146178     -0.34    0.734      .2277901     2.839947 
Median HH Income 
(state) 
1.000018    .0000421      0.42    0.673          .9999348 1.000101 
MDs per 10,000 1.00462    .0596774      0.08    0.938      .8935827     1.129455 
Specialists per 10,000 1.001153    .0484091      0.02    0.981      .9101127       1.1013 
Hospitals per 100,000 .4067165    .4531377     -0.81    0.420      .0452115     3.658763 
Admissions per 1,000 .5105272    .9893116     -0.35    0.729      .0111853     23.30183 
For-profit Hospital % 1.639507    4.605819      0.18    0.860      .0064434     417.1675 
Avg Mcaid Payment for 
Adult 
1.000654    .0002776      2.35    0.019      1.000106     1.001201 
Year       
2004 .6931412        .1994743 -1.27    0.204      .3929987      1.22251 
2005 .6037588    .2111647     -1.44    0.151      .3029494     1.203252 
2006 .6376939    .4332128     -0.66    0.509      .1670654     2.434098 
2007 .485386    .2424448     -1.45    0.149      .1812891     1.299579 
2008 .5109518     .314801     -1.09    0.277      .1516364     1.721696 
2009 1.487131    3.323109      0.18    0.859      .0181496     121.8519 
constant 7.822907    31.36353      0.51    0.608      .0028858     21206.33 
Note: Coefficients for state fixed effects not shown.   
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In the unadjusted regressions for the Medicaid market concentration on overall 
plan satisfaction, increases in the MMC HHI were positively associated with higher 
satisfaction ratings, though the coefficient was small—a 1,000 unit increase in the HHI 
was associated with an increase in the plan rating of 0.04 points.  In the Heckman 
selection model with state fixed effects and individual and local control variables, the 
MMC HHI was significantly associated with higher plan ratings conditional on a plan 
rating less than 10; the coefficient again remained small (0.0001, p<0.026) and the 
findings were no longer significant when year fixed effects were included in the model.  
The number of available MMC plans (both linear and non-linear) was not associated with 
reported overall satisfaction with plans, nor were the ratio of MMC to hospital market 
HHIs or the joint categorization of MMC and hospital markets.   
 On the private market side, the mean health plan rating overall was 7.9 (1.9), 
slightly lower than the average rating among MMC enrollees.  About one in three 
respondents who sought plan information, help from customer service, or needed 
approval for treatment experienced a problem doing so (0.31 SE 0.46; 0.35 SE 0.47; and 
0.30  SE 0.45 respectively).   
 Looking at the association between commercial market concentration and 
consumer experiences, market concentration measures were not significantly associated 
with overall satisfaction in the Heckman selection model with year fixed effects.  In 
models without year fixed effects, the ratio of the total private insurance HHI to hospital 
HHI was significantly and positively associated with plan satisfaction (0.03, p≤0.047), 
such that a higher concentration of insurance markets relative to hospital markets was 
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associated with higher reported satisfaction with plans. This effect does not persist when 
year fixed effects are included, so temporal factors that affect all respondents equally may 
explain part of this association.   
Table 33: Administrative Problems and the HMO HHI 
 Number of strata =  364 
Number of PSUs = 780                                  
Number of obs      =      35470 
Population size    =  425027554 
Design df          =        416 
F(  28,    389)    =      10.11 
Prob > F           =     0.0000 
Any Administrative Problem Odds Ratio      Std. Err t    P>|t|      95% Conf. Interval 
HMO HHI 1.000032          .0000119 2.70 0.007      1.000009     1.000055 
Sex 1.02177    .0224219      0.98    0.327      .9786326     1.066809 
Hispanic .6574007    .0463162     -5.95    0.000      .5723809     .7550492 
Black .6055445    .0407661     -7.45    0.000      .5304871     .6912216 
American Indian/AK Native 1.254661    .4020328      0.71    0.479      .6683116     2.355451 
Asian .9132808    .0864772     -0.96    0.339      .7581762     1.100116 
Native Hawaiian/ Pacific 
Islander 
.6891169    .2302149     -1.11    0.266      .3573553     1.328879 
MultiRacial 1.245177    .1532099      1.78    0.075      .9776684     1.585882 
Age .9918519    .0014358     -5.65    0.000      .9890336     .9946783 
Unmarried .9075974    .0393685     -2.24    0.026      .8334188     .9883783 
Education 1.006565    .0048758      1.35    0.177      .9970266     1.016195 
Personal Income .9999999    4.93e-07     -0.20    0.839      .9999989     1.000001 
Physical Health 1.067797    .0227515      3.08    0.002      1.023999     1.113469 
Mental Health 1.177781    .0270525      7.12    0.000      1.125787     1.232177 
Urban/Rural Cont. Cd .9946846   .0435963     -0.12    0.903       .912576     1.084181 
Median HH Income (state) 1.000003    4.75e-06      0.57    0.567      .9999934     1.000012 
MDs per 10,000 .9923219    .0064274     -1.19    0.235      .9797679     1.005037 
Specialists per 10,000 1.007466    .0128511      0.58    0.560      .9825185     1.033046 
Hospitals per 100,000 .9525142    .0491607     -0.94    0.346        .86062     1.054221 
Admissions per 1,000 1.000191    .0013072      0.15    0.884      .9976249     1.002764 
For-profit Hospital % 1.002654    .0012693      2.09    0.037      1.000162     1.005152 
Avg. Family Premium 1.000065    .0000339      1.93    0.054      .9999988     1.000132 
Year       
2004 1.006135     .081921      0.08    0.940      .8573298     1.180768 
2005 .9880665     .089811 -0.13    0.895      .8263992     1.181361 
2006 .9049964    .1575428     -0.57    0.567      .6427415     1.274258 
2007 .8578983    .0918749     -1.43    0.153      .6950436     1.058911 
2008 .6598333    .0790452     -3.47    0.001      .5213944       .83503 
2009 .8360652    .2294333     -0.65    0.514      .4874965     1.433867 
constant .2242818     .085422     -3.92    0.000      .1060845     .4741723 
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A higher HMO concentration was associated with statistically higher odds of 
reported administrative problems, though the magnitude of the coefficient was negligible 
(OR 1.000, p≤0.007) (Table 33).  The total commercial concentration (including both 
HMOs and PPOs) was not significantly associated with administrative problems. In the 
nonlinear formulation applying a restricted cubic spline to the number of available 
MCOs, there was a significantly lower odds of administrative problems with each 
additional available plan between 5 and 15 plans (0.98, p<0.05) (Table 34); when more 
than 15 plans were available, changes in the number of plans were no longer significantly 
associated with the odds of reported administrative problems.  The ratio of insurance to 
hospital HHIs and the joint categorization of private insurance and hospital markets were 




Table 34: Restricted Cubic Spline: Number of Commercial Plans and Reported 
Administrative problems, Private Market 
 Number of strata =  364 
Number of PSUs = 780                                 
Number of obs      =      35839 
Population size    =  429260236 
Design df          =        416 
F(  30,    387)    =       9.42 
Prob > F           =     0.0000 
Any Administrative Problem Odds 
Ratio      
Std. Err t    P>|t|      95% Conf. Interval 
5-15 Plans .9782429    .0109421     -1.97    0.050       .956969     .9999898 
15-25 Plans 1.07665    .0511958      1.55    0.121       .980575     1.182138 
25-45 Plans .8464464    .0958083   -1.47    0.142      .6775975      1.05737 
Sex 1.021811    
 
.0223227      0.99    0.324      .9788608     1.066646 
Hispanic .6557299    .0459223    -6.03    0.000      .5713988     .7525071 
Black .6039762    .0402903    -7.56    0.000       .529751     .6886013 
American Indian/AK Native 1.244444    .3946438      0.69    0.491      .6671922     2.321133 
Asian .9178179    .0862271    -0.91    0.362      .7630527     1.103973 
Native Hawaiian/ Pacific 
Islander 
.6922243    .2289439    -1.11    0.267      .3613282     1.326147 
MultiRacial 1.25156    .1522937      1.84    0.066      .9853095     1.589757 
Age .9917642    .0014185    -5.78    0.000      .9889797     .9945565 
Unmarried .9035542    .0388811    -2.36    0.019      .8302695     .9833075 
Education 1.006357    .0048174      1.32    0.186       .996932     1.015871 
Personal Income .9999999    4.87e-07    -0.20    0.842      .9999989     1.000001 
Physical Health 1.066998    .0223543      3.10    0.002      1.023949     1.111856 
Mental Health 1.178777    .0269155      7.20    0.000      1.127039     1.232889 
Urban/Rural Cont. Cd .9972721    .0445919     -0.06    0.951      .9133603     1.088893 
Median HH Income (state) 1.000003    4.76e-06      0.60    0.548      .9999935     1.000012 
MDs per 10,000 .9930621    .0059961    -1.15    0.250      .9813453     1.004919 
Specialists per 10,000 1.004806    .0126228      0.38    0.703      .9802971     1.029927 
Hospitals per 100,000 .9435132    .0497351     -1.10    0.271      .8506442 1.046521 
Admissions per 1,000 1.000361    .0013678      0.26    0.792      .9976759     1.003053 
For-profit Hospital % 1.002505    .0012629      1.99    0.048      1.000025     1.004991 
Avg. Family Premium 1.000079    .0000337      2.34    0.020      1.000013     1.000145 
Year       
2004 1.008758    .0830946      0.11    0.916      .8579582     1.186063 
 
2005 1.090838    .1558001      0.61    0.543      .8238193     1.444405 
2006 .9628596    .1976487     -0.18    0.854      .6431686     1.441455 
2007 .9220362    .1076016     -0.70    0.487      .7330319     1.159773 
2008 .7145181    .1028189     -2.34    0.020      .5384783     .9481089 
2009 .9041911    .2640739     -0.34    0.730      .5092568     1.605401 




Out of Pocket Expenditures in Private Insurance 
 For the private insurance models, we assessed the share of expenditures paid for 
out of pocket (OOP) by respondents, both total and for specific services.  Overall, 
privately insured respondents paid 26.2% of their total health care expenditures out of 
pocket.  This percentage varied by service, ranging from a low of 0.3% on average for 
inpatient expenditures to 29.7% for prescription drug expenditures.   
 Increases in the total commercial insurance HHI (both PPOs and HMOs) was 
associated with a slight but statistically significant increase in the OOP share for office 
visits such that a 1000 unit increase in the HHI increased the OOP share by 0.0029 
percentage points, other factors held constant. There was also a significant association 
between the commercial HHI and prescription drug expenditures—a 1,000 unit increase 
in the HHI was associated with a 0.0039 percentage point increase in the OOP share.  
There was no statistically significant association between the total commercial HHI and 
other services, nor the HMO HHI and the OOP share for any service category.   
The number of MCOs was not significantly associated with the OOP share for 
total expenditures or any of the service categories.  When modeled as a natural spline, 
there does appear to be a statistically significant and nonlinear association between the 
number of plans and the OOP share.  For example, the effect of an additional plan in the 
MSA on the OOP share for total expenditures between 5 and 15 plans is negative and not 
statistically significant (-0.0016, p<0.065), then positive and significant between 15 and 
25 plans (0.0076, p<0.022), and then negative again between 25 and 45 plans (-0.017, 
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p<0.026).  A similar pattern was found in the models for the OOP share of expenditures 
on office visits as well as prescription drugs.   
The ratio of insurance to hospital HHI was significantly associated with the OOP 
share for inpatient expenditures such that an increase in the insurance concentration 
relative to the hospital concentration was associated with a  lower OOP share for 
consumers (-.0003, p< 0.028).  The ratio was not significantly associated with the OOP 
share for other services, including emergency room expenditures or hospital outpatient 
expenditures.  In the joint categorization, respondents in areas with a competitive 
insurance and concentrated hospital market had a significantly higher OOP share for total 
expenditures relative to consumers in a jointly competitive market (0.011, p<0.017), 
while the association was insignificant for the other two categories.  A similar pattern 
was found for the OOP share for expenditures on emergency room services, though for 
inpatient services jointly concentrated markets were associated with a higher OOP share 
(0.001, p<0.047) while the imbalanced markets were not significantly different from 
jointly competitive markets.   
Alternative Specifications 
We estimated alternative specifications of the regression model to determine whether 
findings were robust.  In addition to estimating models with different formulations of 
health insurance market structure as described above, as a sensitivity analysis we also 
restricted the models to only those respondents with positive medical expenditures.  In 
general, the conclusions from these models were consistent with models estimated on the 
full sample.  In some cases the significance of independent variables slipped beyond the 
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95% confidence threshold, but largely the non-effect of market structure persisted in 
models estimated on the sample with positive health expenditures.   
In the instrumental variables approaches we tested, the private market instruments—
the number of firms and the percentage of firms that had more than 500 employees—
were significantly associated with the HMO HHI and the total commercial HHI.  The 
instruments were not strong for the PPO HHI, the total private HHI (including the self-
insured), the total lives HHI (including managed Medicare and Medicaid), or the number 
of MCOs in the MSA.  The findings from the instrumental variables approach should 
therefore be interpreted with caution, though the general finding of a non-effect of market 
structure on consumer experiences persisted in the IV models.  In one of the models, the 
instruments were found to have a slight but statistically significant effect on respondent 
reports of having no USOC other than an ER.  However, the instrument failed the 
overidentification test by virtue of having an independent effect on the outcome even 
after the total commercial HHI was included in the model.   
The MMC instrument—the total number of Medicaid enrollees in the state--was 
significantly associated with a lower Medicaid HHI and higher number of plans after 
controlling for other variables in the model.  The coefficient was small, making the 
instrument relatively weak.  The finding of no significant effect of market structure on 





 Findings from this analysis suggest that health insurance market structure does 
have an effect on access to care and a negligible effect on consumers’ experiences with 
their health plan. Of the domains of consumer experience examined, the travel time to the 
USOC as well as difficulty reaching the USOC seem to be most affected by market 
structure, though the coefficients were still quite small with generally less than a ten 
percent change in odds.  This suggests that plan provider networks may be modified 
based on market conditions in both the insurance and hospital markets. These findings are 
consistent with previous published literature finding little to no significant effect of health 
insurance competition on quality.  Instead, individual factors such as age, income, marital 
status, and self-reported physical and mental health status have a larger bearing on 
consumers’ reported access to care and experience with their health plans.     
Consumers often reported problems with the administrative side of health plans, 
with over a quarter having problems getting help from customer service, waiting for 
approval, completing paperwork, and finding information about the plan.  However, the 
prevalence of these problems does not appear to be affected by market structure in either 
MMC or the private group markets.  The health plan practices that lead to administrative 
challenges for consumers—for example, difficult customer service representatives and 
dense, technical plan information and procedures—are difficult to evaluate at the time 
consumers or health benefits managers make plan purchasing decisions because these 
functions are often ignored until needed in the care-seeking process.  Plans may focus on 
price as a key determinant of enrollment decisions rather than quality as a marketing tool.  
139 
 
Alternatively, some other unmeasured factor, perhaps limited health literacy or language 
accessibility issues, may explain the high prevalence of reported problems among those 
who seek administrative help.  Similarly, overall plan satisfaction was not significantly 
affected by market structure.  While specific domains of the consumer experience may be 
affected by market structure, consumers do not appear to bring these experiences to bear 
when assigning an overall rating to their experience with their health plan.   
One motivation for this study was to compare the relationship between market 
structure and consumer experiences in two different settings, Medicaid managed care and 
private insurance.  MMC enrollees do not pay monthly premiums for their coverage, so 
the beneficiary’s plan selection is not based on price.  One might surmise, then, that plans 
would compete more directly on quality in this setting than in an environment like private 
insurance in which premiums are very salient to consumers.  Despite these theoretical 
differences, the general finding of little to no effect of market structure on consumer 
experiences holds in both MMC and private insurance.    
Insurers in both MMC and private insurance submit CAHPS responses to the 
NCQA and state Medicaid agencies as part of performance monitoring.  Health insurance 
companies seem to be particularly active in promoting access and quality for preventive 
services such as immunizations and managing chronic diseases by coordinating with 
providers and communicating with enrollees through informational flyers and prompts.  
These efforts tend to be targeted to a few conditions such as obesity and diabetes.   
These findings suggest that, while there is some association between health 
insurance competition and consumers’ reported access and satisfaction with their health 
140 
 
plan on some measures, the overall effect is small if it is at all statistically significant.  
Consumers are not significantly more satisfied with their health plan in more competitive 
health insurance markets.  In times of tight budgets and tough choices, policymakers will 
likely look to other outcomes besides consumers’ access and satisfaction to make policy 
decisions about health plan market regulation. 
Limitations 
A strength of this paper is that it builds evidence in a relatively nascent area of 
inquiry - the relationship of health insurance competition to access to care and quality.  
This proposed study uses individual-level data with a full set of controls rather than an 
insurer’s aggregated CAHPS score, which may not fully adjust for individual-level 
factors that are associated with satisfaction and access to care. These characteristics may 
also be associated with health plan quality, which would bias the results of previous 
studies.  In addition, this proposal includes more recent data than previous studies (by 
approximately ten years); in an era when health insurance market dynamics have shifted 
dramatically over the past decade, this newer data provides high policy relevance.  This 
study will include insurance products such as PPOs that have been omitted from previous 
studies.   
Another strength of this proposal is the joint analysis of health insurance 
competition for the privately insured and Medicaid population.  In the Medicaid program, 
prices are regulated so insurers compete more on quality for enrollees.  Therefore, 
economic theory suggests the effects of competition on quality may be cleaner than in the 
private market where price plays an important role to consumers and theory is less 
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specified.    In both markets, there largely was no statistically significant effect of health 
insurance market structure on access to care or consumers’ experience with their health 
plan. 
From a statistical perspective, a limitation of the paper is the low prevalence of 
access problems among the analytic sample.  The low prevalence effectively decreases 
the statistical power of the analysis, making it more difficult to detect significant 
differences. The general lack of an association was also evident in the analysis of other, 
more common outcomes, which lends credence to the findings for the less common 
access problems.  
One limitation of this paper relates to the mediation of insurance markets by 
employers and the state.  In commercial health insurance in the US, employers generally 
determine the health insurance coverage options an individual can select.   In the 
Medicaid program, states solicit bids from insurers and determine which and how many 
contracts to award.  Enrollment is a true measure of competition only in a market where 
individuals make direct purchasing decisions; enrollment numbers in ESI is an artifact of 
employer size and how many plans are offered, and Medicaid Beneficiary enrollment 
based upon the state’s decision to select a given number plans may not truly reflect the 
MMC market structure.  In ESI, employers’ decisions in the aggregate and the resulting 
employee enrollment are arguably a decent proxy for the individual market; employers in 
competitive markets could theoretically choose from lower cost or higher quality plans 
into which their workers would then enroll. These plans are competing for contracts with 
employers, and thus the benefits of these plans would reflect the competitive nature of the 
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insurance and hospital markets.  The extension to Medicaid, where a state and its MMC 
contract decisions are “the only game in town” could be more problematic in using 
enrollment as a measure of competition.     
An additional limitation of this paper is the use of the HHI as the predominant 
measure of market concentration.  While this measure is commonly used both in 
regulatory practice and published literature, it has documented shortcomings and does not 
capture important aspects of the level of competition in markets such as barriers to entry.  
To the extent the HHI is an incomplete measure of market competition, these results 





Paper 3: Are Consumers Who Have a Choice in Health 
Plans More Satisfied? 
Abstract 
This study examines whether individuals who have a choice in health plans at 
their current job report having a better experience with their health plan, better access to 
care, or a lower out-of-pocket percentage of their medical expenditures.  We use data 
from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey from 2003-2009 as well as data from the 
Area Resource File.  Our sample includes respondents with private group coverage 
(N=114,030).  In this sample, 25.6% of individuals were offered a choice in plans at their 
current main job.  Our empirical model adjusted for individual and local market factors 
associated with relevant outcomes and included state fixed effects.  We find that 
individuals with a choice in plans have a very small, but statistically significantly higher 
overall satisfaction, rating their plans 0.08 points higher on a ten point scale.  Among 
those who used a plan’s administrative services like calling customer service, filling out 
plan paperwork, getting approval for treatment, or finding plan information , those with a 
choice in plans were less likely to report having any problem when using that service 
(OR 0.91, p<0.017).   On most measures of access to care, those with a choice in plans 
reported equal access to those without a choice, though those with a choice were less 
likely to have no usual source of care other than an ER.  On the other hand, those with a 
choice reported higher odds of not getting or delaying care relative to those without a 
choice in plans (OR 1.21, p<0.003) .  People with a choice in plans have a lower OOP 
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percentage for total medical expenditures than those without a choice; however, there 
was no significant difference for office visit or prescription drug expenditures.  These 
findings are consistent with the theory that individuals with a choice in plans can better 
maximize their utility than those without a choice in plans, though the overall effect was 
small.   
Background 
Over the past several decades, the percentage of employers offering their workers 
a choice in health plans has increased.  For example, the percentage of private sector 
firms that offer more than one health plan option to its employees has doubled in the last 
15 years: in 1996, about 21.5% of firms offered two or more options, rising to 42.6% in 
2012, though some employees who work for a firm that offers multiple options may be 
ineligible for coverage or limited to one plan due to part-time status or other eligibility 
restrictions (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) 2013).  However, 
recent evidence suggests this trend may be slowing; in 2013, a Towers Watson survey of 
companies with 1,000 or more employees with the National Business Group on Health 
found that nearly 15% of companies offered only a high-deductible plan with a savings 
account, up from 7.6% in 2010.  At the same time, the establishment of new state-based 
and federally-facilitated health care marketplaces under the Affordable Care Act (ACA) 
will create a new venue for purchasing health coverage that offers multiple options for 
those seeking coverage. 
In light of these changes in the health care system, this study examines whether 
individuals who are offered a choice in health plans report higher satisfaction with their 
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health care plan, better access to care, or lower out-of-pocket spending than those without 
a choice in plans.  Previous research found that the overall level of market competition, 
expressed as an HHI, is not generally associated with access, consumer experience, and 
the OOP percentage of health spending (Shartzer 2013) (Scanlon D. , Swaminathan, Lee, 
& Chernew, 2008).  This study examines whether competition at the individual level—
expressed as whether an individual has a choice between health plans—is more strongly 
associated with consumer experience with their health plan, access to care, or the out-of-
pocket (OOP) percentage of health spending.   
Several previous studies have examined whether having a choice in health plans 
affects satisfaction.  In an early study of the impact of managed care choice based on a 
1994 survey of 3,000 nonelderly adults in Boston, Los Angeles, and Miami, Davis and 
colleagues found that managed care enrollees without a choice in plans were twice as 
likely to rate their plan as fair or poor compared to individuals with a choice between 
managed care and FFS (Davis, et al. 1995).  Using data from 1994 and 1995 telephone 
surveys of about 1,000 adult enrollees in Dallas, Houston, Atlanta, and Washington, 
D.C., Ullman and colleagues found that individuals with a choice in health plans were 
more satisfied than those without a choice, regardless of whether the individual selected a 
Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) or Fee-for-Service (FFS) coverage (Ullman, et 
al. 1997).   In logistic regressions examining the association between choice and a 
dichotomous satisfaction measure, plan choice and health status were significantly related 
to satisfaction while other demographic variables were not.  Schone and Cooper 
examined the 1996 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) and found that 41% of all 
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workers had a choice in plans from their own employer, rising to 55% when other sources 
of insurance such as a spouse were included (Schone and Cooper 2011).  In multivariate 
regressions controlling for individual characteristics, this study found that plan choice 
was associated with an increase in the likelihood of feeling that the family’s health needs 
were being met; the coefficient for having a usual source of care positive but was not 
significant at the 5% confidence level.   The authors noted wide geographic variation in 
plan choice, with individuals in rural areas more likely to have only one plan option.  Our 
methodology attempts to overcome some of these geographic differences by using 
restricted MEPS data with geographic identifying information to include local area fixed 
effects to control for time-invariant unobservable characteristics at the state level, 
including urban and rural differences in availability of plan choice.    
Taken together, these studies suggest that health plan choice is positively 
associated with consumer satisfaction.  In the years since the data for these studies were 
collected, the health insurance marketplace has changed.  The managed care “backlash” 
has ushered in an era of less restrictive managed care products, so those individuals 
without a choice in health plans may exhibit higher baseline satisfaction levels.  If the 
reference satisfaction levels have risen among those without a choice, we could observe a 
smaller marginal effect of plan choice on satisfaction. In addition, the percentage of 
employers offering more than one plan option has increased appreciably, and so the 
demographic profile of individuals with a choice in plans may have shifted.  This study 
expands upon these previous studies by using multiple years of data from MEPS that 
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reflects a more current health insurance environment, geographic information to control 
for local area characteristics, and a range of outcome measures salient to consumers .   
This study focuses on the ways in which having a choice in health plans affects 
individual experiences with health plans and access to care; we do not assess the net 
effects on an employer of offering more than one plans, such as adverse selection or the 
effects on total health insurance premiums.  Research on the aggregate employer effects 
have generally found that reductions in premiums through plan competition are 
counterbalanced by losses due to adverse selection (Cutler and Reber 1998) or a switch 
from family to single coverage and less generous benefits ( (M. K. Bundorf 2003).  In a 
setting with workers of varied risk, employers may establish varied contribution amounts 
to stabilize the risk pools for multiple plan options and minimize the effects of adverse 
selection (Cutler and Reber 1998), (Pauly and Herring 2000).   
Conceptual Model 
This study uses a conceptual framework of utility maximization which postulates 
that people will choose plans that best meet their anticipated needs, such as minimizing 
premiums, lowering out-of-pocket (OOP) payments, choosing plans that include  
providers they might need, having coverage for needed services, and other factors that 
could matter to them.  Those individuals without a choice in plans do not have the 
opportunity to maximize utility, and so we expect their realized utility to be lower.  In 
this study, we conceptualize utility in several dimensions: consumer experience with their 
plan, including overall satisfaction and the presence of administrative problems; access to 
care, reflecting an individual’s ability to access the providers he or she needs in a timely 
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fashion; and the percentage of spending on select medical services that is paid out of 
pocket, based on the theory that a higher OOP percentage reflects more spending on out-
of-network providers or for services the plan does not cover.   
 The utility maximization framework is commonly used in the literature on 
consumers’ choice of health plans (Scanlon, Chernew, and Lave 1997).  In a more recent 
review, Kolstad and Chernew (2009) also adopt a utility maximization model from 
neoclassical economics, in part because much of the literature regarding quality and 
consumer choice of health plans is based on the empirical expression of this model.  In 
this utility maximization model, rational consumers are presumed to determine their best 
option given the information available to them.  Consumers base their enrollment choice 
on the attributes of each plan option, including price and quality.  Individuals understand 
the various attributes of health plan options (premiums, out-of-pocket cost sharing, 
provider networks, etc) and how they value those attributes.  This study applies the 
framework of utility maximization while being mindful that the choices available to an 
individual are generally determined a sponsor (primarily employers) who select one or 
more candidate health plans from the open market and determine the employees’ 
financial contribution for each health plan (Enthoven 1993).   
Previous Literature 
Much of the literature on consumers’ choice of health plans focuses on factors 
that determine which health plan a consumer selects.  Scanlon and colleagues (1997) 
separate these factors into primary factors—those that are related directly to the plan, 
such as price, quality, provider networks, and benefits—as well as secondary factors 
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related to the characteristics of the individuals choosing the health plans such as health 
status and risk preference, characteristics of the environment, and other variables that 
may influence the weight placed on plan attributes in the selection process.  This line of 
inquiry requires ample information about the plan options available to consumers that 
often exceeds what is available in national datasets and surveys, and so these studies 
focus on large employer group or natural experiments on a smaller scale, such as a city or 
university.   While this limits the generalizability of the research, these studies are very 
useful in identifying factors that should be included in models addressing health plan 
choice.   
Early research on consumer choice of health plans focused on price and found 
consistently that price is significantly and negatively related to the probability  of 
enrolling in a health plan (Buchmuller and Feldstein 1996), (Long, Sette and Wrightson 
1988) (Short and Taylor 1989) (Welch 1986) (McGuire 1981) (Marquis and Long, 
Worker demand for health insurance in the non-group market 1995) (Feldman, et al. 
1989).  Studies define price in varied ways, including the total premium cost, the 
employee share of the premium, or the plan’s loading fee, which represents the cost of 
the plan above the actuarially fair value.   
When making a plan selection, consumers likely focus on prices that are most 
meaningful to them like premiums and cost sharing provisions.  Barringer and Mitchell 
analyzed data from a large manufacturing firm in which employees were offered four 
health insurance options and found that employees moving away from traditional FFS 
preferred a higher premium plan with lower cost-sharing requirements than a lower-
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premium, lower coverage option (Barringer and Mitchell 1994).  Admittedly, many of 
these studies are old and the health insurance market has shifted from HMOs and FFS 
plans to one with more product options such as PPOs and consumer-directed health plans, 
but these findings have persisted in more recent studies with diverse plan options 
(Marquis, Buntin, et al. 2007), (Parente, Feldman and Christianson 2004).  Naessens and 
colleagues use a 2004 natural experiment at the Mayo Clinic in Rochester to assess the 
interaction between health status, premium, and copayments in health plan choice.  This 
study found that overall 62% of employees chose a high-premium, low cost-sharing plan 
option over a plan with a lower premium and higher cost-sharing and that older 
individuals, those with higher previous-year health expenditures, and those with more 
comorbidities were more likely to enroll in the high premium option (Naessens, et al. 
2008).  Thus, consumers make tradeoffs between the “price” of the premium and the 
“price” of care at the point of service determined by plan cost-sharing requirements, and 
an individual’s expected health expenditures is an important mediator of this tradeoff.   
A number of more recent studies have examined the role of plan quality in 
consumers’ health plan selections, summarized in a review by Kolstad and Chernew 
(2009).  While information on premiums and copayment requirements may be relatively 
straightforward for most consumers to understand, a plan’s quality is multidimensional, 
often includes many different measures, and may be more difficult for consumers to 
comprehend.  To help convey plan quality information to employers making plan 
decisions for their workforce as well as consumers, the National Committee for Quality 
Assurance (NCQA) developed the Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set 
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(HEDIS).  This effort focuses on several broad areas of plan performance: process-
oriented quality of care, access to care, and member satisfaction.  HEDIS uses data 
collected from medical and administrative records as well as consumer information 
collected through the Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems 
(CAHPS) survey.  Many empirical studies use a plan’s HEDIS and CAHPS score as the 
measure of the plan’s quality, and this is often the type of information provided to 
consumers in studies of the effect of providing quality information about plans to 
consumers. 
A number of studies have found a positive and statistically significant response to 
quality after report card information is released.  Wedig and Tai-Seale (2002) examined 
the effects of report cards on federal employees in 1995 and 1996 and found that plan 
rating significantly influenced employees’ enrollment.   These findings are consistent 
with Beaulieu’s study of Harvard University employees (Beaulieu 2002); Scanlon and 
colleagues found that General Motors employees were responsive to overall quality 
indices, but not specific quality measures (D. Scanlon, et al. 2002). Quality information is 
relevant to the employers who determine the health plan choices available to their 
workforce as well, as evidenced in a study by Chernew and colleagues that found 
employers were more likely to offer insurance plans with higher absolute and relative 
HEDIS and CAHPS scores (Chernew, Gowrisankaran, McLaughlin, & Gibson, 2004).   
In addition, several studies demonstrate that consumers choose higher quality plans even 
when formal information is not provided, perhaps on the basis of informal plan reputation 
such as office chatter about which of the employers’ plans is best.  For example, Dafny 
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and Dranove found that Medicare HMO enrollees tended to switch into higher quality 
plans even without report cards (Dafny and Dranove 2005).  Jin and Sorenson (2006)  
estimate the association between both published and unpublished plan quality 
information on enrollment decisions and find that both types of quality information are 
positively and significantly associated with enrollment.  In general, the impact of quality 
on plan choice was concentrated on a small number of enrollees in these studies and 
fewer than 10% of enrollees switched plans.    
Consumers also view the breadth of the provider network as an important aspect 
of plan quality (Beaulieu 2002), (Feldman, et al. 1989).  Bundorf conceptualizes the 
breadth of the provider network as one component of plan generosity.  She found that 
employers were responsive to employees’ preferences for plan generosity in the health 
plans they selected for their workforce, though the effect was small (M. Bundorf 2002).  
In a survey of privately insured nonelderly adults in Los Angeles, Harris found that 
individuals were willing to trade higher quality for increased restrictions on the provider 
network, but the differences in quality needed to be large in order to sway consumers 
(Harris 2002).  
The new contribution of this study is to examine whether individuals who have a 
choice in health plans report higher satisfaction report better experiences with the plan, 
better access to care, or lower out-of-pocket expenditures than those individuals who do 
not have a choice in plans.  Based on the research, we presume individuals with a choice 
will seek to minimize premiums and out of pocket payments and maximize quality and 
the network of providers they might need, making some tradeoffs among plan elements 
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based on preferences and individual characteristics.  Privately insured individuals who do 
not have a choice in plans do not have the same opportunity to express those preferences 
in a plan selection, so we expect their satisfaction and access to be lower with higher out-
of-pocket spending because they cannot select their preferred panel of in-network 
providers.  This study will inform employers establishing benefit packages for their 
workforce, particularly those considering offering two or more health plans or only one 
health plan option, whether employees report greater satisfaction under one of the two 
scenarios.  It also has implications for those serving as “sponsors” of insurance markets 
such as the health insurance marketplaces established under the Affordable Care Act, 
Medicare Advantage, Medicaid managed care, etc., in terms of the importance of 
providing a choice in plans to an individual.   As the marketplaces are implemented and 
the participation of insurers remains in flux for several years, policymakers may enact or 
regulate changes that make it easier for people to have and exercise a choice in health 
plans.  In addition, while most Medicare Advantage and Medicaid managed care 
enrollees do have a choice in health plans, MMC beneficiaries living in rural areas may 
not have a choice in plans.   
Methods 
Data 
This study uses data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) from 
2003 to 2009 to estimate the association between having a choice in health plans and self-
reported satisfaction with their health plan.  The MEPS Household Component (HC) is a 
survey of the US non-institutionalized population conducted by the Agency for 
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Healthcare Research and Quality each year that collects information on demographic 
characteristics, health conditions, health status, use of medical services, charges and 
source of payments, access to care, satisfaction with care, health insurance coverage, 
income, and employment.  MEPS has a panel design in which each panel is interviewed 
five times (“rounds”) over the course of two years, allowing for some full calendar-year 
estimates that combine two panels as well as longitudinal analysis that examine changes 
within the panel over two years.  Some question sets, including the “Satisfaction with 
Plans” and “Access to Care” sets, are only asked in certain rounds.   In each year since 
2003, MEPS interviewed approximately 12,000 families representing more than 30,000 
individuals.   
In addition to MEPS, this study includes local market characteristics from the 
Area Resource File and market competition measures based on data from HealthLeaders-
Interstudy, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), and the American 
Hospital Association.  The Area Resource File is a collection of data from more than 50 
sources published annually by the Health Resources and Services Agency (HRSA).  It 
provides county-level statistics on the supply of health care facilities, health 
professionals, health care utilization and expenditures, and population demographics and 
economic characteristics.  The American Hospital Association Annual Survey database 
includes survey responses and AHA membership information on organizational structure, 
facility and service lines, inpatient and outpatient utilization, expenses, physician 
arrangements, staffing, corporate and purchasing affiliations, teaching status, and 
geographic indicators for about 6,500 hospitals each year.  This study uses 
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HealthLeaders-Interstudy data providing plan by county-level managed care enrollment 
information for HMOs, PPOs, managed Medicare, and managed Medicaid plans for 
2003-2009.  
Measures 
MEPS includes a question asking whether the individual has a choice of health 
plans at his or her current main job.  This question serves as the independent variable of 
interest in this study.  This question is asked in each round of the MEPS, and the survey 
instrument includes a “determined in previous round” response category for rounds 4/2 
and 5/3 along with responses of individuals newly eligible to answer the question in that 
round.  To address this, we create a variable measuring whether the respondent ever 
reporting having a choice in health plans at their current main job across the various 
rounds of the survey.  
The questions in the MEPS “Satisfaction with Plans” section, which serve as the 
primary outcome measures in this study (Table 1), are based on the Consumer 
Assessment of Health Plans questions developed at ARHQ with researcher support. 
There is a wealth of literature on the validity and measurement properties of CAHPS, 
much of which is synthesized in a 2005 analysis by Mathematica (Lake, Kvam and Gold 
2005).  More than 90% of U.S. health plans use CAHPS, which as mentioned serve as an 
important part of health plan report cards created by NCQA alongside HEDIS measures.  
CAHPS questions address ease of access to medical care, the need to seek approval for 
medical treatments and delays in care experienced while waiting for approval, ease of 
access to understandable plan information and repercussions of poor access, need to 
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complete paperwork and problems filling out paperwork, and an overall rating of the 
health plan.  Some of the CAHPS questions ask whether the family experienced a big, 
small, or no problem using an administrative health plan service; however these questions 
are asked only of a subset of MEPS respondents conditional on seeking or using a 
particular service.  For example, only those who called their health plan’s customer 
service are asked whether they had a problem getting help from customer service.  To 
address the small sample size for these conditional questions, we combine responses into 
one summary measure of having any administrative problem, conditional on needing 
administrative help like calling customer service, looking for plan information, needing 
approval for treatment, or completing  (Table 35).  MEPS data also document the 
respondent’s out of pocket (OOP) share of total expenditures for certain medical services 
including inpatient, outpatient, office visits, emergency room services,  prescription 
drugs, and total medical expenditures.  While total out of pocket spending on selected 
services represents both price and quantity, the respondent’s OOP share of expenditures 
is more a reflection of health plan generosity and removes quantity from the measure.   
Certain services such as inpatient hospitalizations have low OOP cost-sharing 
requirements and are less prevalent in the population, and thus there are many null values 
in the dataset with little variation around the small OOP mean percentages that are 
observed.  More routine and less expensive services such as office visits and prescriptions 
show wider variation around the mean and are observed for more respondents, and so 
these two variables along with the OOP share of total medical expenditures serve as 




a lower OOP share of expenditures than individuals who do not have a choice. 
 
In addition, individuals--particularly for those with chronic health needs—may 
choose between health plans on the basis of its provider network.  To assess whether 
those with a choice in health plans experience a more optimal provider network than 
individuals without a choice, we assess measures of access to care including whether the 
respondent has a usual source of care, whether they delayed or did not get care, the time 
Table 35: Outcomes Measures for Choice in Plans Analysis  
 Variable Format & Response Categories 
Any Administrative Problem: (any of 
below) 
Dichotomous  
    Getting help from customer service Not a problem A small problem; a big problem 
    Finding information on the plan Not a problem A small problem; a big problem 
    Waiting for approval for a treatment Not a problem A small problem; a big problem 
    Problem with plan paperwork Not a problem A small problem; a big problem 
Any problem getting a personal doctor Not a problem A small problem; a big problem 
Overall plan rating Linear (0-10) 
Difficult to reach USOC Not at all 
difficult; a little 
difficult 
Somewhat difficult; very 
difficult 
Delayed/did not get health care Dichotomous  
    Delayed getting necessary health care No Yes 
    Unable to get necessary health care  No Yes 
No USOC other than an ER 
      Has USOC 







No USOC   
Hospital ER 




Takes 31-60 minutes, 61-90, 
91-120, more than 120 minutes 
OOP % of Office Visit expenditures Linear (0-1) 
OOP % of Prescription expenditures Linear (0-1) 
OOP % of total medical expenditures Linear (0-1) 
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it took to get to their usual source of care, and whether the respondent had trouble getting 
a personal doctor.  
Statistical Model 
The study design is a longitudinal analysis of cross-sectional data, employing 
multivariate statistical regressions.  We conducted analyses of dependent variables 
measuring access to care, health plan satisfaction, or OOP expenditures  Ypmt for person p 
with their health plan in market m.  We use a reduced-form model that expresses an 
individual’s reported experience with her health plan and access to care      as a 
function of having a choice in health plans    , individual demographic and 
characteristics and time-varying local market factors      , state fixed effects   ,  and 
an error term as expressed in general form in Equation 1.  The functional form of the 
equation (for example, logistic or linear multivariate regression) depends on the outcome 
of interest. 
 
                             
Our model controls for individual and local market characteristics that are 
associated with satisfaction with health plans and access to care (Morales, et al. 2001) 
(Zaslavsky, et al. 2001) (Lurie, et al. 2003) (AHRQ 2012).  Individual-level 
characteristics in our model include age (in years), gender, marital status (married vs. 
others), total personal income (in dollars), education (in years), race/ethnicity (indicators 
for African American, Hispanic, American Indian/Alaska Native, Native 





status (5-point Likert scales with 1=excellent health and 5=poor health).  When possible, 
we retained the linear expression of MEPS variables such as age and income in the 
statistical model and used categorical variables when linear was not feasible.  The local 
market variables included as controls in the model are MSA-level rural/urban status, 
median household income, total physicians per 10,000 individuals, total specialists per 
10,000 individuals, the number of hospitals per 100,000, the number of hospital 
admissions per 100,000, the percentage of hospitals that are for-profit, and the average 
total family health insurance premium.  For all variables except the family premium, we 
created MSA-level weighted averages of county statistics, with the county population as 
the weight.  We use restricted-access MEPS data with geographic identifying information 
and thus can include state fixed effects to account for time-invariant unobserved 
characteristics that may influence access to care and patient satisfaction, such as cultural 
attitudes toward health plans and state insurance regulations or provider licensing policies 
that could affect access, OOP expenditures, or consumer experience with the plan.   
Sample 
  We include in our analytic sample individuals with employer, union, or other 
group private insurance coverage who were eligible for the Satisfaction with Plans 
questions and did not have Medigap insurance.  Respondents were eligible for the 
Satisfaction with Plans questions if someone in the reporting unit was covered by the plan 
on the date of the interview and the insurance was hospital/physician or Medicare 
supplemental coverage.   We exclude individuals who were out of scope for the entire 
reference period (for example, those who were living in an institution).  Table 36 shows 
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sample statistics (for all years) by whether the respondent had a choice in their health 
plan as well as sample sizes by year. 
Table 36: Unweighted MEPS Sample Characteristics  
 Privately Insured 
with a Choice in 
Plans at Current 
Main Job 
Privately 
Insured without  
a choice in plans 
Total 
N 27,605 86,425  114,030 
% Female 52.9 51.7 51.4 
% Married 65.1 44.6 49.6 
% With More than HS Degree 67.4 34.3 42.9 
% Hispanic 14.4 17.6 27.0 
% Black 16.4 14.3 12.3 
% American Indian/Alaska 
Native 
0.6 0.7 0.7 
% Asian 6.5 6.0 6.3 
% Native Hawaiian/Pacific 
Islander 
0.6 0.4 0.4 
% Multiracial 1.5 2.2 1.9 
% in Excellent or Very Good 
Physical Health 
65.7 68.2 67.6 
% in Excellent or Very Good 
Mental Health 
75.1 75.6 75.5 
Mean age 42.7 32.9 35.3 
Mean personal income $51,638 $21,963 $29,148 
Mean Rural/Urban Continuum 
Code 
1.41 1.47 1.45 
Mean Local Median 
Household Income 
$44,688 $43,929 $44,121 
Mean MDs per 10,000 21.7 21.5 21.6 
Mean Specialists per 10,000 6.9 6.9 6.9 
Hospitals per 100,000 1.2 1.2 1.2 
Mean Hospital Admissions per 
1,000 
118.3 121.0 120.3 
Mean % For-profit hospitals 21.0 21.5 21.4 
Mean MSA total family 
premium 
$11,292 $11,215 $11,235 
Sample Size by Year 
2003 3,851 12,965 16,816 
2004 3,839 12,642 16,481 
2005 3,795 12,593 16,388 
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2006 4,001 12,437 16,438 
2007 3,856 11,305 15,161 
2008 4,040 11,753 15,793 
2009 4,223 12,730 16,953 
Results 
 In the MEPS sample, 26% of respondents had a choice in health plans at their 
current main job and 74% did not have a choice.    Those who had a choice tended to be 
older, married, more educated, and have a higher average personal income.  The health 
status and local area characteristics was similar across the two groups.  The proportion of 
respondents with a choice in plans remained consistent over 2003-2009.   
Global Plan Rating 
Overall, privately insured respondents reported being satisfied with their health 
plan, giving it a 7.86 on average on a scale of 1-10.  The average ratings were similar for 
those with and without a choice in health plans (mean rating of 7.86 for both).  In the full 
linear model examining the relationship between having a choice in health plans and 
global satisfaction, we find a positive association between having a choice in health plans 
and rating a plan higher (Table 3).  All other things equal, those with a choice in plans 
rated their health plan 0.08 points higher on a ten point scale.  Other significant factors 
associated with a higher plan rating include age and Hispanic ethnicity, while worse 
physical and mental health status was associated with lower plan ratings.  Each additional 
year in age was associated with a slightly higher rating (0.0037), and Hispanics rated 
their plans 0.2 points higher on average than non-Hispanics other factors held constant.  




Table 37: Linear Regression Results for Global Plan Rating as a function of 
Having a Choice in Plans  
Plan Rating Coefficient 
Linearized 
Std. Error. t P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval 
Had a Choice in Plans 0.0831 0.0237 3.51 0 0.0366 0.1296 
Male  0.0013 0.0140 0.09 0.928 -0.0263 0.0289 
Age 0.0037 0.0008 4.47 0 0.0021 0.0053 
Not married -0.0260 0.0234 -1.11 0.267 -0.0720 0.0200 
Years of education -0.0051 0.0036 -1.42 0.156 -0.0121 0.0019 
Total personal income 0.0000 0.0000 1.42 0.157 0.0000 0.0000 
Hispanic Ethnicity 0.2140 0.0427 5.01 0 0.1300 0.2980 
Black 0.0539 0.0396 1.36 0.174 -0.0239 0.1317 
Asian -0.0258 0.0511 -0.5 0.614 -0.1261 0.0746 
Other  0.0994 0.0757 1.31 0.19 -0.0494 0.2481 
Health Status -0.0919 0.0147 -6.26 0 -0.1208 -0.0631 
Mental Health Status  -0.1072 0.0151 -7.11 0 -0.1368 -0.0775 
MSA-level Market Characteristics 
Rural-urban Continuum code -0.0722 0.0269 -2.68 0.008 -0.1251 -0.0192 
Median HH Income 0.0000 0.0000 0.49 0.626 0.0000 0.0000 
Total MDs per 10,000 -0.0003 0.0033 -0.09 0.928 -0.0068 0.0062 
Total Specialists per 10,000 0.0004 0.0031 0.14 0.886 -0.0056 0.0065 
Hospitals per 100,000 0.0300 0.0471 0.64 0.524 -0.0626 0.1227 
Hospital Admissions per 1,000 0.0007 0.0009 0.8 0.425 -0.0011 0.0025 
For-profit hospital % -0.0001 0.0011 -0.07 0.946 -0.0023 0.0022 
Total premium for single coverage 0.0002 0.0000 5.05 0 0.0001 0.0002 
_cons 6.9643    0.2084     33.41    0.000      6.5547      7.3740 
Note: State fixed effects not shown. 
 
To address potential skewness in the data with most respondents rating his or her 
health plan highly, we estimated a two-part model that estimated the probability a 
respondent rated the plan a “10” based on demographic characteristics and then estimated 
the association between choice and global ratings, conditional on rating the plan less than 
10.  We also estimated the association with a Heckman model (Heckman 1979).  Both 
models are similar in their two-part structure: the first “selection” stage uses a probit 
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model to predict the odds of selection based on covariates, in this case the odds of rating 
the plan a “10”.  The second phase uses OLS linear regression to model the outcome 
based on another set of covariates for those observations in the set, in this case those 
rating their plan less than 10.  The two part model assumes there is no correlation 
between the error terms of the two stages (Breen 1996).   In both specifications, the 
findings regarding the significance and magnitude of the coefficient on plan choice were 
robust—in the two part model, the coefficient was 0.0939 (p<0.01) and it was 0.0972 (p 
<0.01) in the Heckman specification.   
Experience with Plan 
Among those who sought administrative services from their health plan such as 
needing approval for treatment, seeking information on how the plan works, calling 
customer service or the plan administration, or filling out paperwork for the plan, about a 
third (34.7%) reported having any administrative problem when seeking the service.  This 
percentage was not statistically different for those who had a choice in plans (33.5%) and 
those who did not have a choice (35.2%).  In the full logistic regression model, 
individuals with a choice in health plans were less likely to report an administrative 
problem such as problems finding plan information, getting help from customer service, 
or waiting for approvals, than those without a choice (Table 38).  Those in worse health, 
particularly those in worse mental health (OR 1.18, p<0.01), were more likely to report 
an administrative problem.  Older individuals, unmarried individuals, Hispanics (relative 
to non-Hispanics), and Blacks (relative to whites) were less likely to report an 
administrative problem.  Previous research found that Hispanics tend give a higher 
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proportion of “10”s than non-Hispanics and caution that some of the differences in plan 
ratings may stem from different response styles rather than a superior experience with 
their health plan (Weech-Maldonado, et al. 2008).   
Table 38: Logistic Regression Results for Administrative Problems 
Any Administrative Problem 
Odds 
Ratio Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Had a Choice in Plans 0.9190 0.0323 -2.4 0.017 0.8577 0.9848 
Male  1.0165 0.0219 0.76 0.447 0.9744 1.0605 
Age 0.9919 0.0014 -5.81 0 0.9891 0.9946 
Not married 0.9181 0.0391 -2.01 0.045 0.8443 0.9982 
Years of education 1.0084 0.0046 1.83 0.068 0.9994 1.0176 
Total personal income 1.0000 0.0000 0.42 0.677 1.0000 1.0000 
Hispanic Ethnicity 0.6676 0.0490 -5.5 0 0.5778 0.7713 
Black 0.6105 0.0422 -7.14 0 0.5329 0.6994 
Asian 0.9417 0.0911 -0.62 0.535 0.7786 1.1389 
Other  1.0826 0.1247 0.69 0.491 0.8633 1.3577 
Health Status 1.0704 0.0225 3.23 0.001 1.0270 1.1156 
Mental Health Status  1.1758 0.0271 7.03 0 1.1237 1.2302 
MSA-level Market Characteristics 
Rural-urban Continuum code 0.9933 0.0459 -0.15 0.884 0.9071 1.0877 
Median HH Income 1.0000 0.0000 -0.48 0.633 1.0000 1.0000 
Total MDs per 10,000 0.9965 0.0049 -0.73 0.466 0.9870 1.0060 
Total Specialists per 10,000 1.0038 0.0055 0.7 0.485 0.9931 1.0146 
Hospitals per 100,000 0.9318 0.0602 -1.09 0.275 0.8206 1.0581 
Hospital Admissions per 1,000 1.0002 0.0016 0.12 0.906 0.9970 1.0034 
For-profit hospital % 1.0020 0.0019 1.07 0.285 0.9983 1.0058 
Total premium for single 
coverage 1.0000 0.0001 -0.76 0.449 0.9998 1.0001 
_cons 0.7531 0.2641 -0.81 0.419 0.3780 1.5005 
Note: Among those who needed administrative services.  State fixed effects not shown.  
Access to Care 
In the MEPS privately insured sample, 3.4% of respondents reported delaying or 
not getting needed health care, including 4.3% of those with a choice in plans and 3.2% 
of those without a choice.  In the full logistic regression model, individuals with a choice 
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in health plans had a higher odds of delaying or not getting care (Table 39).  This finding 
is contrary to our overarching hypothesis that those with a choice in plans will report 
better outcomes, but is consistent with at least one previous study in the Medicaid 
population which found a lower proportion of MediCal beneficiaries with twelve months 
of continuous coverage in counties with a choice in plans compared to beneficiaries 
without a choice and higher rates of ambulatory care sensitive hospitalizations among 
beneficiaries with a choice in plans (Millett, Chattopadhyay and Bindman 2010).   
Table 39: Logistic Regression Results for Delaying or Not Getting Care   




Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Had a Choice in Plans 1.2057 0.0749 3.01 0.003 1.0671 1.3622 
Male  0.7600 0.0361 -5.77 0 0.6922 0.8344 
Age 0.9957 0.0016 -2.72 0.007 0.9927 0.9988 
Not married 1.5583 0.0946 7.31 0 1.3832 1.7557 
Years of education 1.0654 0.0081 8.35 0 1.0496 1.0814 
Total personal income 1.0000 0.0000 -2.54 0.011 1.0000 1.0000 
Hispanic Ethnicity 0.6808 0.0677 -3.87 0 0.5600 0.8277 
Black 0.6064 0.0462 -6.56 0 0.5221 0.7044 
Asian 0.4951 0.0640 -5.44 0 0.3841 0.6382 
Other  1.0473 0.1371 0.35 0.724 0.8097 1.3547 
Health Status 1.6889 0.0558 15.85 0 1.5827 1.8023 
Mental Health Status  1.1921 0.0375 5.58 0 1.1205 1.2682 
MSA-level Market Characteristics 
Rural-urban Continuum code 0.9426 0.0528 -1.05 0.292 0.8443 1.0524 
Median HH Income 1.0000 0.0000 -0.35 0.728 1.0000 1.0000 
Total MDs per 10,000 1.0076 0.0056 1.37 0.171 0.9967 1.0187 
Total Specialists per 10,000 0.9761 0.0061 -3.87 0 0.9641 0.9881 
Hospitals per 100,000 1.0703 0.0950 0.77 0.445 0.8989 1.2744 
Hospital Admissions per 
1,000 0.9981 0.0018 -1.06 0.291 0.9946 1.0016 
For-profit hospital % 0.9957 0.0026 -1.66 0.097 0.9907 1.0008 
Total premium for single 
coverage 0.9998 0.0001 -1.95 0.051 0.9997 1.0000 
_cons 0.0037 -0.0018 11.69 0 0.0015 0.0096 
Note: State effects not shown. 
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About one in six respondents (15.6%) reporting having no USOC other than an 
emergency room.  Individuals with a choice in health plans were less likely to report 
having no USOC other than an ER (OR 0.878, p <0.01, Table 40).  On average, 6.7% of 
respondents reported any problem finding a doctor with whom they were happy.  
Individuals with a choice in health plans were not statistically significantly more likely to 
report a problem finding a doctor (1.066, p < 0.145) than individuals without a choice.  
There was no statistically significant difference between those with and without a choice 
in health plans in the odds of it taking thirty or more minutes to reach the respondent’s 
USOC (0.991, p<0.849), nor was there a statistically significant difference in the odds of 
reporting it was somewhat or very difficult to reach the respondent’s USOC (0.995, 




Table 40: Logistic Regression Results for Having No USOC other than an ER   




Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Had a Choice in Plans 0.8778 0.0310 -3.7 0 0.8190 0.9408 
Male  1.6975 0.0446 20.14 0 1.6121 1.7875 
Age 0.9768 0.0013 -18.23 0 0.9744 0.9793 
Not married 1.2395 0.0466 5.72 0 1.1513 1.3345 
Years of education 1.1620 0.0052 33.26 0 1.1517 1.1723 
Total personal income 1.0000 0.0000 0.02 0.983 1.0000 1.0000 
Hispanic Ethnicity 1.8180 0.0995 10.92 0 1.6326 2.0244 
Black 1.4330 0.0716 7.2 0 1.2990 1.5807 
Asian 1.6828 0.1096 7.99 0 1.4806 1.9127 
Other  1.1181 0.1356 0.92 0.358 0.8810 1.4189 
Health Status 0.8910 0.0173 -5.93 0 0.8575 0.9257 
Mental Health Status  1.0393 0.0203 1.97 0.049 1.0002 1.0801 
MSA-level Market Characteristics 
Rural-urban Continuum code 0.9657 0.0426 -0.79 0.43 0.8855 1.0532 
Median HH Income 1.0000 0.0000 3.08 0.002 1.0000 1.0000 
Total MDs per 10,000 0.9875 0.0042 -2.95 0.003 0.9792 0.9958 
Total Specialists per 10,000 1.0072 0.0037 1.96 0.051 1.0000 1.0144 
Hospitals per 100,000 1.0830 0.0846 1.02 0.308 0.9289 1.2626 
Hospital Admissions per 1,000 1.0034 0.0012 2.71 0.007 1.0009 1.0058 
For-profit hospital % 1.0006 0.0015 0.4 0.686 0.9976 1.0037 
Total premium for single 
coverage 1.0000 0.0000 0.98 0.33 1.0000 1.0001 
_cons       
Note: state effects not shown 
 
To explore why the results for delaying or not getting care appear incongruent 
with the rest of the access to care results suggesting those with a choice had equal or 
better access to care than those without a choice, we assessed the follow-up questions in 
the MEPS survey that question why the respondent delayed or did not get care.  The most 
commonly cited reason for not getting care was cost (12.5%, Table 41), while the most 
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common reason for delaying care was “other” (37.2%), with a similar percentage citing 
cost as a reason (13.6%). 
Table 41: Reasons for Delaying or Not Getting Care Among Those with a 
Choice in Plans   
 Did not get care Delayed Care 
Could not afford care 12.5% 13.6% 
Insurance company would not 
approve/cover/pay 6.1% 8.1% 
Doctor refused family insurance plan 0.3% 0.8% 
Problems getting to doctor’s office 0.9% 3.2% 
Different language 0.1% 0.0% 
Could not get time off work 0.8% 3.8% 
Don’t know where to get care 0.6% 1.6% 
Was refused services 3.8% 2.5% 
Could not get child care 0.0% 0.0% 
Did not have time or took too long 2.4% 11.0% 
Other 6.8% 37.2% 
Inapplicable/DK/not ascertained 65.8% 18.2% 
 
Out of Pocket Expenditures 
On average, about a quarter (27.3%) of total medical expenditures incurred by 
privately insured individuals was paid for out-of-pocket, including the statistically similar 
27.2% for those with a choice in health plans and 27.4% for those without a choice.  The 
average OOP percentage was 19.7% for office visits and 30.3% for prescription drugs.  In 
comparison, respondents contributed 1.5% on average for ER expenditures and 0.3% out 
of pocket on inpatient hospital expenditures; the percentages were 13.7% for respondents 
with an ER visit and 5.3% for those with an inpatient hospital stay.  After controlling for 
individual and local market factors and state fixed effects, having a choice in health plans 
was associated with a lower OOP percentage for total medical expenditures (Table 42).   
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There was not a statistically significant difference in the percentage of spending 
on office visits paid out-of-pocket by respondents (-0.0029, p<0.313).  Those in worse 
physical health had a slightly lower OOP for total medical expenditures, perhaps related 
to increased utilization of services with lower cost-sharing or alternatively meeting 
deductible requirements of their plan.  Those in worse mental health did report a higher 
OOP percentage for total medical expenditures, possibly reflecting limitations on 
coverage for mental health services.  The percentage of expenditures on prescription 
drugs paid out-of-pocket was also not statistically different between those with and 
without a choice in health plans.  
Table 42: Linear Regression Results for Total Out-of-Pocket Expenditure 
Percentage  
OOP % of Total Medical 
Expenditures Coef. 
Linearized 
Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Had a choice in plans -0.0195 0.0029 -6.67 0 -0.0252 -0.0137 
Male -0.0203 0.0023 -8.95 0 -0.0247 -0.0158 
Age 0.0002 0.0001 2.7 0.007 0.0001 0.0004 
Not married 0.0253 0.0028 8.94 0 0.0198 0.0309 
Years of Education 0.0040 0.0003 12.58 0 0.0034 0.0046 
Personal Income 0.0000 0.0000 6.01 0 0.0000 0.0000 
Hispanic Ethnicity -0.0300 0.0041 -7.28 0 -0.0380 -0.0219 
Black -0.0573 0.0035 -16.15 0 -0.0643 -0.0503 
Asian -0.0154 0.0057 -2.68 0.008 -0.0267 -0.0041 
Other race -0.0380 0.0085 -4.46 0 -0.0548 -0.0213 
Physical health status -0.0161 0.0014 -11.66 0 -0.0188 -0.0134 
Mental Health Status 0.0048 0.0016 3.06 0.002 0.0017 0.0078 
MSA-level Characteristics 
Rural-urban Continuum code 0.0036 0.0029 1.26 0.209 -0.0021 0.0094 
Median HH Income 0.0000 0.0000 0.17 0.863 0.0000 0.0000 
Total MDs per 10,000 0.0010 0.0003 3.02 0.003 0.0003 0.0016 
Total Specialists per 10,000 -0.0011 0.0003 -3.31 0.001 -0.0017 -0.0004 
Hospitals per 100,000 -0.0018 0.0037 -0.49 0.625 -0.0091 0.0054 
Hospital Admissions per 1,000 -0.0002 0.0001 -2.75 0.006 -0.0004 -0.0001 
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For-profit hospital % 0.0003 0.0001 2.31 0.021 0.0000 0.0005 
Total premium for single 
coverage 0.0000 0.0000 -4.37 0 0.0000 0.0000 
_cons 0.3314 0.0219 15.11 0 0.2882 0.3745 
Note: State effects not shown 
 
In recent years, surveys have suggested that employers are shifting more premium 
costs to employees in an effort to control health care spending.  If this holds true for plan 
benefit design and effective OOP spending at the point of service as well, a failure to 
address these temporal changes in patient cost sharing responsibility could bias our 
findings.  To assess whether plan OOP responsibilities changed over time, we modeled 
the OOP percentage for total expenditures that included individual demographics, local 
market characteristics, and year fixed effects.  Relative to 2003, all coefficients for years 
were negative and all except 2006 were statistically significant at the p<0.05 confidence 
level.  This indicates that the effective percentage of total medical expenditures paid by 
respondents declined over time, all other things equal.   
Discussion 
 This analysis demonstrates that in general, having a choice in health plans is 
associated with slightly higher and statistically significant global satisfaction with the 
plan; those with a choice in plans rated their plans 0.08 points higher on a ten point scale.  
Individuals with a choice in plans also were less likely to report administrative problems 
with the plan, other factors held constant.  On most measures of access, having a choice 
in health plans was associated with equal access as those without a choice. There was no 
significant difference in the travel time or level of difficultly getting to a USOC, nor was 
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there a difference in having problems finding a doctor the family liked.  Individuals with 
a choice in plans were significantly less likely than those without a choice to face the 
access challenge of having no USOC other than an emergency room.  
On the other hand, having a choice in plans was associated with higher odds of 
delaying or not getting care.  The most common reason for not getting care cited by 
privately insured individuals with a choice in plans was cost; 6% of those not getting care 
cited insurance coverage issues as the reason.  The most common reason for delaying 
care was the catchall category of “other”, which unfortunately provides little insight into 
the higher odds of delaying care associated with having a choice in plans.   Neither 
insurance coverage issues nor provider network issues (e.g. getting to the provider, being 
refused services, the provider not taking family insurance) were commonly cited reasons 
for delaying care.  Though puzzling, these findings are consistent with a study of choice 
in California Medicaid managed care by Millett and colleagues that found lower rates of 
12-month continuous enrollment for MMC beneficiaries with a choice in plans and 
higher rates of hospitalization for ambulatory care sensitive conditions.  The authors 
suggest the phenomenon of having a choice in plans was related to delays in enrollment 
as people struggled to understand and weigh options (Millett, Chattopadhyay and 
Bindman 2010).  Privately insured individuals in this study may have delayed getting 
care while they decided on a plan or in the transition period waiting for coverage to take 
effect when switching plans, neither of which are captured in the response categories for 
reasons why care was delayed or not obtained.  The other access questions largely focus 
on having a USOC, which could plausibly be less affected by delays in enrolling in the 
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plan. An alternative explanation for delaying or not getting care is that individuals with a 
choice in health plans may be more aware of the cost sharing requirements associated 
with seeking care as a result of the decision-making process.  Benedetti and colleagues 
found that patients changed care-seeking behavior to avoid paying copayments as a result 
of perceived costs; increased perception on the part of those with a choice could bias 
results away from the null (Benedetti, et al. 2008).  
This study finds a negative association between having a choice in health plans 
and the percentage of total medical expenditures paid out-of-pocket by the consumer, so 
consumers without a choice paid a higher OOP share, all other things equal.   This 
finding is consistent with the hypothesis that those with a choice can maximize utility, in 
this case making plan selections to maximize the financial protection insurance provides.  
However, there was no statistically significant association between OOP spending on 
office visits or prescription drugs.  This could in part reflect standardization of 
copayments for office visits and prescription drugs (for example, a standard $20 copay 
for an office visit across plans) that does not exist for other types of medical services. 
One limitation of this study is the lack of information on plan benefits for both 
groups, but particularly for those individuals who do have a choice in plans at their 
current main job.  To the extent that plan options offered by an employer have 
standardized benefit packages, as suggested by Scanlon and colleagues (1997), there may 
not be a real distinction between the available options the employer offers in terms of 
covered services, cost sharing, or provider networks.  This would tend to bias the results 
toward the null hypothesis.    More robust information on plan benefits would also help 
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control for differences in plan quality between those who have a choice in plans and 
those who do not. 
Another potential limitation of this study is the assumption that consumers are 
well-informed about the differences between plan options and are motivated to act on that 
knowledge.  A recent survey in the Netherlands found that consumers view switching 
health plans as overwhelming, do not understand quality information clearly, and often 
prefer the decision making to a third party  (Lako, Rosenau and Daw 2011).  If these 
findings generalize at least in part to the United States, the results in this study would be 
biased toward the null.  Individuals may have a choice of plans in name, but there may be 
a strong incumbent advantage as consumers avoid the taxing process of selecting and 
switching plans. 
Published research shows that provider networks are important to individuals 
when making health plan enrollment decisions.  While this paper attempts to address the 
importance of provider networks by assessing access to care, problems finding a personal 
doctor, and out of pocket spending, a direct question ascertaining the individual’s rating 
of a health plan’s provider network would be preferable.  Unfortunately, no such question 
exists in the MEPS.  The closest approximation in this study—whether the respondent 
experienced any problem finding a personal doctor with whom they were happy—found 
no significant difference between those with and without a choice in plans.   
While these findings suggest a positive association for the individual between 
having a choice in health plans and the outcomes assessed, the magnitude of the 
coefficients was relatively small though statistically significant.  This suggests that 
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employers considering offering employees a choice in plans may find individual worker 
satisfaction rise slightly.  However, this study does not assess the net effects of offering 
more than one plan on premiums, risk selection, or other features of the plans since we do 
not have data on the entire insured population within a firm.  In the wake of rising health 
costs for employers and individuals, the individual benefits of having a choice in plans 
may be outweighed by the potential cost savings to the employer associated with moving 
a workforce into a high-deductible plan or otherwise limiting coverage options.  More 
research into the net effects of offering a choice in plans on consumer-reported 
experiences and access as well as premiums and risk selection would be beneficial.   
In addition, it will be helpful to revisit the issue of choice in plans following the 
implementation of the ACA when workers have access to more group health insurance 
options outside of their employer.   The burdens and benefits of health plan choice will 
fall more squarely on consumers and small businesses purchasing coverage in the 
marketplaces.  Several factors differentiate the choices available to individuals in the 
marketplace from those currently available to the privately insured.  The marketplace will 
provide price, benefits, quality, and other information in standard plain language across 
plans to those making purchasing decisions.  Each marketplace will have at least three 
qualified health plans from which to choose, including a gold, silver, and bronze plan that 
differ in terms of cost-sharing.  While health insurance issuers must be certified by the 
state or federal government as a Qualified Health Plan, the choice set in the exchange will 
not be “sponsored” in the same way that an employer defines the health plan choices 
available to employees.  In addition, many of those purchasing coverage in the exchange 
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will receive a subsidy to do so, lessening the effect of price on their decision. With 
effective tools, individuals could continue to maximize utility in this setting.  However, it 
will be important to evaluate how the dynamics of plan choice play out on the ground.   
This study suggests that consumers with a choice are likely to fare slightly better in terms 
of access to care and overall experience, though policymakers should watch for warning 
signs that consumers in the marketplaces are delaying or not getting care as a result of 







In the first paper, we discussed various approaches for developing measures of 
competition in health care markets, focusing on health insurance and hospital markets.  
Tantamount in the process of developing these measures is identifying the relevant 
analytic question and purpose of the concentration measure, which will drive some of the 
analytic choices in measure development.  In the case of a targeted measure assessing 
concentration in specific services like heart surgery, the choices may be clear.  For 
general purpose measures intended to track changes in market structure over time, 
analysts must consider multiple factors that could influence the level of concentration 
portrayed by the measure.   For example, the choice of a geographic definition for the 
market, the types of hospitals or insurance products to include, and the basis for the 
market share calculation can all have a significant impact on the level of concentration 
depicted by the HHI.   
 The paper also noted differences in measures that might be implemented in an 
empirical formulation versus those that are intended to be reported as a number to a wider 
audience.  Those approaches used in a model could be both more precise and complex, 
with multiple terms and structural parameters to define market competition.  
Policymakers often prefer simple numbers for reporting or tracking, and measures such 
as the number of firms or market share do provide simplicity and understandability.  
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However, these measures also lack meaningful nuances of competition in their attempt to 
be widely understandable.   In all cases, analysts should be clear and explicit about the 
methods used to develop the concentration measure so that fellow researchers and 
policymakers understand how the measure was crafted.   
Across most of the measures examined in the paper, we found hospital and health 
insurance markets to be highly concentrated according to the FTC-DOJ merger 
guidelines, meaning the HHI was greater than 2,500.  The mean level of competition in 
the hospital and health insurance markets did not change significantly from 2003 to 2009, 
though some markets did experience a greater degree of change.  The correlation between 
measures of concentration was generally high, suggesting that in many cases the analytic 
decision made would not greatly alter the conclusion one made about the level of 
concentration in the market.  For example, the narrow, medium, and broad definitions of 
hospitals in scope for the market did not appreciably effect the HHI, nor did the service 
product used to calculate market share (e.g. beds, Medicare discharges, etc).  Some 
exceptions are noteworthy, however.  Hospital HHIs based on Medicaid service use tend 
to portray a more concentrated market and should be reserved for those interested in 
competition in safety-net services.  The geographic definition of markets (e.g. states 
versus MSAs) also impacts the reported level of competition. 
We assessed differences across one dimension of a measure at a time.  For 
example, we examined whether the medium, narrow, or broad definition of hospitals in 
scope for the measure affected the HHI and found little effect across these variations.  We 
did not examine whether a CBSA-based broad definition using hospital staffed beds 
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differed significantly from a HRR-based narrow definition using total discharges.  Such a 
multifaceted comparison may uncover larger differences as small differences in the one-
dimensional measures accumulate, though the number of potential comparisons is large.  
However, our analysis did uncover some approaches where the concentration measure 
did differ, including the geographic area and measures based on Medicaid enrollment and 
discharges.   
The paper also highlighted trends in the relative concentration of health insurance 
to hospital market concentration, finding that the average MSA-level market experienced 
higher concentration in health insurance than hospital services from 2003-2009.  The 
categorization of markets in terms of both hospital and total private health insurance 
concentration found that each year, about 20-25% of MSAs were concentrated in both 
markets, about a third of MSAs were concentrated insurance and competitive hospital 
markets,  a smaller percentage (15-20%) were competitive insurance and concentrated 
hospital MSAs, and about a third were competitive in both.    
The review of studies assessing the impact of competition in hospital and 
insurance markets finds great consistency among the literature addressing hospital 
competition and price.  These studies, using a variety of measures of hospital 
concentration, find that more concentrated hospital markets are associated with higher 
prices.  The literature was less consistent regarding the impact of hospital competition on 
quality, with some studies reporting a negative effect of increased concentration on 
quality and some finding a positive association.  This could reflect the more diverse array 
of outcomes and conditions assessed in quality studies compared with price.  As 
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suggested by Gaynor (2006), the association between competition and price may also be 
tighter than that for quality, and failure to account for possible confounding variables or 
sources of bias could consequently have a greater impact on studies with quality as the 
outcome.   
The studies of health insurance competition also generally find increased prices 
associated with increased health insurance concentration; the few studies of health 
insurance competition and quality have found no significant association between 
competition and quality.  The studies that have carefully examined the relative 
concentration of health insurance and hospital markets through health plan buying power 
or leverage have demonstrated a “monopoly busting” relationship such that prices are 
lower and output higher with increased health plan market power relative to hospitals 
compared to less concentrated health insurance markets.  
Paper 2 
The second paper investigates an area where only a handful of studies have been 
published. These studies have either been focused on a small number of states or have 
included only plan-level independent and outcome variables.  This paper is a national 
study that includes individual level data to better control for factors associated with 
access to care and reported consumer experiences with health plans, such as health status 
and income. Findings from this analysis suggest that health insurance market structure 
does have a small but statistically significant association with reported access to care and 
a negligible effect on consumers’ experiences with their health plan. Of the domains of 
consumer experience examined, the travel time to the USOC as well as difficulty 
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reaching the USOC seem to be most affected by market structure, though the coefficients 
were still quite small.  These findings are consistent with previous published literature 
finding little to no significant effect of health insurance competition on quality.  Despite 
differences in the structure of competition in private insurance and Medicaid, the results 
were consistent across the two settings.  In both sectors, individual factors such as age, 
income, marital status, and self-reported physical and mental health status have a larger 
bearing on consumers’ reported access to care and experience with their health plans than 
the level of competition in the market.     
Consumers generally rated their health plan favorably, with an average 8.5 rating 
on a ten point scale among MMC enrollees and a 7.9 among those with private group 
coverage.  Overall plan satisfaction was not significantly affected by market structure.  
Across various model specifications, the insurance HHI or the relative insurance to 
hospital concentration was not a statistically significant factor in consumers’ overall plan 
rating.   
Consumers who sought out administrative services from their health plan often 
reported problems with the administrative side of health plans, with over a quarter having 
problems getting help from customer service, waiting for approval, completing 
paperwork, and finding information about the plan.  However, the prevalence of these 
problems does not appear to be affected by market structure in either MMC or the private 
group markets. One possible explanation for the high prevalence of administrative 
problems and lack of association with market structure is that these aspects of a health 
plan are largely invisible to a consumer when making enrollment decisions, plans may 
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focus on price as a key determinant of enrollment decisions rather than quality.  
Alternatively, some other unmeasured factor, perhaps limited health literacy or language 
issues, may explain the high prevalence of reported problems among those who seek 
administrative help.  Similarly,  
These findings suggest that, while there is some association between health 
insurance competition and consumers’ reported access and satisfaction with their health 
plan on some measures, the overall effect is small if it is at all statistically significant.  
Consumers are not significantly more satisfied with their health plan in more competitive 
health insurance markets, and so more competition does not necessarily improve access 
and satisfaction.  In times of tight budgets and tough choices, policymakers will likely 
need to look beyond policies addressing competition to impact consumers’ access to care 
and experience with their health plan. 
Paper 3 
The third paper investigates the impact of a form competition that is more closely 
felt by consumers—whether they have a choice in health plans at their job.  Most of the 
research into consumer choice of health plans pertains to factors influencing enrollment 
decisions.  A small number of previous studies asseseds the association between plan 
choice and satisfaction.  This analysis builds upon those studies in several ways.  First, 
the analysis uses multiple years of national data which allows for more generalizable 
findings and the inclusion of geographic fixed effects to control for time invariant 
regional differences both in the availability of plan choice and in the broader health care 
environment.  The analysis also assesses a greater number of outcomes that capture a 
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more robust picture of a consumer’s experience with their health plan, including 
administrative problems, overall satisfaction, having and getting to a usual source of care, 
finding an acceptable doctor, and the share of health expenditures paid out of pocket.  
Finally, previous analyses occurred in an era when the choice was often between a FFS or 
HMO option; health plan options have evolved such that PPOs are more common and 
FFS rarely an option. The more recent data in this analysis reflects a more current and 
accurate market.   
This analysis demonstrates that in general, having a choice in health plans is 
associated with slightly higher and statistically significant global satisfaction with the 
plan; those with a choice in plans rated their plans 0.08 points higher on a ten point scale.  
Individuals with a choice in plans also were less likely to report administrative problems 
with the plan (OR 0.91, p<0.0117), other factors held constant.  On most measures of 
access, having a choice in health plans was associated with equal access or slightly better 
access than having no choice.  However, having a choice in plans was associated with 
higher odds of delaying or not getting care (OR 1.21, p<0.003).  This may be a result of 
delayed enrollment associated with transitions in coverage or an increased awareness 
sand subsequent avoidance of cost-sharing requirements associated with the process of 
selecting a plan.   This study finds a negative association between having a choice in 
health plans and the percentage of total medical expenditures paid out-of-pocket by the 
consumer, so consumers without a choice paid a higher OOP share by 2 percentage 
points, all other things equal.   However, there was no statistically significant association 
between OOP spending on office visits or prescription drugs.   
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One limitation of this study is the lack of information on plan benefits for both 
groups, but particularly for those individuals who do have a choice in plans at their 
current main job.  To the extent that plan options offered by an employer have 
standardized benefit packages, as suggested by Scanlon and colleagues (1997), there may 
not be a real distinction between available options in terms of covered services, cost 
sharing, or provider networks.  This would tend to bias the results toward the null 
hypothesis.    More robust information on plan benefits would also help control for 
differences in plan quality between those who have a choice in plans and those who do 
not. 
Themes 
The results suggest that proximal factors such as age, health status, and 
race/ethnicity have a larger impact on an individual’s reported experience with their 
health plan and access to care than more distal measures such as provider supply, rural or 
urban location or, importantly, health insurance market competition.  To the average 
consumer with employer-based coverage, the level of competition in the marketplace is 
largely unobserved.  It is the employer-agent or state Medicaid office who more directly 
experiences the market and narrows the pool of choices for the individual.  An individual 
may live in a competitive health insurance market, but it may not appear competitive if 
that person only has one coverage option at work or in MMC.  Competition may be felt 
more closely in the individual market because an individual directly purchases a health 
plan from the array of choices available.  However, many individuals—especially older 
individuals or those with a pre-existing health condition—could currently have their 
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choices limited in this market.  This analysis focuses on competition and choice in private 
group coverage and Medicaid managed care, which constitute a much larger share both of 
enrollment nationally in health coverage as well as the MEPS survey population.    
For those who have a choice in health plans from their employer, the market may 
feel more competitive because they can exercise a choice and because, in fact, the various 
plan options at the employer are competing with one another for enrollment share.  These 
reasons may explain the small but statistically greater association of having a choice in 
plans with reported access, health plan experience, and out-of-pocket spending that the 
overall level of market concentration.   
Policy Implications 
The findings from these studies suggest that while increasing competition in 
health care markets may important in reducing prices, the impact on consumers’ 
experience with their health plan and access to care were not significantly affected by 
these efforts.  The common reports of administrative challenges among those who sought 
administrative services from their plan suggest there is much room for improvement 
among health plans.  Initiatives to standardize plan benefits language as through the 
marketplaces, simplify plan paperwork and information, and make the administrative 
process easier to navigate for consumers have the potential to mitigate some of the 
administrative challenges expressed by consumers in these studies.  The impact of these 
initiatives on consumer experiences, access to care, and the OOP share of medical 
spending is an area for future research, particularly in light of the efforts underway to 
make coverage accessible in the health care marketplaces.   
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In addition, new avenues for competition and plan choice will soon open up in the 
health insurance marketplaces implemented as part of the Affordable Care Act.  The 
ACA seeks to make changes in both health insurance and delivery system that will 
improve quality of care and reduce costs.  As the research community evaluates the 
effectiveness of these initiatives, it is important to include an assessment of the effects on 
market concentration and to gain an improved understanding of the function of new 
markets such as insurance marketplaces and ACOs.   Researchers should continue to 
develop and test alternative concentration measures that reflect a changing health care 
delivery and coverage landscape.  It will also be useful to revisit the issue of choice in 
plans following the implementation of the ACA when workers have access to more group 
health insurance options outside of their employer.   Policymakers can monitor access to 
care, consumer satisfaction, and out-of-pocket spending within the marketplaces through 
surveys and administrative filings to assess whether policy objectives are being met.  In 
particular, policymakers should watch for reports of delayed or foregone care that could 
be associated with the process of enrolling in or selecting coverage. The burdens and 
benefits of health plan choice will fall more squarely on consumers and small businesses 
purchasing coverage in the marketplaces.  With effective tools, individuals could 
continue to maximize utility in this setting.  However, it will be important to evaluate 
how the dynamics of plan choice play out on the ground.  Going forward in this new 
environment, researchers and analysis should carefully and clearly construct 
concentration measures, and policymakers should understand that policies addressing 
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competition and plan choice, though warranted for other reasons, may have only a limited 






Appendix A: HLI Private Plan Enrollments Included in Insurance HHI by Year 
 
 
 HMO HHI PPO HHI Total Commercial 
HHI 
Total Private HHI  
includes self-insured  
2003  Fully-insured 
Commercial HMO  no separate PPO enrollment reported 
 2004 Fully-insured 
Commercial HMO 
2005 Fully-insured 





Commercial PPO + 
Commercial HMO 
Fully-insured 
Commercial PPO + 
Commercial HMO + 
PPO self-insured 
2006 Fully-insured 





Commercial PPO + 
Commercial HMO 
Fully-insured 
Commercial PPO + 
Commercial HMO + 
PPO self-insured 
2007 Fully-insured 





Commercial PPO + 
Commercial HMO 
Fully-insured 
Commercial PPO + 
Commercial HMO + 
PPO self-insured 
2008 Fully-insured 






Commercial PPO + 
Commercial HMO + 





Commercial PPO + 
Commercial HMO + 
POS fully-insured + 
PPO self-insured + POS 
self-insured  
2009 Fully-insured 





Commercial PPO + 





Commercial PPO + 
Commercial HMO + 
POS fully-insured + 
PPO self-insured + POS 
self-insured 
NOTES  
1 Replaced two hmos with negative enrollment with zero enrollment 






Appendix B : Methods for the Relative Concentration of Insurance Markets to 
Hospital Markets 
The first measure of the relative concentration of insurance markets to hospital 
markets we use is the ratio of the two HHIs.  We base the ratio on a health insurance HHI 
at the MSA level and the hospital market HHI at the HRR level.  In order to create a 
common geographic unit for analysis, therefore, we must crosswalk the estimates to one 
antoher.   
To do this, we first apportion the county-level health insurance enrollment 
information to HRRs using a county to HRR crosswalk obtained from staff at the 
Dartmouth Center for Outcomes Research.  We crosswalk counties rather than MSA 
enrollment information because crosswalking the smaller geographic unit to HRRs allows 
for a cleaner and more precise allocation of enrollment.  For each HRR, we sum the total 
private enrollment (including the self-insured plans) and total lives for each health plan to 
represent the health insurance market structure that hospitals within an HRR experience 
when negotiating contracts with insurers.  From this HRR-level insurance enrollment we 
create an HRR-level health insurance HHI. 
We create HRR-level HHIs using the medium definition of hospitals in scope for 
the market, which includes general acute care hospitals; surgical; cancer; heart; obstetrics 
and gynecology; eye, ear, nose and throat; rehabilitation; orthopedic; chronic disease; 
other specialty; and children’s general hospitals.  We use the hospital system’s total 
Medicare discharges as the basis for our market share calculation.  We exclude long-term 
care hospitals and hospitals located outside the 50 states and District of Columbia.   
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The relative insurance to hospital market concentration is defined as ratio of the HRR-
level insurance market HHI and HRR-level hospital HHI.  Subsequent analyses in this 
thesis use the relative concentration measure as an independent variable in the model 
examining the association between this relative concentration and consumers’ access to 
care and experiences with their health plan in private insurance and in Medicaid managed 
care (MMC).  These models are estimated at the MSA level (in the case of private 
insurance) and state level for MMC. Specifically, we merge the area-level market 
concentration and provider supply variables to the restricted-use MEPS data by the 
respondent’s encoded state or MSA of residence at the time of the survey.  Therefore, the 
ratio of insurance to hospital market concentration needs to be expressed in the 





Abraham, J., Gaynor, M., & Vogt, W. (2007). Entry and competition in local hospital 
markets. Journal of Industrial Economics, LV(2), 265-288. 
Aday, L., & Andersen, R. (1974). A framework for the study of medical care. Health 
Services Research, 9(3), 208-220. 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ). (2013). Percent of private-sector 
establishments that offer health insurance by plan options and insurance offerings 
to retirees by firm size and selected characteristics (Table I.A.2.e). Retrieved 
August 10, 2013, from MEPSnet/IC: 
http://www.meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/data_stats/MEPSnetIC.jsp 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. (2013). Percent of private-sector 
employees working in establishments that offer two or more health insurance 
plans by firm size and selected characteristics (Table I.B.2.c), years 1996-2012. 
Retrieved August 24, 2013, from Medical Expenditure Panel Survey Insurance 
Component Tables. Generated using MEPSnet/IC. 
http://www.meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/data_stats/MEPSnetIC.jsp 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. (2013). Percent of private-sector 
establishments that offer health insurance by plan options and insurance offerings 
to retirees by firm size and selected characteristics. Retrieved August 24, 2013, 
from http://www.meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/data_stats/MEPSnetIC.jsp 
AHRQ. (2012). National Healthcare Disparities Report. Retrieved August 11, 2013, 
from http://www.ahrq.gov/research/findings/nhqrdr/nhdr12/chap9.html 
Akosa Antwi, Y., Gaynor, M., & Vogt, W. (2009). A Bargain at Twice the Price? 
California Hospital Prices in the New Millennium. Forum for Health Economics 
and Policy, 12(1). 
American Medical Association. (2012). AMA’s Competition in Health Insurance: A 
Comprehensive Study of U.S. Markets.  
Andersen, R., & Aday, L. (1978). Access to Medical Care in the U.S.: Realized and 
Potential. Medical Care, 16(7), 533-546. 
Andersen, R., McCutcheon, A., Aday, L., Chiu, G., & Bell, R. (1983). Exploring 
Dimensions of Access to Medical Care. Health Services Research, 18(1), 49-74. 
Baker, L. (2001). Measuring competition in health care markets. Health Services 
Research, 36(1 Pt 2), 223-251. 
Barringer, M., & Mitchell, O. (1994). Workers' preferences among company-provided 
health insurance plans. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 48, 141-152. 
Bates, L., & Santerre, R. (2008). Do Health Insurers Possess Monopsony Power in the 
Hospital Services Industry? International journal of Health Care Finance and 
Economics, 8(1), 1-11. 
Beaulieu, N. (2002). Quality information and consumer health plan choices. Journal of 
Health Economics, 21(1), 43-63. 
192 
 
Benedetti, N., Fung, V., Reed, M., Price, M., Brand, R., Newhouse, J., & Hsu, J. (2008). 
Office visit copayments: patient knowledge, response, and communication with 
provider. Medical Care, 46(4), 403-409. 
Berenson, R., Ginsburg, P., & Kemper, N. (2010). Unchecked Provider Clout In 
California Foreshadows Challenges To Health Reform. Health Affairs, 29(4), 
699-705. 
Berenson, R., Ginsburg, P., Christianson, J., & Yee, T. (2012). The Growing Power Of 
Some Providers to Win Steep Payment Increases from Insurers Suggests Policy 
Remedies May be Needed. Health Affairs, 31(5), 973-981. 
Berki, S., & Ashcraft, M. (1980). HMO enrollment: who joins what and why: a review of 
the literature. Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly/Health and Society, 58, 588-
632. 
Breen, R. (1996). Regression models: Censored, sample-selected, or truncated data. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage university paper series on Quantitative Applications in 
the Social Sciences. 
Buchmuller, T., & Feldstein. (1996). Consumers' sensitivity to health plan premiums: 
evidence from a natural experiment in California. Health Affairs, 15, 143-151. 
Bundorf, M. (2002). Employee demand for health insurance and employer health plan 
choices. Journal of Health Economics, 21(1), 65-88. 
Bundorf, M. K. (2003). The effects of offering health plan choice within employment-
based purchasing groups. Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER). 
Burgess, J., Carey, K., & Young, G. (2005). The effect of network arrangements on 
hospital pricing behavior. Journal of Health Economics, 24(2), 391–405. 
Burke, T., & Rosenbaum, S. (2010). Accountable Care Organizations: Implications for 
Antitrust Policy. BNA's Health Law Reporter, 19(10). 
Burns, M. (2009). Medicaid managed care and health care access for adult beneficiaries 
with disabilities. Health Services Research, 44(5 Pt 1), 1521-1541. 
Capps, C. (2005). The quality effects of hospital mergers. Bates White LLC. 
Capps, C., & Dranove, D. (2004). Hospital consolidation and negotiated PPO prices. 
Health Affairs, 23(2), 175-181. 
Capps, C., Dranove, D., & Satterthwaite, M. (2003). Competition and market power in 
option demand markets. RAND Journal of Economics, 34(4), 737-763. 
Casalino, L., Devers, K., Lake, T., Reed, M., & Stoddard, J. (2003). Benefits of and 
Barriers to Large Medical Group Practice in the United State. Archives of Internal 
Medicine, 163, 1958-1964. 
Chernew, M., Gowrisankan, G., McLaughlin, C., & Gibson, T. (2004). Quality and 
employers' choice of health plans. Journal of Health Economics, 23(3), 471-492. 
Chernew, M., Gowrisankaran, G., McLaughlin, C., & Gibson, T. (2004). Quality and 
employers' choice of health plans. Journal of Health Economics, 23(3), 471-492. 
Congressional Budget Office. (2013). Effects on Health Insurance and the Federal 
Budget for the Insurance Coverage Provisions in the Affordable Care Act—May 
2013 Baseline. Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office. Retrieved August 





Coughlin, T., & Long, S. (2000). Effects of Medicaid Managed Care on Adults. Medical 
Care, 38(4), 433-446. 
Coughlin, T., Long, S., & Graves, J. (2009). Does Managed Care Improve Access to Care 
for Medicaid Beneficiaries with Disabilities? A National Study. Inquiry, 395–407. 
Cowling, K., & Waterson, M. (1976). Price-cost margins and industry structure. 
Economic Journal, 43, 267-274. 
Creswell, J., & Abelson, R. (2013, August 13). New Laws and Rising Costs Create a 
Surge of Supersizing Hospitals. New York Times, p. B1. Retrieved from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/13/business/bigger-hospitals-may-lead-to-
bigger-bills-for-patients.html 
Cutler, D., & Reber, S. (1998). Paying for health insurance: the tradeoff between 
competition and adverse selection. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(2), 433-
466. 
Cutler, D., Dafny, L., & Ody, C. (2012). How Does Competition Impact the Quality of 




Dafny, L. (2009). Estimation and identification of merger effects: An application to 
hospital mergers. Journal of Law and Economics, 52(3), 523-550. 
Dafny, L. (2010). Are health insurance markets competitive? American Economic 
Review, 100, 1399-1431. 
Dafny, L., & Dranove, D. (2005). Do report cards tell people anything they don't already 
know? The case of Medicare HMOs. Cambridge, MA: NBER. 
Dafny, L., Duggan, M., & Ramanarayanan, S. (2011). Paying a premium on your 
premium: consolidation in the US health insurance industry. American Economic 
Review. 
Damiano, P., Elliott, M., Tyler, M., & Hays, R. (2004). Differential use of the CAHPS 0-
10 global rating scale by medicaid and commercial populations. Health Services 
and Outcomes Research Methodology, 5(3-4), 193-205. 
Davis, K., Collins, K., Schoen, C., & Morris, C. (1995). Choice matters: enrollees' views 
of their health plans. Health Affairs, 14(2), 99-112. 
DeLellis, N., & Ozcan, Y. (2013). Quality outcomes among efficient and inefficent 
nursing homes: a national study. Health Care Management Review, 38(2), 156-
165. 
Department of Justice. (1984). 1984 Merger Guidelines. Retrieved from 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/hmerger/11249.pdf 
Donabedian, A. (1965). Evaluating the quality of medical care. The Milbank Memorial 
Fund Quarterly, 44(3 Part 2), 166-206. 
Dranove, D., Gron, A., & Mazzeo, M. (2003). Differentiation and competition in HMO 
markets. Journal of Industrial Economics, 51(4), 433-454. 
194 
 
Dranove, D., Lindrooth, R., White, W., & Zwanziger, J. (2008). Is the impact of managed 
care on hospital prices decreasing? Journal of Health Economics, 27(2), 362–376. 
Dunn, A., & Shapiro, A. (2013). Do Physicians Possess Market Power? forthcoming. 
Encinosa, W., & Bernard, D. (2005). Hospital finances and patient safety outcomes. 
Inquiry, 42(1), 60-72. 
Enthoven, A. (1993). The history and principles of managed competition. Health Affairs, 
29(S1), 24-48. 
Farley, D., Short, P., Elliot, M., & Hays, R. (1999). The effects of a CAHPS report on the 
choice of Medicaid managed care plans. Abstract Book for the Associaiton of 
Health Services Research Meeting, 16, pp. 82-83. 
Federal Trade Commission. (2011, October 29). Statement of Antitrust Enforcement 
Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organizations Participating in the Medicare 
Shared Savings Program. 76, 209, 67026-67032. Federal Register. 
Federal Trade Commission. (2012). In the Matter of Fresenius Medical Care AG & Co. 
KGaA. Retrieved from http://ftc.gov/os/caselist/1110170/index.shtm 
Feldman, R., & Wholey, D. (2001). Do HMOs have monopsony power? International 
Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics, 1, 7-22. 
Feldman, R., Finch, M., Dowd, B., & Cassou, S. (1989). The demand for employment-
based health insurance plans. Journal of Human Resources, 24, 115-42. 
Felt-Lisk, S., Barrett, A., & Nyman, R. (2007). Public Reporting of Quality Information 
on Medicaid Health Plans. Health Care Financing Review, 28(3), 5-16. 
Fisher, E., Staiger, D., Bynum, J., & Gottlieb, D. (2007). Creating Accountable Care 
Organizations: The Extended Hospital Medical Staff. Health Affairs, 26(1), w44-
w57. 
French, M., & Popovici, I. (2011). That Instrument Is Lousy! In Search of Agreement 
When Using Instrumental Variables Estimation in Substance Use Research. 
Health Economics, 20(2), 127–146. 
Garrett, B., & Zuckerman, S. (2005). National Estimates of the Effects of Mandatory 
Medicaid Managed Care Programs on Health Care Access and Use, 1997-1999. 
Medical Care, 43(7), 649-657. 
Garrett, B., Davidoff, A., & Yemane, A. (2003). Effects of Medicaid Managed Care 
Programs on Health Services Access and Use. Health Services Research, 38(2), 
575-594. 
Gaynor, M. (2006). What do we know about competition and quality in health care 
markets? Foundations and Trends in Microeconomics, 2(6), 441-508. 
Gaynor, M. (2006). What do we know about competition in health care markets? 
National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Gaynor, M., & Town, R. (2012). Competition in Health Care Markets. In M. Pauly, T. 
McGuire, & P. e. Barros, Handbook of Health Economics, Volume II. North-
Holland. 
Gaynor, M., & Vogt, W. (2000). Antitrust and Competition in Health Care Markets. In e. 
J. Newhouse and A. Culyer, Handbook of Health Economics (pp. 1405-1487). 
Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier. 
195 
 
Gold, M., Mittler, J., Draper, D., & Rousseau, D. (2003). Participation of Plans and 
Providers in Medicaid and SCHIP Managed Care. Health Affairs, 22(1), 230-240. 
Government Accountability Office. (2003). Specialty Hospitals: Geographic Location, 
Services Provided, and Financial Performance GAO-04-167. Retrieved from 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/250/240210.pdf 
Government Accountability Office. (2003a). Specialty Hospitals: Geographic Location, 
Services Provided, and Financial Performance GAO-04-167. Retrieved from 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/250/240210.pdf 
Government Accountability Office. (2003b). Specialty Hospitals: Information on 
National Market Share, Physician Ownership, and Patients Served. Washington, 
DC. 
Gowrisankaran, G., & Town, R. (2003). Competition, payers, and hospital quality. Health 
Services Research, 38, 1403-1422. 
Gresenz, C. J.-R. (2004). ‘Updated Variable-Radius Measures of Hospital Competition. 
Health Services Research, 39, 417-430. 
Gruneir, A., Lapane, K., Miller, S., & Mor, V. (2007). Long-term care market 
competition and nursing home dementia special care units. Medical Care, 45(8), 
739-745. 
Haas-Wilson, D., & Garmon, C. (2011). Hospital Mergers and Competitive Effects: Two 
Retrospective Analyses. International Journal of the Economics of Business, 
18(1). 
Haas-Wilson, D., & Gaynor, M. (1998). Increasing Consolidation in Healthcare Markets: 
What are the Antitrust Policy Implications? Health Services Research, 33(5 (Part 
II)), 1403-1419. 
Harris, K. (2002). Can High Quality Overcome Consumer Resistance to Restricted 
Provider Access? Evidence from a Health Plan Choice Experiment. Health 
Services Research, 37(3), 551-571. 
Heckman, J. (1979). Sample selection bias as a specification error. Econometrica(47), 
153-161. 
Herring, B., & Adams, K. (2011). Using HMOs to serve the Medicaid population: what 
are the effects on utilization and does the type of HMO matter? Health 
Economics, 20(4), 446-60. 
Herring, B., & Adams, K. (2011). Using HMOs to serve the Medicaid population: what 
are the effects on utilization and does the type of HMO matter? Health 
Economics, 20(4), 446-60. 
Ho, K. (2009). Insurer Provider Networks in the Medical Care Market. The American 
Economic Review, 99(1), 393-430. 
Ho, K. (2009). Insurer-provider networks in the medical care market. American 
Economic Review, 99(1), 393-430. 
Ho, V., & Hamilton, B. (2000). Hospital mergers and acquisitions: Does market 
consolidation harm patients? Health Services research, 19(5), 767-791. 
Holahan, J., & Cook, A. (2009). Changes in Health Insurance Coverage, 2007-2008: 
Early Impact of the Recession. Kaiser Family Foundation. 
196 
 
Holahan, J., & Suzuki, S. (2003). Medicaid Managed Care Payment Methods and 
Capitation Rates in 2001. Health Affairs, 22(1), 204-218. 
Howard, D. (2005). Quality and consumer choice in healthcare: Evidence from kidney 
transplantation. Topics in Economic Analysis and Policy, 5(1), 1-20. 
Howell, E. A. (2012). Medicaid and CHIP Risk-Based Managed Care in 20 States: 
Experiences over the Past Decade and Lessons for the Future. Washington, DC: 
Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, US Department of Health and 
Human Services. Retrieved from 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/2012/riskbasedmanagedcare/rpt.shtml 
Howell, E., Palmer, A., & Adams, F. (2012). Medicaid and CHIP Risk-Based Managed 
Care in 20 States: Experiences Over the Past Decade and Lessons for the Future. 
Washington, D.C.: Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. 
In the Matter of Promedica Health System, Inc., Docket No. 9346 (US Federal Trade 
Commission 2011). 
Institute of Medicine. (2009). America's uninsured crisis: consequences for health and 
health care. Washington, DC: National Academy Press. 
Jin, G., & Sorenson, A. (2006). Information and consumer choice: the value of publicized 
health plan ratings. Journal of Health Economics, 25, 248-275. 
Kaiser Family Foundation. (2010). Medicaid and Managed Care: Key Data, Trends, and 
Issues. Washington, DC. 
Kaiser Family Foundation. (2010). Medicaid: A Primer. Washington, DC. 
Kaiser Family Foundation/Health Research and Education Trust. (2010). Employe 
rHealth Benefits 2010 Annual Survey.  
Keeler, E. M. (1999). The changing effects of competition on non-profit and for-profit 
hospital pricing behavior. Journal of Health Economics, 18(1), 69-86. 
Kessler, D., & McClellan, M. (2000). Is hospital competition socially wasteful? Qarterly 
Journal of Economics, 115(2), 577-615. 
Kirchoff, S. (2013). Physician practices: background, organization, and market 
concentration. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. 
Kleiner, S., Lyons, S., & White, W. (2012). Provider concentration in markets for 
physician services for patients with traditional Medicare. Health Management, 
Policy, and Innovation, 1(1), 3-18. 
Kocher, R., & Sahni, N. (2011). Hospitals' Race to Employ Physicians — The Logic 
behind a Money-Losing Proposition. New England Journal of Medicine, 364, 
1790-1793. 
Kolstad, J., & Chernew, M. (2009). Quality and consumer decision making in the market 
for health insurance and health care services. Medical Care Research and Review, 
66(1), 28S-52S. 
Kopit, W. (2004). Is there evidence that recent consolidation in the health insurance 
industry has adversely affected premuims? Health Affairs, 23(6), 29-31. 
Krishnan, R. (2001). Market restructuring and pricing in the hospital industry. Journal of 
Health Economics, 20, 213-237. 
197 
 
Lake, T., Kvam, C., & Gold, M. (2005). Literature review: Using quality informaiton for 
health care decisions and quality improvement. Mathematica Policy Research. 
AHRQ. 
Lako, C., Rosenau, P., & Daw, C. (2011). Switching health insurance plans: evidence 
from a random sample survey. Health Care Analysis, 19(4), 312-328. 
Lee, D., Chertow, G., & Zenios, S. (2010). Reexploring Differences among For-Profit 
and Nonprofit Dialysis Providers. Health Services Research, 45(3), 633-646. 
Lewis, M., & Pflum, K. (2011). Diangosing hospital system bargaining power in 
managed care networks. 
Lijesen, M. G. (2004). Adjusting the Herfindahl index for close substitutes: an 
application to pricing in civil aviation. Transportation Research Part E, 40, 123-
134. 
Liu, H., Phelps, C., Veazie, P., Dick, A., Klein, J., & Shone, L. N. (2009). Managed care 
quality of care and plan choice in New York SCHIP. Health Services Research, 
44(3), 843-861. 
Lo Sasso, A., & Freund, D. (2000). A Longitudinal Evaluation of the Effect of Medi-Cal 
Managed Care on Supplemental Security Income and Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children Enrollees in Two California Counties. Medical Care, 38(9), 
937–47. 
Long, S., Sette, R., & Wrightson, C. (1988). Employee premiums, availability of alternate 
plans, and HMO disenrollment. Medical Care, 26, 927-938. 
Luft, H., & Maerki, S. (1984-1985). Competitive Potential of Hospitals and Their 
Neighbors. Contemporary Policy Issues, 3, 89-102. 
Luft, H., Phibbs, C., Garnick, D., & Robinson, J. (1989). Rejoinder to Dranove and 
Shanley. Journal of Health Economics(8), 479-483. 
Lurie, N., Zhan, C., Sangl, J., Bierman, A., & S. E. (2003). Variation in racial and ethnic 
differences in consumer assessments of health care. American Journal of 
Managed Care, 9(7), 502-209. 
Lustig, J. (2010). Measuring welfare losses from adverse selection and imperfect 
competition in privatized Medicare. Boston University. 
Maeda, J., & Lo Sasso, A. (2012). The relationship between hospital market competition, 
evidence-based performance measures, and mortality for chronic hearlt failure. 
Inquiry, 49(2), 164-175. 
Maestas, N., Schroeder, M., & Goldman, D. (2009). Price variation in markets with 
homogenous goods: The case of Medigap. National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
Marquis, M., & Long, S. (1995). Worker demand for health insurance in the non-group 
market. Journal of Health Economics, 14, 47-63. 
Marquis, M., Buntin, M., Escarce, J., & Kapur, K. (2007). The role of product design in 
consumers' choices in the individual insurance market. Health Services Research, 
42(6 (Pt 1)), 2194-2223. 
Martin, A. L. (2011). Recession Contributes To Slowest Annual Rate Of Increase In 
Health Spending In Five Decades. Health Affairs, 30(1), 11-22. 
198 
 
McGuire, M. (1981). Price and membership in a prepaid group medical practice. Medical 
Care, 19, 172-183. 
McWilliams, J., Chernew, M., Zaslavsky, A., Hamed, P., & Landon, B. (2013). Delivery 
system integration and health care spending and quality for Medicare 
beneficiaries. JAMA Internal Medicine, 173(15), 1447-1456. 
Melnick, G. K. (2007). The Effects of Multi-Hospital Systems on Hospital Prices. 
Journal of Health Economics, 26, 400-413. 
Melnick, G., & Keeler, E. (2007). The Effects of Multi-Hospital Systems on Hospital 
Prices. Journal of Health Economics, 26, 400-413. 
Millett, C., Chattopadhyay, A., & Bindman, A. (2010). Unhealthy competition: 
conseequences of health plan choice in California Medicaid. American Journal of 
Public Health, 100(11), 2235-2240. 
Morales, L., Elliott, M., Weech-Maldonado, R., Spritzer, K., & Hays, R. (2001). 
Differences in CAHPS adult survey reports and ratings by race and ethnicity: an 
analysis of the National CAHPS benchmarking data 1.0. Health Services 
Research, 36(3), 595-617. 
Moriya, A., Vogt, W., & Gaynor, M. (2010). Hospital prices and health insurance 
markets: a review and research agenda. Health Economics, Policy and Law, 
5(04), 459-479. 
Moriya, A., Vogt, W., & Gaynor, M. (2010). Hospital prices and market structure in the 
hospital and insurance industries. Health Economics, Policy, and Law, 5(4), 459-
479. 
Mukamel, D., Zwanziger, J., & Tomaszewski, K. (2001). HMO penetration, competition, 
and risk-adjusted hospital mortality. Health Services Research, 36(6), 1019-1035. 
Mutter, R., Romano, P., & Wong, H. (2011). The effects of US hospital consolidation on 
hospital quality. International Journal of the Economics of Business, 18(1), 109. 
Naessens, J., Khan, M., Shah, N., Wagie, A., Pautz, R., & Campbell, C. (2008). Effect of 
premium, copayments, and health status on the choice of health plans. Medical 
Care, 46(10), 1033-1040. 
Nyman, J. (1988). The effect of competition on nursing home expenditures under 
prospective reimbursement. Health Services Research, 23(4), 555-574. 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. (2012). Competition for 
Hospital Services--United States. Retrieved from 
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/international/docs/1202comphospitalservices.pdf 
Parente, S., Feldman, R., & Christianson, J. (2004). Employee choice of consumer-driven 
health insurance in a multiplan, multiproduct setting. Health Services Research, 
39(4 (Pt 2)), 1091-1112. 
Pauly, M., & Herring, B. (2000). An efficient employer trategy for dealing with adverse 
selection in multple-plan offerings: an MSA example. Jouranl of Health 
Economics, 19(4), 513-528. 
Phibbs, C., & Robinson, J. (1993). ‘A Variable-Radius Measure of Local Hospital Market 
Structure. Health Services Research, 28, 313-324. 
Pizer, S., & Frakt, A. (2002). Payment Policy and Competition in the Medicare+Choice 
Program. Health Care Financing Review, 24(1), 83-94. 
199 
 
Robinson, J. (2004). Consolidation and the transformation of competition in health 
insurance. Health Affairs, 23(6), 11-24. 
Robinson, J. (2011). Hospital Market Concentration, Pricing, and Profitability in 
Orthopedic Surgery and Interventional Cardiology. American Journal of 
Managed Care, 17(6), e241-e248. 
Robinson, J. (2011). Hospital Market Concentration, Pricing, and Profitability in 
Orthopedic Surgery and Interventional Cardiology. American Journal of 
Managed Care, 17(6), e241-e248. 
Rogowski, J., Jain, A., & Escarce, J. (2007). 2007. Health Services Research, 42(2), 682-
705. 
Sacher, S., & Vitu, M. (2001). The competitive effects of a not-for-profit hospital merger: 
A case study. Journal of Industrial Economics, 49(`), 63-84. 
Scanlon, D., Chernew, M., & Lave, J. (1997). Consumer health plan choice: current 
knowledge and future directions. Annual Reviews of Public Health, 18, 507-528. 
Scanlon, D., Chernew, M., McLaughlin, C., & Solon, G. (2002). The impact of health 
plan report cards on managed care enrollment. Journal of Health Economics, 
21(1), 19-41. 
Scanlon, D., Chernew, M., Swaminathan, S., & Lee, W. (2006). Competition in health 
insurance markets: limitations of current measures for policy analysis. Medical 
Care Research and Review: MCRR, 63(6 Suppl), 37S-55S. 
Scanlon, D., Swaminathan, S., Chernew, M., & Lee, W. (2006). Market and plan 
characteristics related to HMO quality and improvement. Medical Care Research 
and Review, 63(6 (Suppl)), 56S-89S. 
Scanlon, D., Swaminathan, S., Lee, W., & Chernew, M. (2008). Does competition 
improve health care quality? Health Services Research, 43(6), 1931-1951. 
Scanlon, D., Swaminathan, S., Lee, W., & Chernew, M. (2008). Does competition 
improve health care qualtiy? Health Services Research, 43(6), 1931-1951. 
Schone, B., & Cooper, P. (2011). Assessing the impact of health plan choice. Health 
Affairs, 20(1), 267-275. 
Shartzer, A. (2013). Concentration in Health Care Markets and the Impact on Consumers. 
Unpublished dissertation. Johns Hopkins University Bloomberg School of Public 
Health. 
Shartzer, A. (2013). Health Insurance Competition: Its Impact on Consumers' 
Experiences. PhD Dissertation. Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public 
Health. 
Sheingold, S., Shartzer, A., & Ly, D. (2010). Variation and Trends in Medigap 
Premiums. Washington, DC: US Department of Health and Human Services, 
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation. 
Short, P., & Taylor, A. (1989). Prmeiums, beefits, and employee choice of health 
insurance options. Journal of Health Economics, 8, 293-311. 
Sisk, J. (1998). Increased competition and the quality of health care. The Milbank 
Quarterly, 76(4), 687-707. 
Smith, R., Cheung, R., Owens, P., Wilson, R., & Simpson, L. (2007). Medicaid markets 
and pediatric safety in hospitals. Health Services Research, 42(5), 1981-1998. 
200 
 
Smith, V., Giffort, K., Ellis, E., Rudowitz, R., O'Malley, M., & Marks, C. (2009). The 
Crunch Continues: Medicaid Spending, Coverage, and Policy in the Midst of a 
Recession, Results from a 50-state Medicaid Budget Survey for State Fiscal Years 
2009 and 2010. Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured. 
Sohn, M. (2002). A Relational Approach to Measuring Competition Among Hospitals. 
Health Services Research, 37(2), 457-482. 
Sohn, M., & Rathouz, P. (2003). Competition among hospitals and qualit of care: 
Hospital-level analsyis. 
Starc, A. (2010). Insurer pricing and consumer welfare: evidence from Medigap. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University. 
State Health Facts. (2010). Total Medicaid Spending, FY2008. Retrieved Feb 7, 2011, 
from http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparemaptable.jsp?ind=177&cat=4 
Thomas, L. (2004). Elaborating a dichotomous measure of enrollment choice--HMOs vs. 
FFS Plans. Social Work in Health Care, 38(4), 83-100. 
U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission. (2004). Improving Health 
Care: A Dose of Competition. Washington, DC. 
U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. (2010). Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines. Washington, DC. Retrieved from 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf 
U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2004). Medicaid Managed Care: Access and 
Quality Requirements Specific to Low-Income and Other Special Needs Enrollees. 
Washington, D.C. 
Ullman, R., Hill, J., Scheye, E., & Spoeri, R. (1997). Satisfaction and choice: A view 
from the plans. Health Affairs, 16(3), 209-217. 
United States v. Aetna Inc., No. 3-99CV 1398-H KH 17-18 (June 21, 1999). Retrieved 
from http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f2500/2501.pdf 
US Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justicce. (2004). Improving Health 
Care: A Dose of Competition. Washington, DC. 
Vogt, W., Town, R., & Williams, C. (2006). How has hospital consolidation affected the 
price and quality of hospital care? Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. 
Wedig, G., & Tai-Seale, M. (2002). The effect of report card on consumer choice in the 
health insurance market. Journal of Health Economics, 21(2), 1031-1048. 
Weech-Maldonado, R., Elliott, M., Oluwole, A., Schiller, K., & Hays, R. D. (2008). 
Survey Response Style and Differential Use of CAHPS Rating Scales by 
Hispanics. Medical Care, 46(9), 963-968. 
Welch, P., Stearns, S., Bindman, A., & Cuellar, A. (2013). Sharing the Shingle: The 
Growth of Physician Groups in the United STates. Health Affairs (forthcoming). 
Welch, W. (1986). The elasticity of demand for health maintenance organizations. 
Journal of Human Resources, 21, 252-266. 
Wholey, D., Feldman, R., & Christianson, J. (1995). The Effect of Market Structure on 
HMO Premiums. Journal of Health Economics, 14, 81-105. 
Wong, H., Zahn, C., & Mutter, R. (2005). Do Different Measures of Hospital 
Competition Matter in Empirical Investigations of Hospital Behavior? Review of 
Industrial Organization, 26, 61-87. 
201 
 
Wu, V. (2008). The Price EFfect of Hospital Closures. Inquiry, 45(3), 280-292. 
Zaslavsky, A., J.A., Z., Ding, L., JA, S., & al., e. (2001). Adjusting Performance 
Measures to Ensure Equitable Plan Comparisons. Health Care Financing Review, 
22(3), 109-126. 
Zwanziger, J., & Mooney, C. (2005). Has Competition Lowered Hospital Prices? Inquiry, 
42(1), 73-85. 
Zwanziger, J., Melnick, G., & Eyre, K. (1994). Hospitals and Antitrust: Defining 








3019 N. Toronto St. 
Phone 703-408-4656 Email adeleshartzer@gmail.com 
 
Experience 
U.S Department of Health and Human Services                  Washington, DC 
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation 
Program Analyst                October 2010-present 
 Conduct internal quantitative and qualitative evaluation of health care programs, including assessing 
alternatives to the sustainable growth rate and the determinants of the supply of Ambulatory Surgical 
Centers 
 Produce factual summaries and briefing information on health care programs at the request of the 
Assistant Secretary 
 Review and comment on proposed regulations and administrative documents  
 Assist with the development of regulations guiding healthcare reform implementation 
 
Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health       
Baltimore, MD 
Research Assistant                 March 
2009-present 
 Worked on an RWJF-funded project assessing the impact of incremental coverage expansions on 
uncompensated care spending and the uninsured rate, including development of the analytic file and 
regression analysis 
 Served as a student intern with U.S. DHHS assessing the availability of hospital resources to address 
the H1N1 influenza pandemic 
 Assisted with the interpretation of results from a study of geographic variations in inpatient hospital 
expenditures 
 
Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation                                                                                                            
Washington, DC  
Special Assistant to the Executive Vice President and Executive Director                    November 2005-
August 2008 
of the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured (KCMU)                                                       
 Collaborate with Diane Rowland to prepare the content of journal articles, congressional testimony, 
and presentations  
 Fulfill requests for information from Kaiser Family Foundation Trustees, KCMU Commission 
members, and other research requests from Dr. Rowland  
 Coordinate the Foundation’s initiatives related to the health care system in New Orleans after 
Katrina  
 Participate in design, analysis, and production of several internal research projects focused on health 
care in the Gulf Coast region after Katrina  
 Formulate Foundation materials, present findings at briefings, organize site visits, and monitor 
policy developments related to health care after Katrina  
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 Provide background information to journalists  
 Track health reform initiatives at the state and national level  
 Maintain an updated set of Kaiser Family Foundation graphics for presentations and publications  
 Coordinate intern recruiting process for policy programs  
 
Policy Analyst, Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured                                     July 2005-
November 2005  
 Tracked policy changes to state Medicaid programs  
 Assisted in the writing and editing of publications  
 Updated online reference library on Medicaid for www.kaiserEDU.org  
 Worked with outside contractors to research churning on and off health insurance using SIPP  
 
National Institute for Health Care Management Foundation                                                        
Washington, DC  
Research and Policy Analyst                                                                                                                 October 
2004-July 2005  
 Worked collaboratively in the implementation of three federal grants, including writing and editing 
of publications, conference development, and strategic planning for the grant  
 Wrote a CDC-funded report on health plan initiatives to address the obesity epidemic  
 Co-authored a background brief for an AHRQ-funded meeting on health information technology  
 Produced a HRSA-funded issue brief on children’s mental health  
 Managed the annual Health Care Journalism Award process  
 Oversaw two briefs in an “Expert Voices” series of publications addressing variations in health care 
quality and obesity  
 Participated in intern recruitment, website maintenance, and other administrative duties as necessary  
 Found and developed new grant proposals for Foundation research  
 Strategized about future projects and research and policy issues of interest to NIHCM Foundation  
 
Families USA                                                                                                                                                        
Washington, DC  
Research Associate                                                                                                                      September 
2003-August 2004  
• Provided research and writing for a published brief on the Health Coverage Tax Credit  
• Developed, led, and implemented a 50-state survey on the Medicaid component of fiscal relief in 
2003  
• Developed a published report on Medicaid’s economic impact in states and updated supervisors 
about state actions regarding Medicaid and SCHIP  
• Tracked changes in pharmaceutical prices during the transition to Medicare Part D discount cards  
• Coordinated a workshop session on hospital billing practices during annual conference  
• Analyzed health-related academic literature and provide summaries to supervisors  
 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention                
Atlanta, GA 
Summer Intern, Office of Human Research Protection                    July-
August 2002 
• Led a project to develop an institutional policy on conflicts of interest in public health research  








Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health                               Baltimore, MD  
Ph.D. in Health Policy and Management, Health Services Research Track                
Cumulative GPA 3.95 
Dissertation: “Health Insurance Competition: Its Impact On Consumers’ Access and 
Satisfaction” 
 
2003- 2005  
George Washington School of Public Health and Health Services    Washington, DC  
Masters of Public Health, Concentration in Health Policy        
 Cumulative GPA 3.97  
Special Project: “Health Savings Accounts: Overview and Policy Recommendations”  
 
1999-2003  
University of Virginia          Charlottesville, VA 
Bachelor of Arts, Echols Interdisciplinary Major in Bioethics       
Cumulative GPA 3.58 
 
Publications 
• D. Rowland and A. Shartzer, “The Statistics and the Backstory,” Journal of Law, 
Medicine & Ethics, November/December 2008  
• D. Rowland and A. Shartzer, “Existing Federal Programs as Building Blocks for 
Coverage Expansions,” forthcoming in National Voter Magazine  
• “Health Challenges for the People of New Orleans: The Kaiser Post-Katrina Baseline 
Survey,” Kaiser Family Foundation report #7659, July 2007  
• R. Rudowitz, D. Rowland, and A. Shartzer, “Health Care in New Orleans Before and 
After Hurricane Katrina,” Health Affairs 25(5): w393-w406, August 2006  
• M. Perry, A. Dulio, S. Artiga, A. Shartzer, and D. Rousseau, “Voices of the Storm: 
Health Challenges of Low-Income Katrina Survivors,” Kaiser Family Foundation 
report # 7538, August 2006  
• J. Lee and A. Shartzer, “Health IT and Workflow in Small Physician Practices,” 
NIHCM Foundation report funded by AHRQ, April 2005  
• “Health Plans Emerging as Pragmatic Partners in the Fight Against Obesity,” NIHCM 






• “Hospital and Beneficiary Factors Associated with 30-day All Cause Readmissions,” 
AcademyHealth Annual Research Meeting, June 23, 2013 
• “Medicaid Managed Care: Its Impact on Beneficiary Access and Experiences with 
Health Plans,” (Poster), AcademyHealth Annual Research Meeting, June 23, 2013 
• “Kaiser Family Foundation Research on Health Care in Post-Katrina New Orleans,” 
for the Government Accountability Office Health Care Team, November 2007, 
Washington, DC  
• “Medicaid, the Uninsured, and Health as a Campaign Issue,” for the International 
HIV/AIDS Education and Prevention Delegation, November 2007, Washington, DC  
• “Health Coverage in the United States,” for the Joel Fleishman Fellows in Public 
Policy from Duke University, October 2007, Washington, DC  
• “Who We Are and How We Work: Health Care in the Aftermath of Katrina,” Kaiser 
Family Foundation panel, October 2007, Washington, DC  
• “Health Care in New Orleans Before and After Hurricane Katrina,” New York 
University School of Law, February 2007 
 
Awards and Honors 
Johns Hopkins University 
• Alvin R. Tarlov and John E. Ware Jr. Doctoral Dissertation Award in Patient 
Reported Outcomes, 2011 
• Sandvold-Hydle Family Scholarship Recipient, 2011 
• AHRQ National Research Service Award (NRSA) Trainee, 2008-2010 
 
George Washington University  
• Department of Health Policy Award for Excellence in a Special Project  
• Dean’s Honors  
• Accepted to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Emerging 
Leaders Program  
 
University of Virginia  
• Jefferson Scholar  (Frank Gardiner Wisner St. Paul’s Scholar) 
• Echols Scholar  
• Intermediate Honors  
• Dean’s List  
• Order of Omega  
• Phi Eta Sigma 
206 
 
Activities and Service 
• Junior League of Washington, 2007-2013 
• Students Promoting Healthcare Reform (SPHERE), Vice President for Education, 
2009-2010 
• Jefferson Scholars Foundation Alumni Advisory Board, 2006-2010  
• DC Health Policy Young Professionals, 2006-2007  
• UVA Class of 2003 Reunions Planning Committee, 2007-2008  
• Jefferson Scholars Foundation, Washington DC/Suburban Maryland Regional 
Selection Committee Member, 2006-2007  
• FBC Alexandria Choir, Alto Section Leader, 2004-2007  
• 1869 Society (benefiting the Corcoran Museum of Art), 2006-2007 
